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ABSTRACT 
 
WHY DOES PLATO’S LAWS EXIST? 
Harold Graham Parker, III 
Susan Sauvé Meyer 
If the ideal city described at length in Plato’s Republic is a perfect and 
philosophically attractive encapsulation of Plato’s political philosophy, why does Plato 
go on to write the Laws – which also describes an ideal city, albeit one very different 
from the Republic? The fundamental challenge of scholarship concerning the Laws is to 
supply a comprehensive account of the dialogue that explains all aspects of it while also 
distinguishing the Laws from the Republic in a way that does not devalue the Laws as a 
mere afterthought to the Republic. Past attempts at meeting this challenge, I argue, can be 
classified under the headings of the democratic, legal, and demiurgic approaches. 
Although each is prima facie plausible, each also faces its own set of problems. 
Furthermore, none are truly capable of explaining the Laws in its full specificity; the 
intricate array of customs, regulations, and practices making up the life of the city 
described form a complex totality not reducible to the concept of democracy, the rule of 
law, or demiurgy. 
Instead, I propose a fundamentally new approach to interpreting the Laws, the 
systematic approach, which I claim is responsive to the deepest and most innovative 
tendencies within the dialogue. Specifically, the proper way of conceiving the shift from 
the Republic to the Laws, I argue, lies in Plato replacing the concept of “cadre” in the 
former with the concept of a self-governing “system” in the latter. As I deploy these 
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notions, a cadre is a small group of specially qualified individuals, while a system is a 
large population whose members or constituents affect, and interact with, one another in 
orderly ways. Each of these concepts gives rise to a corresponding model of government. 
Under the cadre model, all power is assigned to a small minority of specially qualified 
individuals, and under the system model, power is periodically rotated between members 
of a group in accordance with both laws and the extra-legal patterns of social and cultural 
norms. I use this framework to mount a series of linked investigations into various 
aspects of the society described in the Laws.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. The problem under consideration 
 Why does Plato’s last dialogue, the Laws, exist?1 Or worse yet, does it exist? The 
underlying subject of the dialogue – describing at length an ideal society – is certainly a 
subject worthy of human intellectual interest. Indeed, Plato’s more famous dialogue, the 
Republic, shares this topic. Yet at the same time, the existence of this dialogue – 
triumphant, complete in itself, and philosophically attractive – hardly calls for 
justification. It is, in a word, καλή. But if the Republic is perfect, complete, and “classic” 
in every way, then its self-assured triumph is so much the worse for the Laws. If the 
Republic already exists, why, then, does the Laws exist? And if the Republic exists, does 
the Laws even really exist?  
One could grant that the Laws exists perhaps as a mere adjunct to the Republic, or 
as a workmanlike exercise in practicality from the Republic’s template, or even as an 
expression of Plato’s senility and waning powers, but each of these options is just a way 
of denying that the Laws really exists in the first place.2 They are to consign the Laws to 
the embarrassment and decadence and imperfection of the post-classical – proof of 
                                                            
1 The best bibliographical guide to scholarship on the Laws is Saunders and Brisson, Bibliography on 
Plato’s Laws. Unless otherwise specified, I will use the English translation of the Laws by Saunders 
contained in Plato, Complete Works. Additionally, there exists a useful English translation of the Laws by 
Tom Griffith, edited by Malcolm Schofield: Plato: Laws, Griffith and Schofield. The most authoritative 
Greek text is that Des Place, found together with a French translation in Des Places, Platon: Oeuvres 
Complètes. The Greek of the Oxford Classical Text is useful as well. Plato and Burnet, Platonis Opera. T. 
5.A useful commentary (as well as a German translation) can be found in Schöpsdau, Nomoi. Finally, 
another useful commentary and English translation, unfortunately only of the first two books of the Laws, 
can be found in Meyer, Plato. 
2 Other ways of denying that the Laws – as a complete, unified, and organized work – even exists would be 
the separate work-fragmenting suggestions of Müller and Schofield. The former analyzes the Laws as a 
“Zwitter” without a single, clear essence, and the former claims to identify multiple, distinct “projects” at 
work in the Laws. Müller quoted in Morrow, “The Demiurge in Politics,” 6. Schofield, “The Laws’ two 
projects.”. 
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Plato’s dual existence as both philosopher and individual, i.e., the merely biological 
continuation of the eternal thinker and author of the Republic, itself an eternal work of 
which the Laws would be merely a contingent emanation. The Republic and Laws would 
then correspond to Plato philosophus and Plato comicus.3 Even if Plato comicus, in a 
sense, authored Plato philosophus, it is most certainly Plato philosophus, and not Plato 
comicus, who authored the Republic. There is no reason to believe any subsequent work 
has the same author in the sense I mean, short of establishing this fact by reference to the 
work. 
 So why, indeed, does Plato’s Laws exist? Such a question can be answered in two 
different ways. On the one hand, we can answer this question with regard to Plato the 
historical individual (“Plato comicus”). In other words, we can inquire about events in the 
personal biography of Plato with a view toward explaining his decision to author the 
Laws.4 Yet such a line of inquiry is alien to academic philosophy except to the extent it 
serves as an indirect way of answering other questions falling within its proper domain. 
After all, the Laws would remain interesting and would remain a “problem” even if it 
were authored by someone besides Plato. On the other hand, we can answer this question 
in a resolutely work-focused way. What is the raison d’être, we might ask, of the work 
itself? (Forget the raisons of the author.) Or, to put it in Aristotelian terms, what is the 
τέλος of the Laws – i.e., what immanent governing principle informs and makes it the 
way it is, as distinct from a set of external reasons? In the Laws, when the Athenian asks 
                                                            
3 In addition to the philosopher by name of Plato, there was also a contemporaneous comic poet by the 
same name. These two figures are often distinguished as Plato philosophus and Plato comicus. Here, 
however, I am using the latter phrase to refer to Plato the historical individual, as opposed to “Plato” the 
thinker/author constructible from texts. 
4 Cf. Morrow: “No one can study the Laws critically without asking what Plato was trying to do when he 
wrote it.” Morrow, “The Demiurge in Politics,” 5. 
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Kleinias and Megillus about the purported divine authorship of the law-codes at Sparta 
and Crete, what he is asking them to exhibit is the underlying spirit or overall rationale at 
work in these law-codes – their τάξις. All questions of scholarship concerning the Laws 
are ultimately subordinated to this question, the fundamental question. The present 
dissertation is an attempt to answer it. 
 Before giving that answer, I will first canvass the general outlines of the societies 
of the Republic and Laws, focusing on the elements most useful to my framework. Next, I 
will describe other popular approaches in the secondary literature before proceeding to 
describe my own, using examples from the subsequent chapters in this dissertation. 
Afterwards, I will compare my approach with others in the secondary literature. Finally, I 
will set out the plan for the rest of my dissertation carrying out this approach in the form 
of three studies. 
In the Republic, a small group of elite “philosopher-kings” preside as absolute 
rulers of the “kallipolis.” They reign in virtue of the unerring knowledge of the good they 
are intended to possess. This knowledge both imparts to them the capacity to rule and 
endows them with the title to rule the rest of the city (540a-b). They rule without the 
intermediation of laws or checks.5 Only this group rules; indeed, the exclusivity of their 
rule follows from the very conception of justice in the Republic as “doing one’s own 
work” (433a). They are selected for this role after considerable scrutiny and preparation, 
which takes the form of biological eugenics, character diagnostics, and considerable 
                                                            
5 True, Plato does sometimes use expressions in the Republic like “the laws and the ways of life of the city” 
(484b-c), but “laws” in this connection appears to function as little more than a synonym for the kind of 
πολιτεία he deems most suitable. Other apparent allusions to legality, etc., in the Republic can be best 
explained in the same or similar ways which leave the central claim untouched. Cf. n. 19, below. 
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periods of careful education (502c ff.). In summary, the strategy of governance 
appropriate to the Republic is the exclusive empowering of a small group as rulers who 
are in turn made as excellent rulers as possible. Meanwhile, the vast majority of the 
population plays no effective role in the governance of the polis. The “guardians,” as they 
are called, appear to possess absolute power within the basic structure of the state. 
In the Laws, power is more widely distributed: there exists a variety of different 
political offices. The chief power-exercising bodies are the nomophylakes (752d-755b), 
the council (756b-758d), and the assembly (763e-764b). Other magistrates include priests 
(759b-d), local wardens for the market, city, and country (760b-763e), and various 
educational officials (765a-766c). These magistracies are mostly filled by elections to 
which nearly everyone has some form of input or access.6 A system of popular courts 
completes the set of political institutions of Magnesia (766d-768e). In sum, instead of 
being ruled by omnicompetent philosopher-kings, the citizens themselves take turns 
governing and being governed, and they do, at least in part, in the style of the traditional 
Greek polis. In addition to the political institutions, an intricate body of religious rites, 
social customs, and sundry usages and practices (e.g., organized dances in 771a-772a, 
communal meals in 779d-783b, etc.) — again, partly in the style of the traditional polis, 
even if significantly redesigned by Plato — adorns the life of the city.7 Most importantly, 
there exists no small class analogous to the philosopher-kings of the Republic: i.e., there 
exists no small class which is cognitively enriched to the maximum extent and then 
empowered to the maximum extent. Nevertheless, there is still a pronounced interest in 
                                                            
6 I discuss these elections at length in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. 
7 I discuss various “cultural” aspects of the Laws in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
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moral character and cognitive enrichment and distributing power according to attainment 
in these respects. Finally, there exists a kind of remnant-version of the philosopher-kings 
of the Republic called the nocturnal council. This council is made up of the most 
philosophically capable elders of the city and is given important, if vague, responsibilities 
(951a-952d, 960b-969c).8 
 
1.2. A survey of the secondary literature 
 The question I want to answer is why the Laws exists.  In other words, how can 
we (a) best describe and organize the ways in which it differs from the Republic and 
constitutes its own unity, and (b) explain the evident appearl associated with this set of 
changes? Before enumerating and discussing a variety of attempts by individual scholars 
to answer these questions, I will describe three general ways the shift could be 
characterized – namely, the (i) democratic approach, (ii) the legal approach, or (iii) the 
demiurgic approach. Needless to say, individual scholars may belong to the same general 
approach but still differ with one another; likewise, the approaches can be combined in 
various ways. While I think each approach is valid pro tanto, none of them, I argue, can 
fully answer (a) and (b).  Here I will describe each and identify some problems with it. 
Subsequently, I will describe my own approach, the systematic, and explain how I think 
it solves the problems with each of the other three. 
 
1.2.1. The democratic approach 
                                                            
8 The nocturnal council is the subject of Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. 
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In the Laws Plato appears to espouse a markedly more democratic way of 
proceeding than he does in the Republic. After all, in the Republic there are no 
democratic ways of assigning power whatsoever, and in addition, the form of government 
of democracy comes under specific criticism in Book VIII and other places.9 In the Laws, 
by contrast the electoral devices of election and lot figure many times – for instance, the 
members of the council and nomophylakes are partially elected, and the members of the 
council are also partially selected by lot.10 In addition, daily life in the Laws partakes of a 
more “activist” character in general according to which citizens are called upon to 
exercise their own powers and make decisions for the good of the community.11 Thus, to 
the extent we are interested in an account of the Laws which comprehensively explains it 
and distinguishes it from the Republic, the concept of democracy seems promising. 
However, there are two reasons to reject the democratic approach, even while 
assenting to it pro tanto, from the perspective of (a) and (b) above. First, it does not 
capture the rich specificity of the Laws, especially the intricate array of customs, 
regulations, and practices making up Magnesian life – all in all, a complex totality in no 
way reducible to the concept of democracy as the distinguishing element from the 
Republic. Many of these things are orthogonal to the question of democracy, and some of 
them are even anti-democratic. For instance, the complex system of incentives in place 
for electing the council is anti-democratic, and the memorial culture of Magnesia is 
                                                            
9 Many portions of the Republic (as well as Plato’s corpus as a whole) admit of an anti-democratic reading. 
The most explicit is in 555b-562a. 
10 The election of the nomophylakes is discussed in Chapter 2, and that of the council is discussed in 
Chapter 3. 
11 For examples of what I mean, see “social enforcement” in Chapter 5. 
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neither pro-democratic nor anti-democratic.12 Some aspects, like the “social 
enforcement” I describe in Chapter 5, are appropriate to the historical reality of 
contemporaneous Greek democracy, but not captured by the bare concept of 
democracy.13 Thus, we must look for supplementary resources if we want to best 
characterize why the Laws exists. 
Second, the term democracy is a problematic term of analysis for tackling the 
shift from the Republic to the Laws. It highlights contingent sociology instead of marking 
out what is of fundamental political concern from Plato’s perspective. Namely, the term 
implies that the δῆμος or “people” is the group possessed of κράτος or “power” in 
government, but this is not the most important characteristic of government from Plato’s 
perspective.14 For Plato, it is irrelevant whether the ruling-element of society is an 
individual monarch, a small clique of families, or the popular δῆμος. Rather, as he claims 
in the Statesman, the most important characteristic of government is – regardless of its 
formal character – whether or not it empowers those with the knowledge and art of 
ruling. Only a government satisfying this criterion is correctly called a “government” 
(πολιτεία) at all; other attempts to rule are merely “imitations” of government.15 So to 
                                                            
12 This is analyzed at length in Chapter 5. I also explain it to some extent subsequently in this chapter. 
13 Monoson advocates precisely the former sense of democracy and thus brings to light various 
“democratic” aspects of Plato’s Republic (the Laws is incidental to her main project). However, as correct 
as Monoson undoubtedly is in this regard, it also seems true that Plato himself did not necessarily think of 
democracy in this way. I discuss Monoson further below. Monoson, Plato’s Democratic Entanglements. 
14 It is also an inadequate basis for the understanding of contemporaneous Attic democracy. For 
representatives of a different view of actually-existing Athenian democracy, see Balot, Greek Political 
Thought; Ober, The Athenian Revolution. 
1515 See Stm., 259a-b, for the related fundamental claim (familiar enough in the Socratic-Platonic context) 
that only whoever has knowledge relevant to the profession of x ought to be properly called by its name. 
Thus, most government-names (democracy, oligarchy, etc.) are irrelevant to the extent they do not specify 
whether those with power possess or do not possess the knowledge relevant to statesmanship (291d-293e). 
Only constitutions (politeiai) which empower the knowledgeable should even be called politeiai (293d-e). 
Everything else is just an imitation (293e). In Magnesia, the empowered officials and institutes are meant to 
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call the Laws “more democratic” than the Republic is to plot the two, albeit appropriately, 
along a rather inappropriate axis. 
 
1.2.2. The legal approach 
What would be a more appropriate axis? The Statesman itself gives us a possible 
clue: some imitations are deemed “for the better” and others “for the worse.” 
Specifically, it is the presence of law that distinguishes imitations “for the better” from 
those “for the worse.”16 The best form of government – the one by those with the 
knowledge and art of ruling – cannot be bound by law at all.17 Since the society of the 
Laws certainly features a number of, well, laws, goes to great lengths to inculcate a kind 
of spirit of law-abiding in general, and is described in Book V as only the “second-best” 
form of government,18 it would be tempting to take “law” as the successor-concept to 
“democracy” in our attempt to formulate an account that satisfactorily explains the Laws 
contrast to the Republic.19 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
have knowledge, but these does not exist some pre-government group x which has knowledge such that the 
government of Magnesia can be labeled “government by x” in the style of an oligarchy or democracy.s 
16 See Stm., 293e. 
17 See Stm., 294a. This fact has to do with the limitations of the law-form, described below. 
18 I will discuss this passage under the heading of the “demiurgic approach” below. 
19 Such is the totemic allure of the law-form that Barker even goes so far as to call Magnesia the “law-
state.” Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 374. Cf. Sabine: “As the name of the dialogue indicates, the 
Laws was written in an attempt to restore law to the place which it occupied in the moral estimation of the 
Greeks and from which Plato had tried to remove it.” Sabine, A History of Political Theory, 77. At the same 
time, law – and the rhetoric of law, legislation, etc. – is not absent from the Republic. Meyer cites many 
examples in “Plato and the Law:” e.g., Rep. 425e and 452c. However, none of them truly anticipate the 
thoroughgoing concern with, centrality of, and reliance on, the law-form we find in the Laws. For instance, 
in Rep. 425e, the law-form is implicitly denigrated in comparison with the judgment of wise and good men. 
In other cases (such as Rep. 452c), apparent talk of “laws” really only denotes an emphasis on elements of 
the kallipolis that depart from existing Greek reality (such as the inclusion of women in the public sphere). 
Meyer, “Plato on the Law,” 373. 
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 Unfortunately, there are three problems with this approach – call it the “legal 
approach.” The first two arise directly from Plato’s repeated and emphatic critique of the 
law-form considered in isolation. Plato claims in the Statesman that the law, due to (i) 
“dissimilarities between human beings and their actions” and (ii) “the fact that practically 
nothing in human affairs ever remains stable,” cannot hope to successfully “embrace 
what is best and most just for all at the same time.” The “simple decisions” codified in 
law will prove problematic inasmuch as “it is impossible for what is perpetually simple to 
be useful in relation to what is never simple.”20 
Second, Plato claims in Book VI of the Laws that, regardless of the intrinsic 
excellence of a set of laws, electing incompetent or unsuitable officials into power will 
bring disaster. At best, these officials will waste the “good laws” with risible results. At 
worst, they will pervert them to an end positively destructive to the state, and “the state 
will find that its laws are doing it damage and injury on a gigantic scale” (751b-c). The 
disturbing ease with which even “good laws” can be nullified or transformed into their 
opposite demonstrates both the fragility of laws tout court and the necessity they be 
supplemented with a reliable method of producing and selecting capable individuals to 
place at their helm. 
 Third, as we saw with the deficiency of the democratic approach above, there are 
many distinctive aspects of life in Magnesia which go uncaptured by this description – 
for example, the preambles to the laws, social enforcement, the provision of communal 
messes for women as well as men, and so on. However, even as the legal approach fails 
to adequately describe the specificity of the Laws in its entirety, it is nonetheless 
                                                            
20 See Stm., 294b-c. 
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substantially correct. Indeed, I view the approach put forward in this dissertation – the 
systematic approach – as a supplement and transformed version of the legal approach. I 
aim to describe what Plato is doing in the Laws as in part a response to his own critique 
of the law-form as well a combination of the law-form with certain extra-legal 
improvements nonetheless germane to the legal approach: an attempt to make the law-
form work given the advantages and disadvantages of groups of actually-existing agents 
who are cognitive, affective, and practical. However, before discussing this in more 
detail, let us turn to the last general approach to theorizing the relationship between the 
Republic and the Laws.  
 
1.2.3. The demiurgic approach 
 It is popular to regard the Laws as a less ideal – or indeed as a “second best” – 
version of the Republic. In particular, a famous passage in Book V (739c-e) seems to 
make precisely that claim. After proposing the establishment of a certain city which the 
Athenian calls “best,” he announces instead the development in what is to follow of a city 
he calls "second best” (739c-e). Many interpret this as a coded – or straightforward – 
reference to the Republic along with a manifesto of the Laws: it is to be the “second best” 
city after the Republic.21 Let us therefore call the approach which emphasizes Plato’s 
demiurgy as the key concept in an account explaining the Laws in its entirety and 
                                                            
21 E.g., Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 335; Kahn, Plato and the Post-Socratic Dialogue, 229. On 
the other hand, Bobonich is a notable dissenter. Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and 
Politics, 10–12.  
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valuably distinguishing it from the Republic. The concept of demiurgy is borrowed from 
the primarily cosmological dialogue of about the same time as the Laws, the Timaeus.22 
There are three responses that could be made to this way of analyzing the Laws. 
First, it should be noted that the demiurgic approach comes perilously close to a 
statement of support for the inexistence of the Laws. After all, the Laws would only exist 
as a pale imitation of the Republic, and we know how Plato feels about imitations. Of 
course, advocates of the demiurgic approach may not begrudge that outcome if they think 
that their approach is indeed the most textually and conceptually sound one. 
Nevertheless, to the extent that we have a regulative interest in approaches to the Laws 
which claim that it does exist, we have reason to disfavor in our investigations the 
demiurgic approach as presently constituted. 
Second, the demiurgic approach relies upon a mistaken interpretation of the 
passage in Book V. In particular, it glosses over the communist criterion adduced to 
separate the best from the second best city (739c-e). This criterion simply does not do the 
work many interpreters of the dialogue suppose it to do. In the Republic, only the 
guardians partake of communism, not the rest of the citizens; thus, given this crucial 
limitation in the scope of the Republic’s communism, it is incorrect to peremptorily 
identify the Republic with the “best” society conjectured in Book V of the Laws.23 
Furthermore, a great number of other facts about the society in the Republic testify to its 
not being the best society possible: e.g., its inevitable decline (546a ff.), infanticide 
                                                            
22 According to this dialogue, a divine “craftsman” (dêmiourgos) fashions the world in the likeness of some 
divine model using the imperfect material at his disposal. Thus, I use the word “demiurgic” to characterize 
the approach oriented to the ways in which the society of the Laws “falls short” of some more perfect 
model on which it is nonetheless based. See Timaeus, passim. 
23 I repeat the main points in this argument put forward by Bobonich. Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast: His 
Later Ethics and Politics, 10–12. 
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(459d, 460b-c, etc.), the need to lie to its citizens (382c-d, 389b ff., 459c., etc.), and the 
clumsy mechanisms necessary to avoid incest (461e). Of course, this is not, at the same 
time, to deny that the Republic, at least according to certain metrics, is “better” than the 
Laws. Rather, it is to deny that the two governments are such as to be tidily ranked “best” 
and “second best.” Additionally, as Aristotle might remind us, to the extent we are 
practically concerned beings we will be primarily interested in the conception of the good 
that is πρακτός.24 Thus, any account of the Laws which makes it more “practical” but less 
“fine” in comparison with the Republic should not be viewed as a wholly derogatory 
determination.25 
Finally, to assert the Laws is the “second best” of the Republic is not to make a 
contentful assertion regarding the specificity of the Laws. To assert “The Laws is like the 
Republic, but less so” is simply to say nothing at all about the dialogue as such.26 To 
reduce the statement of the nature of the Laws to the second best of the Republic is to fail 
to describe the Laws in itself and, at best, to substitute what is only a proprium for an 
account. 
 
1.2.4. Individual authors in the secondary literature 
                                                            
24 See E.E., 1218a-b or E.N., 1096b. For English and Greek versions of these texts, see Aristotle and 
Woods, Eudemian Ethics. Books I, II, and VIII; Aristotle, Walzer, and Mingay, Aristotelis Ethica Eudemia; 
Crisp, Nicomachean Ethics; Bywater, Aristoteles Ethica Nicomachea. 
25 Thus, Schofield characterizes one of the two projects at work in the Laws as an “idealizing” one and the 
other as “trying to cope with human beings as they actually are.” Schofield, “The Laws’ two projects.” 
26 Above, I emphasized that the demiurgic approach risks denying that the Laws even exists. Here I make 
the somewhat derivative point that it also supplies an insufficient account of why the Laws exists. Of 
course, partisans of the demiurgic approach content with the former will find no cause for dissatisfaction in 
the latter. 
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The “systematic approach” which it is the task of this dissertation to expound by 
means of three linked studies27 builds on – while also supplementing, extending, and 
revising – some of the most significant works on the Laws in recent scholarship: 
specifically, those of Morrow, Bobonich, and Laks. 
In his magisterial Plato’s Cretan City (1960), Morrow offers a comprehensive 
interpretation of every detail of the new society in the Laws from the analytic perspective 
that such a society is the synthesis of contemporaneous Greek historical materials with 
Platonic philosophical principles.28 Morrow analyzes the Laws as a “deliberate and 
sustained effort on Plato's part to illustrate how a philosopher-legislator would proceed, 
using the materials at his disposal in Greek life.”29 Morrow’s general approach (the 
demiurgic par excellence) – which I would hardly dare to refute so much as revise or 
supplement – also shows the pitfalls of regarding the Laws as the second best of the 
Republic. While Morrow successfully makes the case for the fact of demiurgy, as well as 
the “logic” of such a thing, so to speak, his account is incomplete, I contend, without 
attending to the very rationale according to which what is demiurgically utilized is 
potentially useful.30 
Ryan Balot in his comprehensive study of contemporaneous classical Greece, 
Greek Political Thought (2006), provides me with important evidence in assessing the 
                                                            
27 The first “study” is carried out in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, the second in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, 
and the third in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. 
28 An excellent article by Morrow, The Demiurge in Politics, provides an incisive philosophical précis of 
this idea. 
29 Morrow, “The Demiurge in Politics,” 20. 
30 Attending to such a rationale – under the aegis of the systematic approach – necessitates a modification 
of demiurgy as traditionally understood. To that end, I will distinguish between what I call concessionary 
demiurgy and creative demiurgy, and I will claim that the latter in particular characterizes Plato’s enterprise 
in the Laws. Creative demiurgy is the mode of demiurgy attuned to the advantages, in addition to the 
drawbacks, of material. 
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specificity of Plato’s demiurgic utilization of historical circumstances. In particular, Balot 
emphasizes the “culture of participation” along with the widespread “respect for the 
capacities of individuals” and recognition of the “human importance of free political 
associating” in the contest of the Athenian polis.31 These elements also – along with 
Balot’s additional emphasis in the same context on the supra-legal concept of the good 
life and infra-legal focus on the character of citizens – go part of the way to illuminating 
why the Laws cannot be neatly assimilated to the legal approach as what distinguishes it 
from the Republic by providing contemporaneous evidence for aspects of society that 
also characterize the Laws. Likewise, the analytic emphasis of Ober on actually-existing 
Athenian democracy as a “sociopolitical” rather than a “constitutional” phenomenon is an 
aid to understanding the roundabout and trans-institutional character of the politeia of the 
Laws.32 
In Plato’s Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics (2002), Bobonich takes 
Plato’s view of the capacities of ordinary citizens (i.e., non-philosophers) as the central 
pivot on the basis of which to understand to Laws.33 The putative existence of “increased 
optimism” on Plato’s part would certainly be relevant to his political-philosophy, 
detracting from the strength of the “philosopher-king” thesis and perhaps motivating a 
more “Protagorean” picture, one version of which could even be the set of political 
institutions we find in the Laws.34 I will say more on the relational possibilities of the 
                                                            
31 Balot, Greek Political Thought, 15, 49. 
32 Ober, The Athenian Revolution, 114, passim. 
33 Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics. 
34 For the thesis, see R., 473c-e. For the picture, see Prt., 320c-323a. 
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systematic approach and Bobonich’s thesis both below in this Introduction and in the 
rest of the dissertation. 
 In Médiation et coercition: pour une lecture des lois de Platon (2005), Laks 
describes the Laws as “une oeuvre relationnelle” (in regard to the Republic) and proposes 
three different ways of conceptualizing that relation: completion, revision, and 
realization.35 He argues that realization is the most appropriate way of conceptualizing 
the relation although in certain respects revision might be more appropriate. Laks 
suggests that the Laws presents a set of laws and institutions which are “humainement 
parlant, les meilleures possibles.”36 Those of the Republic, by contrast, are simply not 
possible for human beings.37 Thus, the Laws seen in this way is a kind of realization, 
rather than a real revision of the Republic. Yet Laks also argues that so great is the gulf 
between the gods and humans that the category of realization may even be inadequate to 
describe the relation between the two dialogues. Rather, the Laws “se presentment moins 
comme la réalisation d’un modèle que comme un modèle d’un autre type.”38 In this 
sense, there is something immitigably revisionary about the Laws. In sum, Laks claims 
that we should see the Laws as neither an instance of revision nor realization per se, but 
rather as a “changement d’un niveau (divin) à l’autre (humain).”39 
                                                            
35 Laks, Médiation et Coercition, 33. Completion and revision are self-explanatory. By realization, Laks 
means “l’inscription d’un modèle donné dans un matériau qui ne lui est pas nécessairement adapté, et lui 
impose ses conditions.” Clearly, realization, then, is a form of demiurgy. Note that a relational work of 
realization may only partially perform the actual work of realization; rather, to qualify what it must do is 
“du moins la première étape (de nature encore théorique) sur la voie d’une telle realization.” Ibid., 41. 
36 Laks, Médiation et Coercition, 45. 
37 Thus, Laks must argue that passages in the Republic apparently asserting the possibility of the kallipolis 
assert something like “possibility tout court” and not “possibility for us.” Ibid., 79–85. Cf. Davis, “On the 
Imputed Possibilities of Callipolis and Magnesia.” 
38 Laks, Médiation et Coercition, 42. 
39 Ibid. 
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 Furthermore, the key concept Laks find operative in the Laws between 
“optimisme de principe” and “pessimissime de fait” is that of mediation.40 It is the job of 
the legislator to “mediate” between the perfect model strictly unrealizable by human 
beings and the human beings themselves. An important part of this mediation consists in 
the problematization of the law, especially as they are outfitted with preambles.41 Yet 
everywhere in the Laws there exists, according to Laks, “un certain retrait,” given the all-
too-human nature of the Magnesians.42 
 Monoson seeks to complicate Plato’s ostensibly simple – and negative – view of 
democracy, substituting for the received wisdom a verdict of distinct ambivalence on 
Plato’s part.43 To do this, she relies upon a fuller vision of democracy than the mere 
concept, one supplemented by the contemporaneous rituals, performances, and practices 
of actually-existing Athenian democracy.44 This approach is certainly compatible with 
the systematic, and I will reserve some critical comments for below. Schofield, too, casts 
a salutary light on the way religious festivals, etc., perform an ideological role in 
Magnesia as well as the ways in which the Laws embodies an “Athenian” rather than a 
“Socratic” paternalism in which pride in the openness of society and the autonomy of 
citizens to make up their own mind plays an important role.45 
Finally, Samaras also attempts to analyze the shift from the Republic to the Laws 
with reference to the concept of democracy. He does not see the passage as one of a 
                                                            
40 Ibid., 169. 
41 Laks extensively discusses the role of preambles. Ibid., 21, 93–165. 
42 Ibid., 36. 
43 Monoson, Plato’s Democratic Entanglements. 
44 Likewise, Prauscello analyzes the specifically choral performances in the Laws as rituals with desired 
political effects. Prauscello, Performing Citizenship in Plato’s Laws. 
45 Schofield, Plato. 
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simple evaluative reordering: rather, democracy goes from a “politically inefficient and 
morally destructive form of government” to something which could “contribute, at least 
to some degree, towards the best humanly achievable Greek city.”46 Thus, Samaras is 
interested in Plato’s use of democracy as a tool in Plato’s hands (cf. Morrow); he includes 
in his analysis of power both the “formal” distribution of power and the “informal” 
distribution of power.47 
 
1.3. The systematic approach 
From law to system 
It is precisely here, therefore, that I would like to introduce my own concept – 
“system” – as the successor-concept to “law” as what best characterizes Magnesia in 
comparison with the kallipolis. The “system” concept is at the heart of what I call the 
“systematic” approach, which I argue is preferable to the legal approach inasmuch as it 
(i) overcomes the bad generality and (ii) fragility of the law-form which mar the legal 
approach. Additionally, it (iii) accounts for those elements of the specificity of the Laws 
not captured by the legal approach. The systematic approach also solves problems 
associated with the democratic and demiurgic approaches. 
 
Cadre vs. system 
 The relevant contrastive concept to that of system is the “cadre.” I claim that the 
nature of the shift between the Republic and Laws is best captured by the distinction 
                                                            
46 Samaras, Plato on Democracy, 349. 
47 Ibid., 234–35. 
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between “cadre” and “system.”  As I deploy these notions, a cadre is a small group of 
specially qualified individuals, while a system is a large population whose members or 
constituents affect, and interact with, another in orderly ways. Each of these concepts 
gives rise to a corresponding model of government. Under the cadre model of 
government, power emanates from a small cadre of perfect or nearly perfect individuals 
whose existence it is essential to reproduce from generation to generation. By contrast, 
under the system model of government power resides in the complex patterns of 
interaction instituted among and embodied by individuals. These patterns include fixed 
and orderly electoral procedures, the rule of law, and extra-legal social and cultural 
norms. It is vital to maintain these patterns for the sake of preserving the dynamic 
equilibrium constitutive of political order within the system. If power flows from a cadre, 
it circulates among a system. 
The systematic approach is an answer to the fundamental question of why the 
Laws exists – namely, to demonstrate the system model vis-à-vis the government of 
Magnesia. In the three studies that follow this Introduction, I want to identify and 
analyze the ways in which the society of the Laws “governs itself” without having 
recourse to the totalizing surveillance, intelligence, and authority of a cadre. In so doing, I 
aim (a) to bring to light the character of the Laws in its specificity, (b) to put forward a 
general argument about the trajectory of Plato’s political philosophy, and (c) to examine 
how Plato brings our social destiny to the center of his normative political philosophizing 
as part of what I will call his creative demiurgy.  
 
1.3.1. Elucidatory examples of the systematic approach 
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In the Laws, the starring role in the polis no longer played by the bodies and souls 
of a small group of philosopher-kings. Rather, the population at large “governs itself” – 
not only in the sense of exercising direct political control over themselves in accordance 
with rules, but in addition in the sense of displaying dispositions as a population that aid 
their continued existence as an organized population. This is the principal shift from the 
Republic – the replacement of a small group with total control by the complex and 
continuous activity of a population. 
 
(1) Elections 
To see what I mean by means of an elucidatory example, consider the prominence 
and special design of elections in the Laws. By an election I refer to an orderly process 
which elevates to office an individual or group from some candidate-class on the basis of 
a fixed procedure, typically involving voting or other electoral mechanisms. Take that of 
the nomophylakes.48 First, all citizens eligible to vote proceed to an especially significant 
temple, and there anyone who wishes may submit a nominating vote directly on the altar 
of the temple, including key information both of the candidate and himself on the tablet 
(753b-753c). Next, for an extended period of time anyone who wishes may remove any 
tablet to which he objects and place it for display in the market-place instead (753c). 
Subsequently, the officials in charge of this procedure make a list of the three hundred 
candidates with the most nominations, and everyone who wishes votes again, but this 
time from the restricted list of candidates (753c-d). The process repeats itself twice more 
until the list of candidates has been winnowed to just thirty-seven (753d). To cast a vote 
                                                            
48 A large portion of Chapter 2 is devoted to the election of the nomophylakes. 
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in the final round of voting, electors must “walk between the victims of a sacrifice” 
before recording their vote (753d). 
At first glance, we might take the ubiquity of elections in the Laws as evidence for 
the democratic approach. However, a closer inspection raises questions and leads to 
criticisms. Take, for instance, the various “religious” aspects of the electoral process, the 
“rejection round” wherein electors may reject each other’s nominations by removing 
them from the temple to the marketplace, or the iterative component of the above election 
– none of them are adequately explained merely as ways of empowering the δῆμος. Thus, 
(i) the title of democratic does not explain the specificity of the election of the 
nomophylakes. Moreover, (ii) it is the lot, not the voting-contest as above, which was 
regarded by the Greeks as quintessentially democratic, and therefore, again, it is 
problematic to assimilate this election to the democratic approach. Additionally, (iii) 
there are components of various elections (though not necessarily that of the 
nomophylakes) which could justly be described as anti-democratic – i.e., they appear to 
mitigate or restrain the excesses of democratic recklessness.49 
Let us therefore consider the election of the nomophylakes in relation to the 
systematic approach. Recall that a system is a population whose members affect and 
interact with each other in orderly ways and that the system model of government looks 
to the complex patterns of interaction instituted among and embodied by individuals as 
the basis of power. Thus, if an election is a process for elevating a candidate to an office 
on the basis of a fixed procedure, for the systematic approach, unlike the democratic 
                                                            
49 The best example is the schedule of incentives for voting set up for the election of council-members. See 
Chapter 3. 
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approach, the key term and relevant concept will be that of procedure. Candidates who 
are elected are chosen on the basis of a rule-following procedure, as opposed to being 
chosen on the basis of an exercise of pure discretion. Procedure and discretion within the 
genus of choice correspond to election and appointment within the genus of specifically 
political selection. Within this concept-grid, accordingly, we can analyze the Republic as 
featuring the direct appointment of those in power by those in power on the basis of the 
latter’s (philosophically fortified) discretion and the Laws as featuring elections taking 
place on the basis of open, orderly procedures codified in law. 
The systematic approach has no trouble accounting for the specificity of the 
election of nomophylakes, including the use of voting-contests and anti-democratic 
elements. The key is to see that the point of arranging things in such a manner is not 
simply to give the δῆμος as such power, but rather to harness the self-governing 
capacities of a population within the confines of set of rules and procedures.50 Moreover, 
resorting to the population itself is in no way a mere concession (such as the demiurgic 
approach would have it), but rather by doing so the election of the nomophylakes makes 
creatively demiurgic use of the active and social powers of the population participating in 
it. Indeed, it is the very use of these powers which separates the election from an instance 
of mere law or mere procedure (such as the legal approach would have it); rather, it 
depends upon the solicited operation of the expertise, powers, and discretion of the 
electors. 
                                                            
50 For the details, I will refer to Chapter 2. In particular, see “The function of religiosity” for information 
on religion in the election of the nomophylakes, and for various comments on the “rejection round” and 
“iterativeness” of the election see 2.3.3, 2.3.4, and 2.3.5. 
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There is ample textual evidence that electoral processes such as that for the 
nomophylakes are not mere procedures (or sets of rules or laws), but rather depend for 
their success on specific properties of the populations that enact them. The Athenian 
declares that those who are elected must have undergone testing (βάσανος) “right from 
their childhood until the moment of their election” (751c5-8). I call that sort of testing 
“candidate strategies:” it aims to improve and insure the quality of the candidate-class or 
various candidate candidate-classes from which officers are chosen. In part, such 
strategies are specifically electoral; but also in part they pertain to all aspects of living in 
Magnesia. In other words, candidate strategies are part of continuous and society-wide 
process of βάσανος. 
In addition, Plato also relies upon strategies for producing excellence in 
government through the special training and education of the electors for these offices. I 
call these “elector strategies.” For instance, Plato decrees that they must “have been 
brought up [πεπαιδευμένους]] in law-abiding habits” (751c8-9). Plato’s elections simply 
will not function correctly unless the electors possess the right kind of παιδεία. Actually, 
correctnesss as such is not even the relevant desideratum – rather, robust correctness is 
what is required when the Athenian declares that the electors must be “able to approve or 
disapprove of the candidates for the right reasons and elect or reject them according to 
their deserts” (751d1-2). Like candidate strategies, elector strategies can also be called 
“continuous;” elections are not self-contained exercises of self-governance, but rather 
snapshots in time of the systematic functioning of a population governing itself using an 
artful arrangement of formal rules and individual powers. 
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Finally, this election – like other elections in Magnesia – is dependent on more 
than the personal properties of candidates and electors, but requires also that both groups 
be integrated within a stable population of citizens who know each other well-enough to 
form reliable inter-personal discriminations in elections and to make other decisions in 
light of the regard of others (751d3-5).51 In sum, what is functional and distinctive about 
this electoral process is best explained, not through recourse to the concepts of 
democracy or legality, but through recourse to the concept of a self-affecting population 
(system) whose forms of “knowledge” about itself are methodically solicited and utilized 
in non-obvious ways unavailable to the individuals themselves. The system model is, 
therefore, an intricate kind of demiurgy which is poorly described as a mere concession 
to the deficient material of human beings. 
 
(2) Cultures  
Less directly political-institutional instances of the systematic approach to the 
Laws are provided by what I call the “contest culture” and “memorial culture” of 
Magnesia. Both represent ways of tending to self-affecting, self-interacting populations; 
both require a central framework of law-like policies, rules, or patterns as well as a 
suitably talented population to abide by, and enact, them; and finally, both throw the 
differences between the cadre and system model into full relief. 
By “contest culture” I refer to Plato’s attempts to manipulate the normative 
distribution of public honors for the purpose of encouraging socially beneficial, and 
discouraging socially detrimental, patterns of behavior. For instance, in comparison with 
                                                            
51 As an example of the latter, consider the “rejection round” described in Chapter 2. 
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the individual who merely refrains from crime, the individual who also prevents others 
from committing crimes is to be honored more than twice as much by the public (730d2-
5). He or she is to be declared “the winner of the prize for virtue” (730d5-7). Plato 
repeatedly signals his desire to institute a kind of friendly, non-jealous competition for 
virtue among the citizens; within this contest culture they are most successful who help 
others succeed. Such stipulations dovetail with a host of similar practical 
recommendations in Magnesia founded on similar analyses of the communicability of 
virtue by means of inter-personal education, assistance, and correction.52 
In sum, through the judicious bestowal of honors the state attempts to use for its 
own purposes the ability of a population to rate each other and seek each other’s 
approval; the utility of special modes of influence is recognized and commended to 
others. In so doing, Plato makes use of the self-affecting dynamic of a population within 
a system; he relies upon a set of generic policies which must be supplemented by actually 
sufficiently virtuous people; and he relies upon a population to in part manage itself 
rather than rerouting all decisions and control through an empowered cadre. 
The “memorial culture” of Magnesia functions similarly. By “memorial culture” I 
refer to the set of guidelines according to which citizens are to continually remind 
themselves and one another of various maxims and advice. These maxims and advice 
tend to be “more detailed” (732b5) than the ideological pronouncements featured 
elsewhere, yet they are no less important inasmuch as they help stitch up the ethical 
lacunae of everyday life. 
                                                            
52 See Chapter 5 for more along these lines. 
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If forgetting is an “outflow” of valuable thought,53 then Magnesian memorial 
culture aims – via the social functionality of individuals in a population reminding one 
another– at supplying a perpetual inflow of intelligence, thereby helping to maintain an 
economy of useful knowledge in circulation and use (732b-c). It helps correct for 
essential shortcomings of individuals (all individuals) and operates along an infra- and 
para-legal dimension.54 Like the contest culture described above, Magnesian memorial 
culture represents a way of tending to a population of individuals systematically 
interacting with each other; it combines the enthusiasm and virtue of live individuals with 
the operation of general directives; and finally, it throws the difference between the cadre 
and system models into relief. There is no cadre pulling the strings of Magnesian 
memorial culture (cf. Republic), but it would be likewise inaccurate to describe it as 
displaying a trust in the δῆμος itself (cf. democratic approach). Rather, it represents a 
demiurgically innovative way of using the social powers of human beings in groups to a 
positive end in the absence of a supreme cadre. 
 
(3) Nocturnal council 
The ultimate tool with which to further the self-government of a population in 
regard to the intellectual economy of ideas is the so-called nocturnal council. The 
nocturnal council is intended to include the wisest old men and the most promising young 
men; they conduct various sort of intellectual researches and discussion akin to those 
                                                            
53 This is part of what could be called the “hydraulic” theory of memory given by Plato in 732b-c. 
54 That is to say, it concerns a domain beneath the practical scope of law (infra-legal) and operates 
alongside compatible laws (para-legal). 
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practiced by the philosopher-kings of the Republic.55 Among other shadowy ascriptions 
of power, Plato insists that the state “must be entrusted to it” (969b). Indeed, many have 
found the nocturnal council to be seriously at odds in spirit with the rest of the Laws, and 
some have even hypothesized a non-integral text at work. However, as I argue in 
Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 of this work, there is no contradiction between the nocturnal 
council and the rest of the government of Magnesia, either in spirit or in fact. Instead, 
rather than constituting a kind of ersatz or clandestine cadre, the nocturnal council acts as 
an organ of propagation and dissemination over the population in a fashion totally 
appropriate to the system model. To see that the nocturnal council is best described as 
supporting, rather than undermining, the systematic approach, it is simply necessary to 
review the (i) “team functionality” that characterizes the mode of operation of the 
council, (ii) the status of its members as indirectly elected, and (iii) the role of the council 
as a “legal protectorate.” 
By “team functionality,” I refer to the special mode of collaboration obtains 
between junior and senior guardians. Whereas the senior guardians participate in the 
council mostly in virtue of some other office to which they were elected, the junior 
guardians participate in virtue of having been selected as promising by the senior 
guardians. Although the junior guardians do not appear to exercise any special power 
(even within the circumscribed real powers of the nocturnal council), the Athenian does 
provide information about how they are to work together (964d-965a). Specifically, the 
junior guardians are (a) to survey the whole state and “store up in their memory all the 
sensations they receive while on guard,” (964e1-5) whereas the senior guardians are (b) 
                                                            
55 See Chapter 6 for a description of the nocturnal council. 
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to deliberate in light of the reports of, and with the assistance of, these observers. The 
atmosphere throughout is characterized as one of open deliberation, discussion, and 
research. Although the division of labor between the two types of guardians should not be 
reduced to mere theorists and mere data-gatherers (both seem to require some 
understanding of either task), nevertheless it is true that the two tiers of council-members 
together form a complex, cooperative unity whose group-functionality exceeds their 
individual powers. To this extent, the nocturnal council should not be described as 
consisting of cadre-like individuals with absolute knowledge and surveillance; rather, the 
council as such only functions in a corporate sense best described within the systematic 
approach. 
Most members of the nocturnal council occupy it ex officio – i.e., they are 
indirectly elected to the council via election to another office. Therefore, they are already 
considerably involved in the daily governance of the state. However, given the 
predominantly academic and argument-focused character of the council along with their 
superior understanding of good laws from a standpoint of ends, they are perfectly poised 
– via circulating ,socializing, and co-deliberating with other officials – to amplify the 
influence of philosophy itself, to exercise a kind of soft, benevolent, and non-coercive 
control over Magnesian society, and to correct for the deficiencies of the legal form by 
enriching it with a supplemental intelligence everywhere along the line.  
 Indeed, the role of the nocturnal council as “legal protectorate” also has to do with 
the utility of such a supplemental intelligence. The Athenian proposes a law declaring 
that “the Nocturnal Council of the Authorities shall be constituted the legal protector of 
the safety of the state” (968a6-7). This declaration seems both ambiguous and ominous; 
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however, when properly interpreted, I argue,56 it is both innocuous and supportive of the 
system model. In particular, that the council is a “protectorate” (φυλακή) – based on how 
Plato uses similar words in the Laws – has to do with the superior ability of the 
councilmembers to teach and explain various aspects of virtue and similar topics, i.e., it 
has to do with the possession by the council of a set of intellectual-discursive skills along 
with the utility of those skills for the state. The nocturnal council, then, provides a way of 
embodying the extra-legal yet legally necessary discursive and persuasive capacities of 
philosophers in such a way as to ensure the permanence and security of the laws 
themselves. Such an attempt is fully in accord with the system model I claim best 
characterizes the city of Magnesia. 
 
1.3.2. The systematic approach vs. the democratic approach 
The systematic approach to the Laws better captures the work in its specificity 
than the democratic, legal, or demiurgic approaches. Let us consider each of these terms 
in turn in comparison with the systematic, beginning with the democratic. Of course, the 
democratic approach (like the other two) has a great deal to speak for it. Even if it does 
not completely describe the Laws in its specificity, it certainly captures an important truth 
about the dialogue to assert that it is more democratic than the Republic: the latter is the 
enemy to everything democratic, whereas the former does feature many features which 
could be described as more or less democratic. 
 However, a closer look at contemporaneous notions of democratic institutions 
(which feature the lot) reveals the extent to which the character of the Laws is not 
                                                            
56 Again, see Chapter 7 for this argument in detail. 
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reducible to democracy. A useful distinction for sorting out the differences would be the 
distinction between democracy and popular involvement. Whereas the Laws, certainly 
unlike the Republic, features plenty of popular involvement in both the directly political 
processes as well as broader cultural and social tendencies of political relevance, neither 
of the two can be called democratic sans phrase even if the Laws does feature certain, 
carefully constrained authentically democratic elements. 
 Consider, for example, the two linked phenomena in the Magnesian law-code I 
call “social persuasion” and “social enforcement.” Social persuasion refers to the state’s 
assignment of reputational predicates in response to preferred or dispreferred patterns of 
behavior. Social enforcement refers to the enforcement of the law by individuals 
themselves aware of its violation. Almost always, they appear in combination. For 
instance, any male who declines to enter marriage and produce children after a reasonable 
portion of time is to remain officially “unhonored” (ἄτιμος) and not to receive any honors 
(τιμῆς…πάσης) customarily bestowed by the younger upon the older (774b). Indeed, the 
young are instructed not to “take the slightest notice of him” (774b). This is what I mean 
by “social persuasion.” Furthermore, if he attempts to chastise someone else, anyone who 
does not rush forward to protect the victim will be declared by law to have a cowardly 
and wretched reputation (774c). This element constitutes what I mean by “social 
enforcement” (and the medium of enforcement in this case is an additional instance of 
social persuasion). The joint phenomenon of social persuasion and social enforcement is 
poorly described as democratic if we refer only to the bare concept of empowering the 
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δῆμος.57 Instead, what distinguishes it is its reliance on an involved population. It induces 
certain behaviors on the part of individuals by appealing to their concern for their 
reputation within that population; and it manages the mutual exchange of influence 
among that population through accurately matching predicates to character. Furthermore, 
it expands the reach of the law by in effect “deputizing” everyone, and it quells potential 
violations of public order or decency by immediately countering them in the fashion of 
negative feedback. 
Similarly, the individual powers of the citizens are frequently and ingeniously 
mobilized within the political institutions themselves of Magnesia, but this mobilization 
is, again, better described as popular rather than democratic. For instance, in the election 
of the nomophylakes,58 the “rejection round” arguably shames electors who make bad 
nominations, thus ministering to the concerns of the electors as members of a population 
and arguably imparting a conservative orientation to the election overall. To the extent 
that this set of electoral procedures does actively solicit and make use of the individual 
contributions of the electors, it could be called broadly democratic, yet their democratic 
character is hardly unrestrained or unambiguous. Even apart from the decidedly non-
democratic ideological environment (intended to stress military service and religious 
                                                            
57 On the other hand, it is well described as democratic if we refer instead to contemporaneous Athenian 
democracy. However, the term would also risk being less informative from our perspective since our 
contemporaneous democracy does not include these phenomena. Used in this way, the term “democratic” 
alters in meaning to something like “historical,” and in any case, the deferred explanatory task would then 
become explaining why these aspects of history (and not others) make it into the Laws. One person who 
does interpret the term in the second sense is Monoson; however, her primary focus is the Republic, not the 
Laws, and I find reason to disagree with much of what she says about the Laws. Monoson, Plato’s 
Democratic Entanglements. 
58 See above for a brief overview of this process and Chapter 2 for a longer one. 
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observance),59 various aspects of the procedures limit or corral the democratic 
preferences of the populace. 
Rather than seeing it as straightforwardly democratic, we should, alert to non-
democratic or even anti-democratic elements, characterize the election of the 
nomophylakes as a process which makes intelligent use of the real contributions of the 
electors without either totally deferring to the electors or writing them off in favor of the 
superior opinion of a cadre. By incorporating a defined rejection-round and allowing 
electors to react to each other’s electoral choices in an iterative way, the electoral process 
is better analyzed as part of the systematic self-management of a population with the aid 
of rules and procedures than as an exercise of democracy as such.60 
 
1.3.3. The systematic approach vs. the legal approach 
Like the democratic approach, there is a sense in which the legal approach is 
substantially correct. There is no supreme cadre in power; instead, the rule of law could 
be said in large measure to have taken its place. Most of the Laws is given over – in place 
of appointing such a cadre – to articulating a set of laws. These laws apply to everyone 
(i.e., ἰσονομία is in effect), and there is no simple way to abrogate them. However, (i) the 
                                                            
59 See Chapter 2. 
60 We can make an exactly similar point in the case of the election of the council. Councilmembers are 
elected from each of the four tiers of Magnesian society as a whole. While anyone can vote for the 
candidates from each tier, a subtle schedule of incentives and penalties encourages members of the upper 
tier to vote in every election and everyone to vote in the upper tier elections. On the one hand, this process 
makes clear and real use of the individual powers of the members of general populace. On the other hand, 
the input from members of the upper tiers is passively privileged over that from members of the lower tiers. 
Just as in the case of the election of the nomophylakes, this electoral process makes use of individual 
electoral contributions in an intelligent way for the good of the whole without either awarding all power 
and discretion to a removed cadre or giving full rein to democracy as such. Rather, it provides a framework 
in which a population of varying levels of “knowledge” can reliably appoint suitable candidates to assist in 
its governance. In sum, the systematic approach best explains the existence of non-democratic and even 
anti-democratic elements of the Magnesian government. 
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Laws is more than just laws, and the legal approach fails to completely capture the Laws 
in its specificity. In addition, (ii) the legal approach’s prospects are further attenuated via 
the critiques (passim in Plato, including the Laws) of the law-form in general – in 
particular, its failures of generality and its vulnerability in the hands of inadequate 
stewards. 
 Thus, what is needed is a sort of supplement to the legal approach which captures 
the specificity of Magnesian society and resolves Plato’s complaints. If the rule of law 
characterizes Magnesia, it is not a rule of law tout court, but a sort of “full-bodied” rule 
of law (in a word: ἐυνομία). It is exactly this task that the systematic approach aims to 
achieve, substituting system as the successor-concept to law. The systematic approach 
encompasses the legal approach along with the recognition that “lawfulness” requires 
more than a set of laws and that laws do not exist in a vacuum, but are actualized in a 
human and social environment by a live population.61 Το put it bluntly, the systematic 
approach is the legal approach with a human face. 
Since the systematic approach takes within it both a set of general patterns and 
directives (some of which are laws) and the human beings who govern and are governed 
by these laws, it possesses the resources to explicate in what ways Plato’s Magnesia is 
more than a collection of laws. To this end, we must be alert to what I call “culture in the 
broad sense.” If “culture in the narrow sense” includes physical works of art or discrete 
products and events, culture in the broad sense refers to the economy of attitudes on all 
subjects along with the attitude-possessors who influence and are influenced by one 
                                                            
61 This expansion of the legal approach pertains both to matters properly falling beneath the law (infra-
legal) and to matters above and beyond the law (supra-legal). I use the word “extra-legal” to mean both 
categories.  
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another in various patterns. What Plato wants is something like an orderly culture in the 
broad sense, but such orderliness consists in more than lawfulness tout court: 
importantly, it consists in a kind of equilibrium, an equilibrium that can be either 
menaced or reinforced by circular causal chains. To show that “orderly culture” rather 
than “legality” is the relevant distinctive characteristic concept of the Laws, I draw 
attention (in Chapter 4) to (i) Plato’s designation of culture in the broad sense as an 
object of political-philosophical attention and (in Chapter 5) (ii) his attempt to repurpose 
it for the purpose of good governance in general. 
Given the need for a supplement to the law in view of its deficiencies, we should 
examine what I call the (a) thematization of the infra-legal in the Laws and (b) the special 
role of the nocturnal council which consists in the trafficking of a kind of legal expertise 
that is itself extra-legal. First, Plato pays special attention to the normative framework of 
daily life that falls outside the scope of explicit law – “unwritten customs,” “ancestral 
laws,” and the like. Although these things are not “laws,” they are nevertheless the 
“bonds of the entire social framework” (793b). They do not replace the law, but they do 
help to endow it with stability (793b-c).62 
Similarly, the nocturnal council – in its role as the “legal protectorate,” according 
to the interpretation I argue most befits this phrase – uses its superior understanding of 
the rationale of the law, along with special intellectual-discursive skills, to protect, 
justify, and explain otherwise dangerous opacities, plug lacunae, and successfully match 
it to the particular material grain of a situation. The council disseminates this extra- but 
pro-legal knowledge and experience by means of the various offices its diverse 
                                                            
62 See (5.2.1) for more on the thematization of the infra-legal. 
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membership holds. As I asserted above, the nocturnal council is best understood as a 
legal or official supplement to protect and uphold the law even in the face of its own 
deficiencies or infelicities.63 
 
1.3.4. The systematic approach vs. the demiurgic approach 
Like the democratic and legal approaches, the demiurgic approach possesses a 
kernel of truth in relation to the Laws while failing to capture the work in its full 
specificity. The systematic approach, on the other hand, preserves the kernel of truth in 
the demiurgic while resolving or overcoming the problems inherent to it. To begin, it is 
certainly true of the Laws that the society envisioned is (a) less ideal or “fine” (καλή) 
than a society, conceivably, could be, and (b) that the legislators must make use of the 
imperfect, all-too-human material at hand to make it as good as they can. So far, so good. 
1. However, by such standards all human societies, including that of the Republic, 
are demiurgic imitations. The Republic itself, which is communist only in the uppermost 
echelon, does not meet the communist criterion of the “best” society conjectured by the 
Laws (739c-e).64 In addition, attending to the text of the Republic itself, we find evidence 
of very many empirical shortcomings, including the unavoidable decay of the society.65 
Therefore, the demiurgic approach fails to adequately distinguish the Laws from the 
Republic in an absolute sense; rather, it is arguable that both are “demiurgic” productions 
along a continuum. Additionally, the demiurgic approach tells us nothing about how to 
                                                            
63 See Chapter 7 for a defense of this interpretation of the nocturnal council. 
64 Only the guardians are said in Book V to partake of communism in relation to property, family, and 
spouse. 
65 For the decline, see R., 546a ff. Other ostensibly non-ideal characteristics include infanticide (459d, 
460b-c, etc.), the need for propagandistic lying (382c-d, 389b ff., 459c., etc.), and the apparently secret 
record-keeping necessary to avoid lateral incest (461e). 
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think of the distinctive esprit and character of the Laws in relation to the Republic (it 
substitutes a proprium for an account). 
2. Similarly, the demiurgic approach as such does not fulfill the desiderata of an 
inquiry aiming at clarifying the unique account of the Laws. In other words, it constitutes 
a form of withholding existence from the Laws. Of course, whether or not the Laws 
actually “exists” in the sense in which I use this word, is itself an open question. We 
might well decide – after appropriate philosophical and scholarly consideration – that it 
does not exist in that sense and is merely a pale, inferior version of the Republic. 
However, to the extent we are especially interested in such an inquiry, then we should 
favor approaches capable of satisfying it, in the style of a regulative ideal. 
3. Finally, we should note that a distinction made within the category of demiurgy 
itself may be capable of resolving the two problems with the demiurgic approach listed 
under (1) above. Namely, we should distinguish concessionary demiurgy from creative 
demiurgy. Whereas the former represents solely a falling-off from some standard of 
perfection due to the exclusive availability of some inferior material, the latter, even if 
nonetheless still “imperfect,” represents a substantively new way of approaching the 
original standard based on an appraisal of the strengths as well as the weaknesses of the 
material at hand.66 The Laws is a demiurgic production, like the Republic,67 but its 
                                                            
66 One counterargument to the supposed distinction between concessionary demiurgy and creative demiugy 
might turn on the identity of their products ceteris paribus. In other words, if I am creating a product pcod 
according to concessionary demiurgy, then this product will not be as fine as the ideal product or model pm, 
yet it will still be as fine as I can make it. However, if I am creating a product pcrd according to creative 
demiurgy, then such a product will still be not as fine as pm, yet at the same time it will still be as fine as I 
can make it, and I will be particularly attuned to the possible strengths of the material. However, this 
provides no reason in itself to think that pcrd will be better or even different than pcod if in each case I made 
the product as fine I could. Thus, creative and concessionary demiurgy would be the same thing. My 
response is the following. The two notions of demiurgy are only the same under the assumption of 
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demiurgy, unlike that of the Republic, commands our attention in virtue of its creative 
appropriation of human and social potential. The systematic approach, in turn, recognizes 
the creative demiurgy at work in the Laws and is therefore in this way preferable to the 
demiurgic approach tout court.68 
Plato’s use of the lot in the election of the council illustrates the creative demiurgy 
I claim is pertinent to the systematic approach. In particular, there are two modes of 
equality which I will call, after Aristotle, arithmetical and geometrical.69 Arithmetical 
equality is simple to carry out, for all one must do is simply award office by lot. The 
visible co-personhood of two persons is sufficient to mark them as arithmetically equal. 
Geometrical equality, by contrast, involves granting “much to the great and less to the 
less great” in accordance with the “real nature of each” (757c). Whereas arithmetical 
equality is straightforwardly “visible,” geometrical equality is opaque and invisible 
(757b). Furthermore, when the positive regime of equality instituted differs from 
individual beliefs about merit, quarrels are the result; by contrast, when they coincide, 
“friendship” is the result. On the one hand, the legislator has clear normative reason, then, 
to institute a regime of geometrical equality: for it involves bestowing upon each a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
omniscience or perfection on the part of the demiurge – that is to say, if I am a perfectly intelligent 
demiurge, then proceeding according to either notion of demiurgy will result in the same product. 
However, the two notions may indeed differ with regard to what products they produce in the hands of 
demiurges of less than perfect intelligence. After all, two different sets of instructions to the same place 
may differ in helping different people get there. To the extent one set of instructions gets more people of a 
certain level of spatial sense to their destination, we could even call that set “better.” This is exactly what I 
claim in the case of concessionary and creative demiurgy. They are different inasmuch as the two examples 
of demiurgy will differently prepare would-be legislator-readers such as Plato is arguably preparing. The 
Laws, qua text, is a communicative act, and thus assertions about it which give rise to different effects 
among its audience track real properties of the text. (I thank Chetan Chetty for raising this point.) 
67 Of course, even if the Republic is a demiurgic production, this is arguably not its primary goal. In my 
view, the primary goal of the Republic is to exist as an object of desire. 
68 The ultimate example of creative demiurgy is the discussion of symposia that takes place in Books I-II of 
the Laws. However, I would like to defer a discussion of this passage to a separate work. 
69 See Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics. 
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quantum of power in accordance with the extent of their nature – the attempt to legislate 
nothing less than justice itself (757c). On the other hand, the (i) emphatic visibility of 
arithmetical equality, (ii) its corresponding ability to generate large reserves of 
friendship, and (iii) the necessity of friendship to the very stability of the state, all mean 
together that there is clear normative reason for the legislator to make use of arithmetical 
equality. Thus, in sum there is normative reason for the legislator to make use of both 
forms of equality, as indeed takes place in the case of the election of the nomophylakes. 
However, it would be inaccurate to describe the legislator’s resort to both as merely a 
concession and falling away from the strict justice represented by geometrical equality. 
Rather, either regime of equality represents a combination of benefits and drawbacks to 
be artfully assembled and mixed by the legislator. Thus, Plato’s creative demiurgy 
utilizes the “lesser” form of equality as a way of bolstering the philia of the state. 
 Likewise, the dense social interactivity of human beings – i.e., their ability to 
influence and be influenced by each other in sometimes rapid and uncontrolled ways – is 
on one level a problem. It is as a nod to this problemness that Chapter 4 of this 
dissertation is labeled, “Culture as Problem.” However, Plato response is more than 
concessionary: yes, on the one hand, he does take steps to limit or staunch this dense 
social interactivity; but, on the other hand, he also takes steps to take advantage of, and 
unexpectedly utilize, such an interactivity. Thus, in recognition of Plato’s examination of 
culture (in the broad sense) as a resource as well as a problem, Chapter 5 is labeled 
“Culture as Solution.” However, Plato – by taking advantage of measures like social 
enforcement, social persuasion, competitive culture, memorial culture, etc. – implements 
a creative rather than a concessionary demiurgy in the Laws. Accordingly, the systematic 
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approach, to the extent it recognizes the creativity of Plato’s demiurgy, is preferable to 
the traditional demiurgic approach. 
Finally, consider once more the “team functionality” of the nocturnal council 
whereby the young and old members perform different tasks and form a complex unity 
with a functionality in excess of that of each faction in itself. Although both actually 
existing young people and actually existing old peopl such as can be expected to inhabit 
the Magnesian colony suffer from various deficiencies, Plato’s demiurgy making use of 
both of them is not merely concessionary, but rather it intelligently and creatively makes 
use of the selective strengths and weaknesses of both. Here, once more, Plato’s creative 
demiurgy pursuant to the systematic approach is more appropriate to the text than the 
concessionary demiurgy associated with the traditional demiurgic approach. 
 
1.4. The systematic approach and the secondary literature 
Having outlined the relative advantages of the systematic approach to the Laws in 
comparison with the democratic, legal, and demiurgic approaches in general, I will now 
once again canvass the principal or salient contributions to the secondary literature with 
the same end in mind. 
Morrow’s – to risk the overuse of an adjective – “magisterial” book exemplifies 
the demiurgic approach to the Laws: Morrow sees the Laws as a combination of (or a 
modeling from) the kallipolis of the Republic with Athenian history and institutions.70 
                                                            
70 See Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City; Morrow, “The Demiurge in Politics.” Laks makes the excellent point, 
however, that there is no reason to restrict the empirical material made use of by the demiurge to what is 
historical; rather, it arguably also includes anthropological facts about humanity. Laks, “Legislation and 
Demiurgy.” 
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However, by my lights Morrow underestimates the radicality of the shift from the 
Republic to the Laws, and moreover, by designating the details of the new society as 
mere material for the application of philosophical principles, he overlooks those details – 
the many intricate customs, rituals, and ideological asides – precisely where we find 
inflected the shift from the cadre to the system model I have described. The Laws 
represents more than a model applied to material; rather, it offers a philosophically rich 
and new way of configuring material in general.71 A virtue of my approach, I believe, is 
the light my framework can shed on such material as part of the overall political 
philosophy of the Laws. In sum, while Morrow is correct in general regarding the fact of 
demiurgical utilization, he does not sufficiently exhibit the particular rationale of such 
utilization. To develop this question of the particular rationale of demiurgic utilization is, 
in my judgment, to embark upon the systematic approach and replace the concept of 
concessionary demiurgy with that of creative demiurgy. 
Bobonich analyzes the Laws under the rubric of an “increased optimism” 
regarding the moral and intellectual capacities of non-philosophers.72 This has clear 
consequences for the political philosophy of the dialogue. Indeed, one way would be for 
me to see it in harmony with my own approach – i.e., such an increased optimism 
obviates the need to restrict real power and knowledge to a cadre, thus enabling the 
system model I claim characterizes the Laws. (1) However, one could equally proceed on 
the basis of an assumption of an increased pessimism on Plato’s part – i.e., Plato’s loss of 
belief in the possibility of reliably forming a real cadre would thus necessitate his resort 
                                                            
71 To this extent, I agree with Laks that the Laws represents “un modèle d’un autre type.” However, I also 
disagree with Laks’s nonetheless concessionary account. Laks, Médiation et Coercition, 42. 
72 Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics. 
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to system. In sum, Bobonich’s contention is ultimately orthogonal to my own.  (2) 
Additionally, qua datum, Bobonich’s conclusion doesn’t necessary explain anything; it 
simply arrives with consequences. By contrast, Plato’s increased awareness of the utility 
of a system model could be used to explain a de facto increased optimism on his part. (3) 
Finally, it is very hard to disentangle Plato’s purported demotic increased optimism from 
his elite increased pessimism; in other words, if Plato comes to think less of the elite in 
general, well this is – and it isn’t – an increased optimism regarding the demos. (4) 
Finally, Bobonich’s argument pertains rather to moral psychology and moral philosophy 
than political philosophy as such; thus, I explore the political philosophy of the Laws in a 
mode largely complementary to – if nonetheless distinct from, and even orthogonal to – 
Bobonich’s analysis.73 
Laks interprets the Laws in comparison with the Republic as a political-
philosophical work utterly devoted to the all-too-human (read: non-divine) context in 
which our political projects must take place.74 This carries great significance for the mode 
of demiurgy we assign to the Laws. However, in one sense Laks is wrong to so starkly 
separate the Laws from the Republic. As I have argued throughout, given (i) the arguable 
non-identity of the Republic and the “best” city conjectured in Book V of the Laws and 
(ii) the many non-ideal characteristics of the kallipolis in the Republic, it does not make 
sense to partition the two dialogues as pertinent to two different “realms,” divine and 
human. Rather, we should see both as non-ideal, demiurgic productions along a 
continuum. However, the contestable status of this background assumption 
                                                            
73 This is a distinct kind of orthogonalness than the kind glossed under (1) above. 
74 Laks, Médiation et Coercition. 
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notwithstanding, Laks is surely correct in finding in the Laws a kind of reinvigorated 
demiurgy and theory of demiurgy. The concept of “médiation" as what characterizes this 
demiurgy is useful.75 Yet Laks, too, falls victim to the concessionary mania which makes 
of the Magnesian legislation a series of regrets and concessions. Thus, in a discussion of 
Laks I would refer to the case above for characterizing the demiurgy at work in the Laws 
as creative rather than concessionary. 
With regard to Monoson, I fully agree with her revisionary argument regarding 
Plato’s view of democracy, in light of the full, concrete, and contemporaneous sense in 
which we should examine that phenomenon.76 Many aspects of this sense are put to 
wonderful and sustained use within the Laws. However, (1) in large part Monoson 
ignores the Laws in favor of the Republic;77 (2) in addition, as I argue in connection with 
the democratic approach above, the notion of “popular involvement,” issuing from the 
systematic framework, is preferable to that of “democracy.” In other words, the Laws-
pertinent evidence assembled by Monoson is better glossed as popular rather than 
democratic.   
Finally, Samaras represents an instance both the democratic and demiurgic 
approaches.78 My criticism in regard to him can be subsumed beneath these axes. That is, 
(1) the democratic approach represents a mistake in focus; and (2) his demiurgic 
approach is concessionary rather than creative. Although Samaras has many interesting 
                                                            
75 Ibid., 36. 
76 However, it is certainly troubling that Plato does not appear willing to agree in writing with this 
argument. I.e., he is not willing to interpret the term democracy in the sense specified by Monoson. 
77 And, indeed, much of what she says about the Laws – or says about the Republic in an apparently 
exclusive way – is contestable. For instance, see my comments on Monoson and the theatrical aspects of 
democracy in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
78 Samaras, Plato on Democracy. 
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tool-pertinent insights into Plato’s use of democracy, he is nonetheless incorrect in 
labeling Plato’s use of the lot as a “half-hearted concession” along with similar 
concessionary demiurgic remarks.79 
 
1.5. The plan of the subsequent work 
So far I have (i) specified the basic question which my own approach to the Laws, 
the systematic approach, is intended to answer, (ii) clarified the problematic in which it 
has taken shape, viz., the democratic, legal, and demiurgic approaches, (iii) glossed a 
representative selection of views of the dialogue from the secondary literature, (iv) 
conveyed the essence of the systematic approach with reference to examples from the 
subsequent document, and (v) explained why it represents an advance with respect to 
each of the democratic, legal, and demiurgic approaches, (vi) as well as its relation with 
the existing secondary literature. In what remains, I would like to (vii) sketch a roadmap 
of the dissertation that follows. 
The following document attempts to give flesh to the systematic approach 
outlined above. To do this, my analysis takes the form of a series of three linked 
investigations into various aspects of the life of the city described in the Laws. First, I 
examine the various electoral processes used in the Laws (2-3). Second, I analyze the 
ways in which Plato theorizes or attempts to control potentially turbulent forces of culture 
operating outside the reach of the law (4-5). Third, I examine the institution of the 
“nocturnal council” and argue that it does not pose a counter-argument to the systematic 
approach (6-7). 
                                                            
79 Ibid., 243. 
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1. Since conforming to a set of electoral procedures epitomizes the system model 
of government, it is important to undertake an examination of the electoral processes in 
the Laws. To start, I argue that Plato – by explicitly restricting the electorate to members 
of the military and abundantly distributing religious signifiers and paraphernalia 
throughout the electoral process – seeks to model the political culture of elections in the 
city on the military ethic and religious sensibility native to it. The anti-anarchical 
ideology encoded in these forms of life encourages citizens to make their electoral 
decisions in a responsibly social way (2.3.1-2). In addition, I show how elections function 
to educate and improve the electors themselves via the presentation of certain edifying 
and informative spectacles as part of the electoral process (2.3.5). Finally, I argue that 
Plato’s judicious use of election by lot promotes solidarity and fellow-feeling among the 
citizenry without, however, compromising the quality of those ultimately selected (3.2). 
Furthermore, I demonstrate how the special format of the voting tablets in use 
forces voters to contextualize their votes with information Plato thinks relevant (2.3.3); 
how Plato uses a careful framework of incentives to manage voter apathy (3.1); and how 
electoral procedures in the Laws synthesize the individual contributions of heterogeneous 
actors into a collective result as part of an intelligent process superior to its individual 
constituents (2.3.4). 
2. Next, I investigate from a systematic perspective the extent to which Plato 
takes “culture” in the broad sense — i.e., the ways in which large groups of people 
influence and are influenced by one another in accordance with patterns of interaction 
which they themselves dictate — as an object of political-philosophical attention. 
Specifically, I point to Plato’s deep concern in the Laws with self-propelling cycles of 
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influence which possess the potential to harm, destabilize, or destroy the city, as well as 
Plato’s attempt to mitigate, curtail, or recuperate those tendencies as part of the self-
regulation of the city. To do this, I examine the ways in which, for Plato, the freedom we 
possess to consort with whom we wish or consume which art we wish risks setting into 
motion patterns of positive feedback culminating in societal catastrophe (4). 
Given the dangers above, I next canvass the various strategies of cultural 
management to which Plato has recourse for his city. I show how Plato makes the proper 
design of customs, usages, and practices in a city a crucial desideratum of political theory 
responsible for the stability of law itself (5.2.1); institutes various preferred patterns of 
interaction among citizens he judges most beneficial for the creation of an intelligent and 
resilient culture of virtue (5.2.2); and insists that the distribution of honors and status-
predicates adorning the public life of the city be arranged in a way conducive to the 
flourishing of the city. In addition, by insisting that certain classes of public misdeeds be 
corrected or punished on the spot by bystanders, Plato nips in the bud potentially noxious 
chains of influence (5.3). Finally, I examine how diverse policies that Plato puts into 
place — the requirement that devotees of music and theater actively participate in the 
regulation of these things, the integration of women into the communal life of the city, 
and the ban on private religion — all have the effect of rooting out potentially threatening 
pockets of cultural autonomy and subjecting all important spheres of life to public 
scrutiny, shared appreciation, and common participation (5.4). 
3. Finally, I consider in particular one of the most interesting institutions in the 
Laws — the mystery-shrouded “nocturnal council.” This council meets every morning at 
dawn and includes many of the powerful officials in the city. It pursues a special 
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curriculum of science and philosophy similar to that studied by the philosopher-kings of 
the Republic and is suggested to possess wide-ranging powers similar to theirs (6). At 
first glance, this institution poses a significant challenge for the systematic approach: 
after all, does the nocturnal council not, in the final analysis, constitute a kind of “cadre” 
situated at the heart of the Laws? I argue that a careful reading of the relevant passages in 
Book XII does not support this judgment. Not only is the nocturnal council not 
incompatible with the system model of government, but indeed, it performs a vital 
function vis-à-vis the research and circulation of necessary knowledge (including the 
study of other cities or cultures) within the system. The nocturnal council is better 
characterized as a non-coercive engine of civic improvement functioning within a 
mutually supportive ecology of institutions than as a shadowy cabal invested with 
absolute power. Properly understood, the members of the nocturnal council are not 
philosopher-kings, but philosopher-consultants (7). 
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2. ELECTING THE NOMOPHYLAKES 
2.1. Introduction 
 The task of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 is to bring to bear a certain perspective 
upon a certain subject matter.  The subject matter in question is the electoral process or 
processes in Magnesia as a result of which prospective office-holders (ἄρξοντες) are 
elected (αἴρεσθαι) and take possession of their offices (ἀρχαί). This topic receives its 
fullest treatment in Book VI of the Laws. The perspective in question is the “systematic 
approach” I claim is most appropriate to understanding the (ideal society proposed by 
the) Laws in its totality. In particular, the systematic approach holds that the Magnesian 
government of the Laws is a system model rather than a cadre model. 
Under the cadre model of government in the Republic, essentially all power lies in 
the hands of a small elite or cadre of “guardians” (φύλακες) entitled to their rank in virtue 
of the unerring and omnicompetent knowledge of the good they possess. An extensive 
program of biological eugenics, character diagnostics, and proper education is 
responsible for their formation. In turn, they are afforded absolute discretion to manage 
the state as they think best within the confines of its basic order.80 By contrast, members 
of the two subsidiary classes of the kallipolis are powerless; they have no say in the 
management of the affairs of the city.  
 Under the system model of government in the Laws, power is widely distributed 
over a hierarchy of offices which are filled by election and to which nearly all have some 
form of input or access. A carefully designed set of ideological, cultural, and social 
                                                            
80 For instance, the guardians cannot abolish the prohibition on private property among guardians. 
However, even this restriction is, technically speaking, superfluous. After all, “no true guardian” would 
ever do such a thing, etc. 
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mechanisms bolsters the fitness of the citizen body to select and serve as their own 
leaders. Whereas in the case of the kallipolis it is the excellence of the ruling cadre that 
determines the excellence of the city, in the case of Magnesia it is the well-functioning of 
the system in general that determines the excellence of the city. Note that the concept of a 
system importantly incudes, but also exceeds, the notion of a set of laws or procedures. It 
also includes the self-interacting population of agents charged with interpreting, 
conforming to, and extending the law. Although in the part of this dissertation devoted to 
electoral policy I will mostly focus on explicit procedures, I will also seek to bring out 
this extra-legal element in the systematic.  
In the rest of this section, I will introduce the subject matter in a more detailed 
way, contribute a few remarks on the structure of the subsequent chapters, and state a few 
preliminary conclusions regarding what is of systematic interest in the electoral law of 
Magnesia. 
 
The electoral process 
 A considerable portion of Plato’s Laws is given over to the project of carefully 
envisioning what kind of πολιτεία the new city of Magnesia ought to possess.81 To this 
end, Plato distinguishes between “two elements in a political system”: (i) the 
establishment of offices and (ii) the development of bodies of law associated with those 
                                                            
81 This project is the principal goal of Books IV through XII. Nevertheless, digressions are frequent and 
lengthy. It takes place as a result of the ambition of the Athenian and his companions – enunciated at the 
end of Book III – to subject what they have just decided to be the “ideal way of administering a state [πῶς 
ποτ’ ἂν πόλις ἄριστα οἰκοίη]” (702a8) to a “test [ἔλεγχος]” (702b2). Kleinias suggests they devote their 
energies to producing a new set of laws for the colony of Magnesia; fortuitously, he himself belongs to a 
deputation of Cretans tasked with exactly this. The groundwork for the technical normativity of legislation 
is laid in Books I through IV; the activity of the demiurge in the Timaeus offers an essential parallel.  
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offices (735a5-6).82 The electoral process falls under the former rather than the latter. In a 
certain sense, electing officers to office is exactly what it means to “establish” 
(καθιστάνειν) those offices.83 However, the establishment of offices includes more than 
just electoral policy; it also extends to such matters as deciding how many offices there 
should be and over what departments of life and society they should preside. These 
considerations fall outside the scope of the present investigation. Similarly, I will not 
discuss the second element in a political system – namely, the development of bodies of 
law subordinate to an established system of offices. In general, I will not here discuss any 
element of the offices of Magnesia from the point of view of what they are but only from 
the point of view of how they come to be.84 
 I employ the term “election” and its paronyms in a generic or “thin” sense to refer 
to an orderly process which elevates to office an individual or group from some 
candidate-class on the basis of some fixed procedure.85 The key term in this definition is 
procedure. What distinguishes procedure from discretion within the genus of choice is 
the use of rules. Both procedure and discretion represent personal strategies for 
navigating contingent situations with practical success. For instance, if I am a doctor 
attempting to diagnose a patient on the basis of his symptoms, on the one hand I may 
                                                            
82 See also 751a-b. I call this distinction “Plato’s analytic of government” and discuss it extensively in 2.2. 
83 Plato appears to use καθιστάνειν in this sense in 751a6: τρόπον ὅντινα καθισταμένας. However, in 735a5 
and 751a2 he appears to use the verb in a broader way to refer to the establishment of a set of offices in 
general, not the establishment of a set of individuals in office. 
84 This is not to deny that these offices as they exist in their own specificity are of systematic interest. 
85 The usual Greek word translated as “election” is αἵρεσις. This word has a somewhat wider scope than 
“election” as stipulated above. With respect to the terms under discussion, αἵρεσις as Plato uses it perhaps 
comes closest to the genus-term “selection.” I will make the Greek wording clear when relevant. 
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adhere to the rules of diagnostic procedure, but on the other hand I may rely upon my 
own discretion as a practicing physician.86 
 Procedure and discretion within the genus of choice are aligned with election and 
appointment within the genus of political selection. Whereas elected officers are elevated 
as the result of the operation of procedure, appointed officers are elevated as the result of 
the exercise of discretion. Whereas rules distinguish procedure from discretion, laws 
distinguish election from appointment. Of course, election and appointment, like 
procedure and discretion, may be intertwined in practice. For instance, direct appointment 
may constitute a single stage of a multi-stage election – e.g., the nomophylakes nominate 
an initial group of candidates for general, but subsequently there are additional rounds of 
counter-nomination and voting (755b-d). Likewise, discretion itself may devolve upon 
the use of certain internalized “procedures” – e.g., a syllogism.87 
 Election and appointment – at least in their typical incarnation – correspond to 
what we might consider “democratic” and “monarchical” forms of government.88 The 
officers who determine policy in a representative democracy are elected as the result of 
ostensibly neutral or fair procedure; monarchs merely issue diktats appointing their 
                                                            
86 Note that discretion may be predicated on either knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) or experience (ἐμπειρία). For 
Plato, the possession of knowledge implies an ability to give rational explanations. However, the 
procedure-like explanations offered in cases of knowledge-based discretion are always contextually 
appropriate and cannot be substituted for the knowledge itself that supplies the principle of their generation 
according to context. This familiar Platonic theme receives perhaps its most interesting treatment in the 
critique of writing from the Phaedrus (274b-278b). 
87 The aim of my definitions above is to provide rough-and-ready criteria for distinguishing what I believe 
to be already familiar concepts, not to logically fix these things for all time or claim that they are perfectly 
immiscible. 
88 The key phrase here is “typical incarnation.” For instance, it is technically possible for a monarch to 
adhere to a dubious “procedure” like elevating into power whoever pays him the most grandiloquent 
compliments. However, even in this situation it is arguable that the “real power” lies with the monarch and 
that his “procedure” is really just a disguised form of appointment. See footnote above for a clarification 
regarding these definitions. 
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favorites to power. Election, then, are “open,” “fair,” or “public,” while appointments are 
“closed,” “unfair,” or “private.”89 However, it would be unwise simply to assume that our 
association between democracy and election holds for the Greeks as well. Indeed, as I 
have argued and will argue throughout this dissertation, the democratic approach is an 
inadequate and incorrect approach to the Laws. 
 First of all, it is necessary to remember that “election” as stipulated differs from 
“election” qua voting-contest. Plato uses χειροτονία and related words to denote the latter 
phenomenon, which frequently figures as part of a more elaborate election procedure.90 
The category of election in general includes both voting contest and election-by-lot. 
Indeed, it was the lot, and not the voting contest, which was perceived to be 
quintessentially democratic. The voting contest was perceived to be aristocratic, possibly 
because it privileges those aristocrats capable of converting into votes the greater 
resources available to them (including reputational or rhetorical resources). By contrast, 
the lot privileges no individual above any other individual. However, to the extent that 
the πολλοί are by definition more numerous than the ὀλίγοι, the lot favors the former as a 
class. 
 Nevertheless, there is still “something democratic” about elections, especially, in 
comparison with pure appointment or those political schemes of an oligarchical or 
aristocratic cast which severely restrict the circle of political participants, and for this 
reason, I characterize the democratic approach as possessing pro tanto validity. Thus, 
                                                            
89 I put these words in quotation marks to indicate my own loose usage; I am writing evocatively here 
rather than scientifically. 
90 E.g., χειροτονεῖν, διαχειροτονεῖν, or ἐπιχειροτονεῖν. The key root in all of these is χείρ or “hand.” The 
dependence of χειροτονία on a merely corporal technology (rather than πινάκια) has two important effects. 
First, it may be difficult to count the number of raised hands with accuracy. Second, votes are inherently 
“unsigned” – i.e., they are not associated with their electors. Both are subsequently thematized in Book VI. 
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Guthrie describes the election of the nomophylakes as taking place on “mainly 
democratic lines.”91 In addition, even if elections favor a certain class with regard to the 
officer-class actually elected, they still permit all electors to exercise their electoral 
privileges. Indeed, it seems that Plato exploits this combination of factors in his design of 
the legislation of Magnesia. As Morrow puts it, “Plato's basic intentions are clear….The 
demos is to be sovereign in certain matters, but it is not to rule.”92 In other words, anyone 
can play a political role by contributing to the process of governing, etc., even if 
inevitably the “chief officers of the state will be persons of maturity and experience."93 
Indeed, this state of things comports with the general Athenian-democratic condition 
which excluded the exercise of hubris while allowing for the differential emergence of 
talent.94  
In addition, the very fact that electors are called upon at all to make a contribution 
of their electoral labor to the process testifies to the at least partial value Plato ascribes 
their discriminating powers. This is in accordance with the “increased optimism” 
regarding the capacities of the non-philosophers typical of the citizen-body Bobonich has 
famously claimed to find in the passage from the Republic and the middle dialogues to 
the Laws and the other late dialogues.95 This increased optimism carries “significant 
                                                            
91 Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 333. 
92 Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City, 230. 
93 Ibid. Morrow goes on to describe this condition as the “mixture of monarchy and democracy, of authority 
and liberty” held out as a desideratum in Book III of the Laws. Ibid. 
94 Balot, Greek Political Thought, 79. 
95 Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics, other page numbers. See also Monoson, 
Plato’s Democratic Entanglements, 125. Laks, by contrast, analyzes the “politisation” of Platonic political 
thought as originating from a shift of focus from divine to definitively human concerns. Laks, Médiation et 
Coercition, 35. 
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implications for his political theory.”96 After all, the “the way that Plato thinks people are 
and can be” will certainly affect “what sort of political institutions and practices are 
appropriate for them.”97 Thus, the input of electors figures in both the elections of the 
nomophylakes and the councilmembers. 
However, although Bobonich’s main contention would only support the general 
drift of the systematic approach, it is not necessary to the latter, and indeed the systematic 
approach may better explain some aspects of the evidence. Whereas Bobonich relies 
upon an assumption of “increased optimism” on Plato’s powers in regard to the 
individual capacities of non-philosophers, the systematic approach need only rely upon 
the felicitous discovery of new ways of using the group capacities of individuals in 
groups the members of which are free to remain as dumb and un-philosophical as they 
were before. Aspects of the electoral process I describe below as “intelligent process” and 
“scene of instruction” may tell in favor of a new focus placed on group capacities rather 
than a revision concerning individual capacities. 
Regardless, Plato evidently thinks these citizens to be of a high enough standard 
in general to enfold their contributions into the electoral process in a way expected to be 
profitable.  Of course, this is not to deny, in either case, the plentiful and intricate checks 
and guiding mechanisms Plato has placed on these contributions – checks and 
mechanisms which suppose the imperfection of this electoral labor.98 However, Plato still 
values contributions highly enough to solicit them and use them in the first place, even if 
                                                            
96 Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics, 374. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Laks interprets the familiar monarcy plus democracy formula of the Laws in terms of competence of 
rulers plus participation of the citizens. Laks, Médiation et Coercition, 62. 
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he also thinks they have to be used and manipulated in key ways that speak to their 
limitations. Thus, for instance, in the election of the nomophylakes, there is the 
elimination-round, and all the nominations of the electors are made to undergo several 
rounds of iterative scrutiny. Likewise, in the case of the election of the councilmembers, 
the structure of incentives potentially has key effects on the patterns of voting. 
 In this sense, Plato’s scheme in Magnesia cleaves close to what some have 
identified in typical Greek political thought as a “well-articulated conception of good 
politics and the good life” founded on “healthy public institutions,” “exhibiting respect 
for the capacities of individuals,” the recognition of the “human importance of free 
political associating,” and “non-relative accounts of good character and healthy 
individual psychology.”99 Plato, too, wants to design good institutions that best utilize the 
capacities of individuals and the tendency for free political associating. In addition, to the 
extent that these practices allow a robust spirit of equality (ἰσονομία) to take root among 
the citizens in virtue of their common participation and common rights of participation, 
as was the case for actually existing democratic societies, Plato can likewise use the spirit 
of equality engendered for the purpose of stability.100 Cartledge glosses ἰσονομία as 
“equality of active citizen privileges under the laws, combined with equality of 
interpersonal respect.”101 
 Finally, it is in virtue of the active solicitation and utilization of the powers of the 
ordinary citizens that Plato’s society in the Laws differs from the “rule of law” tout court, 
in comparison with the rule of philosopher kings, to which so many have tried to reduce 
                                                            
99 Balot, Greek Political Thought, 15. 
100 Ibid., 49. 
101 Cartledge, Ancient Greek Political Thought in Practice, 63. 
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it. According to this view, the Laws carries out the prescription of the Statesman: i.e., that 
the rule of philosophers is best, but second-best is the rule of law.102 However, the society 
of the Laws is not merely the condition of the rule of law. Rather, it constitutes an 
innovative and philosophically fascinating mixture of established routines, patterns, and 
institutions oriented toward the solicitation and utilization of the individual and social 
powers of ordinary citizens in a manner reminiscent of actual Athenian practice.  
 
Some structural remarks 
 There are three levels of generality at which it is proper to analyze elements of 
electoral process in the Magnesian πολιτεία: (i) device, (ii) office, and (iii) culture. By (i) 
“device” I mean a kind of general mechanism or procedure that may be used in multiple 
contexts and as part of the electoral process for multiple offices – e.g., the scrutiny 
(δοκιμασία) or counter-nomination (ἀντιπροβολή). By (ii) “office” I mean the position of 
power or authority (ἀρχή) that is the terminus ad quem of some specific election (αἵρεσις) 
– e.g., guardian of the laws (νομοφύλαξ) or councilor (βουλευτής). By (iii) “culture” I 
mean the complete set of operative attitudes belonging to all the relevant political actors 
in an electoral process, including both candidates and electors, as these attitudes function 
upon and in concert with one another over both the short-term and long-term. So 
considered, we should see the culture of attitudes, etc., manifested in relation to the 
electoral process as continuous with the general culture of attitudes, etc., the entirety of 
which is possessed of political significance. Politics in Plato’s Magnesia, as well as 
                                                            
102 See, e.g., for one articulation of an extremely common view, Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 
335. 
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historical Athens, went well beyond the legal institutions of the polis.103 Indeed, it is 
arguably exactly the more robust network of habits and beliefs enfolding the political 
institutions of the Athenians – or anyone – which allows those institutions to function and 
continue to function in a stable way.104 
 A complete assessment of electoral process in Magnesia must make reference to 
all three levels of generality. In the subsequent document, I will have occasion to 
alternate among them. However, the narrative of my argument will focus on the electoral 
process associated with two offices in particular: (a) guardian of the laws (νομοφύλαξ) 
and (b) council-member (βουλευτής). I will examine these offices both as items of 
interest in their own right as well as exempla of various political devices or facets of 
Magnesian political culture. Prior to my examination of the electoral process for each of 
these offices, however, I will examine the narrative framework within which Plato’s 
discussion of electoral policy in general takes place – the “analytic of government.” 
 
2.1. The analytic of government 
 In Book V the Athenian characterizes as a “prelude” (προοίμιον) the long speech 
on soul, body, and property (726a-734e) which he has just concluded. It would only be 
natural after such a προοίμιον, he suggests, to provide the “tune” (νόμον),105 or rather a 
“sketch of a legal and political framework [νόμους πολιτείας]” (734e3-6).106 The form 
                                                            
103 Balot, Greek Political Thought, 5. 
104 Ibid., 49. 
105 The word νόμος can mean either “law, usage, custom” or “melody, strain” (LSJ). (This is one of many 
puns Plato makes on νόμος throughout the Laws.) Saunders translates προοίμιον in 734e3 as “preface” and 
προοίμιον in 734e4 as “prelude” in what seems to me an unnecessary bit of variatio hindering Plato’s 
(admittedly feeble) joke. 
106 Here is the full text of the phrase: τό γε ἀληθὲς νόμους πολιτείας ὑπογράφειν (734e5-6). 
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taken by the ensuing “sketch” mirrors what Plato considers the fundamental structure of 
government. 
This structure is illustrated by an analogy with weaving. Just as it is impossible 
“to construct the warp and the woof from the same stuff” – since the warp must be 
“strong and firm in character,” while the woof must be “softer and suitably workable” – 
so it is necessary to distinguish between “those occupying positions of authority” and 
those “whose education has been slighter and less testing” (734e6-735a4). 
The fundamental distinction between officers and others influences the mode of 
presentation of the Magnesian πολιτεία. Inasmuch as it is the officers who will interpret 
and enforce the laws (νομοί) of the πολιτεία – whatever they may be – it makes sense to 
examine the latter only after the former. Thus, the Athenian declares, “there are two 
elements in a political system”: the (a) “installation of individuals in office [τὸ μὲν ἀρχῶν 
καταστάσεις ἑκάστοις]” and (b) “equipping those officials with a code of laws [τὸ δὲ 
νόμοι ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἀποδοθέντες]” (735a5-6). 
 I call this division of narrative labor “Plato’s analytic of government.” In the 
section devoted to it, I will (i) provide a more detailed account of the analytic of 
government, especially as it pertains to electoral policy, (ii) give an explanation of the 
way or ways in which the basic structure of government associated with the analytic is of 
systematic interest, and (iii) examine the systematic strategies which emerge in 
consequence of the fundamental structure of government, especially again as they pertain 
to electoral policy. 
 
Setting out the analytic of government 
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 In Book V of the Laws, Plato describes the two elements of the analytic of 
government as (a) installing (καθιστάνειν) various individuals (ἕκαστοι) in various 
offices (ἀρχαί) and (b) assigning (ἀποδοῦναι) various laws (νόμοι) to those offices (735a-
6). He reiterates the analytic of government at the beginning of Book VI before 
proceeding to treat the first part of it in detail over the rest of Book VI.107 He also 
provides a more substantive characterization in Book VI of what falls under each of the 
two elements. Specifically, under the establishment of offices, he includes the decision 
regarding how many there ought to be (ὅσας τε αὐτὰς εἶναι δεῖ) and how they ought to be 
filled (τρόπον ὅντινα καθισταμένας), and under the assignment of laws, he includes the 
decision regarding which (οὕστινάς), how many (ὅσους), and what sort (οἵους) of laws 
are appropriate to the various offices (ἑκάσταις) (751a6-752b2). 
 Saunders accurately translates τρόπον ὅντινα καθισταμένας as “how they ought to 
be filled” (751a6). Clearly, the use of καθισταμένας in 751a6 differs in meaning from the 
use of καταστάσεις in 751a5 since Plato adduces the former as just one component of the 
latter. Indeed, it is necessary to distinguish between establishing a system of offices “in 
general” and establishing a system of offices “in particular.” Only the latter involves 
installing specific individuals (ἕκαστοι) in office. This, of course, is identical with 
electoral policy. 
 
The basic structure of government as systematic 
                                                            
107 There are some minor yet interesting differences between the two formulations. Since they are not 
relevant to the subject of this paper, I will omit a discussion of them. 
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 The basic structure of government implied by the analytic is itself of systematic 
interest. Not only do the officers exert a non-negligible influence over the pliable citizen 
body in a fashion conducive to a culture of order in general, but in addition, as the ones 
actually empowered to interpret and apply the laws, they hold the success or failure of the 
laws in their hands. In sum, even in a system model, it is vital to maximize the excellence 
of officers. 
 Plato makes an important analogy in Book V comparing the distinction between 
warp and woof in the case of weaving to the distinction between officers and others in the 
case of government. Just as the material used to construct the warp must be superior to 
the material used to construct the woof, so it is reasonable (κατὰ λόγον) to distinguish 
between “the authorities who are going to rule in a city” and those “whose education 
[παιδείᾳ] has been slighter and less testing” (734e6-a4).108 The comparison of politics to 
weaving is neither an arbitrary aside nor an innovation of the Laws.109 It should come as 
no surprise, therefore, that certain details of Plato’s analogy are fraught with political 
significance. Specifically, the warp is described as “strong and firm in character [ἰσχυρόν 
τε γὰρ καί τινα βεβαιότητα ἐν τοῖς τρόποις εἰληφός]” (734e9-735a1), while the woof is 
described as “softer and more suitably workable [τὸ δὲ μαλακώτερον καὶ ἐπιεικείᾳ τινὶ 
δικαίᾳ χρώμενον]” (735a1-2). 
The political mobilization of material qualities like hardness and softness is 
familiar from the Republic. In that dialogue, it was deemed necessary that nascent 
                                                            
108 Plato uses the word “education” (παιδεία) here the way he almost always uses it – i.e., to denote not the 
acquisition of technical or factual knowledge, but rather a moral-intellectual orientation toward the good 
and worthy. 
109 The Statesman makes extensive use of weaving – see, e.g., 305e-311c. 
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guardians be both spirited (θυμοειδεῖς) and philosophical (φιλοσοφοῖ) (376b).110 This 
complex state was in turn to be produced by the judicious combination of physical 
exercise (γυμναστική) and music and poetry (μουσική). Physical exercise stimulates the 
spirited part of the soul, but overindulgence may render it “hard and harsh [σκληρόν τε 
καὶ χαλεπὸν]” (410d8). Likewise, music and poetry stimulate the philosophic part of the 
soul, but overindulgence may render it “softer than it should be [μαλακώτερον…τοῦ 
δέοντος]” (410e12). The goal was to use both physical exercise and music and poetry in 
such a way as to harmonize the spirited and philosophic parts of the soul 
(ἡρμόσθαι…πρὸς ἀλλήλας) (410e8). This would enable the guardians to be both hard and 
soft in the complementary ways necessary to their portfolio of duties (410e8). 
In the Laws, the material qualities of hardness and softness are mobilized for 
political use in a very different way. Rather than attempting to “balance” or “harmonize” 
these qualities in the souls of some small, designated class, it is the body of citizens 
occupying office as a whole (τοὺς τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄρξοντας) that Plato likens 
to the warp, “strong and firm in character,” and it is the body of citizens who are not 
qualified for office as a whole (τοὺς σμικρᾷ παιδείᾳ βασανισθέντας) that Plato likens to 
the woof, “softer and more suitably workable” (734e9-735a4).111 
This new configuration of material qualities over the body politic signaled by 
Plato’s weaving metaphor is of interest as a systematic strategy of governance. As in the 
                                                            
110 It was deemed necessary due to what I have in the past called the “problem of the soldier.” Producing 
nascent guardians who are both θυμοειδεῖς and φιλοσοφοῖ means they will be χαλεποί toward unknown 
outsiders but πρᾶοι toward known fellow citizens. I write “nascent guardians” because at the stage of the 
narrative in question the “auxiliaries” and “complete guardians” had not yet been separated from one 
another. 
111 Saunders translates τοὺς σμικρᾷ παιδείᾳ βασανισθέντας as “those whose education has been slighter and 
less testing.” 
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Republic, the material qualities of hardness (ἰσχυρόν) and softness (μαλακώτερον) are 
paired with the corresponding pragmatic characteristics of fixedness (τινα βεβαιότητα) 
and pliability (ἐπιεικείᾳ τινὶ δικαίᾳ) (734e9-735a2). Furthermore, both fixedness and 
pliability are necessary to the integrity of a web or “piece of weaving” (734a6-7); they 
work together to sustain it. Similarly, the integrity of the polis requires a framework of 
officers “strong and firm in character” along with a “suitably workable” populace. 
Appointing the more educated over the less educated exploits local discrepancies in 
education by magnifying the influence of the former over the latter and thereby 
maximizing the global degree of education in the polis.112 This dovetails with Plato’s 
broader attempt to replace the chaotic and often detrimental processes of reputation-
formation endemic to the polis with a self-sustaining culture of excellence.113 
Plato places additional emphasis on the quality of the officers at the beginning of 
Book VI. There he is concerned about the danger of elevating “incompetent” 
(ἀνεπιτηδείους) individuals to office (751b7).114 After all, if incompetent officials are the 
ones in charge, it is irrelevant whether or not there is a “well-constructed state [πόλιν εὖ 
παρεσκευασμένην] with a well-framed legal code [τοῖς εὖ κειμένοις νόμοις]” (751b6-7). 
At best, the incompetent officials will simply waste these “good laws [εὖ τεθέντων]” with 
risible results (751b7-8). At worst, they will convert them into a form positively 
destructive to the state (751b8-c2). The disturbing ease with which apparently “good” 
laws can be nullified or even converted into their opposite reveals not only the 
                                                            
112 Again, Plato uses the word “education” (παιδεία) primarily to refer to moral-intellectual orientation 
rather than the possession of technical knowledge. 
113 I.e., a culture that accurately recognizes and effectively promotes excellence. 
114 Alternative translations of ἀνεπιτηδείους are “unfit,” “unsuitable,” and “useless.” 
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importance of appointing good officials, but also the status of laws themselves as neutral 
instruments, mere forms, or conditional goods. Yet this judgment does not condemn them 
as utterly worthless in comparison with the undimmed perfection of the philosopher-king. 
Rather, if mere laws are to be redeemed, it must be at the hands of capable individuals 
who receive their formation and are elected into office as the result of a reliable system – 
a system in which capable individuals are themselves dynamically embedded – operating 
over a social, cultural, and even biological domain.115 For it is the admixture of the 
human element, flawed yet still fundamentally capable, which can transform an empty 
collection of laws into a functioning system.  
 
Consequent systematic strategies 
 The importance of the excellence of the officers of Magnesia has been sufficiently 
established. Electing superior officers not only influences the other citizens in a way 
beneficial to the polis as a whole, but in addition even well-designed bodies of law 
require the consistent production, recognition, and exploitation of human excellence 
capable of redeeming mere mechanism or mere procedure. Let us therefore examine the 
provisional ways in which Plato announces it necessary to search for or test officers. 
 In the weaving analogy from Book V, Plato declares that the warp “must be of a 
superior type of material [διαφέρειν… τὸ… πρὸς ἀρετὴν γένος]” (734a8-9). Plato’s use 
of ἀρετή cannot be an accident. While ἀρετή is used in a non-moral sense with regard to 
                                                            
115 Cf. Critias 121a-b, where the ability to maintain the laws of Atlantis diminishes with increasing 
admixture of moral blood into kingly stock. Likewise, it is in virtue of the limits of laws that Plato resorts 
to the nocturnal council, but this is a law-focused action rather than a law-trampling one. Samaras, Plato on 
Democracy, 200–201, 297–99. 
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the warp, the very structure of the analogy dictates we assume that the officers of the 
state are likewise superior πρὸς ἀρετήν to the others. Plato further describes non-officers 
as those “whose education has been slighter and less testing [τοὺς σμικρᾷ παιδείᾳ 
βασανισθέντας]” (735a4).116 Thus, two elements distinguish officers from non-officers: 
(a) the former have undergone more testing (βάσανος) than the latter and (b) the former 
are assumed to possess more education (παιδεία) than the latter. The use of the verb 
βασανίζω offers a convenient link between the function of βάσανος in the moral-
intellectual questioning characteristic of Socrates in the early dialogues and the more 
literal sorts of testing Plato will claim make up a key part of the electoral process. 
 Plato resumes developing the idea of subjecting the officers of the state to some 
form of βάσανος in Book VI. Immediately after vividly describing the potentially 
disastrous consequences of putting the “incompetent” (ἀνεπιτήδειοι) in charge, he claims 
that what is necessary (δεῖ) for those entering office to have entered office in the right 
way (ὀρθῶς) is for them to have undergone (δεδωκότας) adequate testing (βάσανον 
ἱκανὴν) “right from their childhood until the moment of their election” (751c5-8).117 
Furthermore, the βάσανος in question should take as its object not only the candidates 
themselves (αὐτούς) but also their family background (γένος ἑκάστων). Plato thinks 
                                                            
116 Saunders’ translation does not follow the syntax of τοὺς σμικρᾷ παιδείᾳ βασανισθέντας. Following the 
syntax would produce something like “those who have been tested through education to a lesser extent.” 
Although Saunders’ translation does appear ultimately to come to the same thing as mine above, it is 
important to recognize the equivalent conceptual priority of testing (βάσανος) and education (παιδεία) – 
i.e., “testing” is not a mere attribute of the education the officers happened to receive; it is an essential 
element in their selection as officers in the first place. 
117 As regards ὀρθῶς, Saunders construes the sentence somewhat differently: “…if your candidates are to 
deserve promotion to positions of power [τοὺς ὀρθῶς ἰόντας ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν ἀρχῶν δυνάμεις]” (751c6). 
However, this conflates a process producing the right result (i.e., a worthy candidate) with a process 
producing a result in the right way (i.e., a correctly selected candidate). Plato does not care if a good 
candidate is somehow elected into office merely by accident. His concern is with reliable systems which 
consistently and reliably select the good candidates in a manner constitutive of the overall robustness of the 
system. See also the use of ὀρθῶς in 751d1. 
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one’s γένος is relevant for two reasons: (a) he thinks our native dispositions are at least 
partially heritable and (b) he thinks our future behavior is at least partially predictable 
from the manner of our upbringing. Thus, taking into account the γένος of each candidate 
in addition to the candidate himself enables more robust judgments concerning suitable 
candidates to be made. 
 The above mode of proceeding is an exemplar of what could be called “candidate 
strategies” – i.e., strategies for producing excellence in government through the 
subjection of candidates for office to special and rigorous forms of testing. However, 
Plato also relies upon strategies for producing excellence in government through the 
special training and education of the electors for these offices. Let these be called “elector 
strategies.”118 For instance, Plato decrees that the electors (τοὺς μέλλοντας αἱρήσεσθαι) 
ought “to have been brought up in law-abiding habits [τεθράφθαι ἐν ἤθεσι νόμων εὖ 
πεπαιδευμένους]” (751c8-9). Note especially the invocation of παιδεία here (somewhat 
obscured in Saunders’ translation): it is important that electors have received the right 
kind of education. Furthermore, it is important that they have received the right kind of 
education and training “so as to be able to approve or disapprove of the candidates for the 
right reasons and elect or reject them according to their deserts [πρὸς τὸ δυσχεραίνοντάς 
τε καὶ ἀποδεχομένους ὀρθῶς κρίνειν καὶ ἀποκρίνειν δυνατοὺς γίγνεσθαι τοὺς ἀξίους 
ἑκατέρων]” (751d1-2). 
 Three points should be made here. First, it is clear that Plato stipulates an 
“education” (παιδεία) and “upbringing” (τροφή) in “law abiding habits” (ἐν ἤθεσι νόμων) 
                                                            
118 Obviously, “electoral strategies” would be the ideal phrase here, but I often use the word “electoral” in a 
more general way that might prove confusing. 
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to be necessary for the electors because these things culminate in a disposition to 
judgment (δυσχεραίνειν and ἀποδέχεσθαι) which, in an electoral context, ensures that the 
electors will either elect or reject (κρίνειν or ἀποκρίνειν) precisely those candidates 
respectively worthy of either election or rejection (τοὺς ἀξίους ἑκατέρων). Second, the 
mere result that good candidates are elected and bad candidates are rejected is 
insufficient for Plato. He specifically stipulates that they must be elected or rejected in 
the right way (ὀρθῶς).119 Thus, as above robustness, rather than mere correctness, is the 
criterion here. Third, we should note Plato’s deep unease concerning elections as this is 
reflected in the elaborate schemes he adduces for the careful management of the 
potentially chaotic sentiments of electors. 
 As a coda to this discussion, we should note note various conditions at the start of 
the new city which Plato laments:120 (a) that the citizens don’t necessarily know one 
another (ὄντες τε ἀλλήλων ἀγνῶντες) (and thus are not in a position to accurately judge 
each other’s worth) and (b) that they have necessarily been educated in the right way 
(ἀπαίδευτοι) (751d3-5). Clearly, the opposite conditions must be desiderata for 
Magnesia. 
 
2.3. Election of the nomophylakes 
                                                            
119 I interpret the adverb ὀρθῶς as applying to κρίνειν καὶ ἀποκρίνειν. However, one could also (as indeed 
Saunders appears actually to do) interpret it as applying to δυσχεραίνοντάς τε καὶ ἀποδεχομένους. Still, the 
point would remain. 
120 This is part of a larger problem I call “the problem of initial conditions.” Put briefly, given that a huge 
amount of the attention and effort of a system is devoted to the difficult task of perpetuating that system, 
and conversely, given that the citizens must have been educated in precisely the right way, etc., for the 
system to function, how is it ever possible to begin at all? How can the state get a running start? The 
subject is treated in extenso in the Laws. Indeed, it would not be an exaggeration to call this a 
methodological obsession on the part of Plato. 
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 In this section, I will discuss those points of systematic interest implicated in the 
election of the nomophylakes, the “guardians of the law.” After providing an overview of 
the electoral process for the nomophylakes as a whole,121 I will treat six themes in 
succession which pertain to elements of the electoral process. As part of the discussion of 
some of these themes, I may refer to the electoral processes of other offices in Magnesia, 
various electoral devices of wider application, and the political culture in general. The 
themes I shall discuss are (1) military membership for electors, (2) the function of 
religiosity, (3) the “expanded ballot,” (4) the election as intelligent process, (5) the 
election as scene of instruction, and (6) the use of age restrictions. 
 
Overview of the electoral process for nomophylakes 
 Such is the importance of the nomophylakes that the Athenian declares, speaking 
with regard to the initial founding of the government of Magnesia by the deputation of 
Cretans, that it is “absolutely vital [ἀναγκαιότατον]” that the nomophylakes be chosen 
first (πρώτους αἱρεῖσθαι) and with all possible care (ἁπάσῃ σπουδῇ) (752e1-2).122 Other 
offices, by contrast, may be allotted less labor (βραχύτερον ἔργον) (752d7-e1). Now, with 
regard to the future when “the constitution has become established” (753b3), the 
Athenian prescribes the following form for the election of the nomophylakes (αἵρεσις 
αὐτῶν) (753b4-5). 
                                                            
121 There is some textual dispute about this part of Book VI. See Saunders, “The Alleged Double Version in 
the Sixth Book of Plato’s Laws.” 
122 Schöpsdau gives a helpful overview of the duties of the nomophylakes. In addition to concerning 
themselves with “die Revision von Gesetzen order die Ergänzung von Gesetzlücken und den Erlaß von 
Detailregelungen auf allen möglichen Gebieten,” the nomophylakes are in charge of voter-rolls and 
property-records, play a role in selecting certain high military offices, and in general enjoy “entweder 
alleinige Entscheidungsbefugnis oder ein Mitspracherecht” in a great number of departments. Schöpsdau, 
Nomoi, Buch IV-VII,114–15. 
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 First, everyone who has served in the past or is serving at present in the military 
should participate (753b4-7). Second, they should proceed to “the temple which the state 
considers to be the most venerable” (753b7-753c1). Third, each elector should place there 
“on the altar of the god a small tablet [πινάκιον] on which he has written the name of the 
person he wishes to vote for, adding the candidate’s father, tribe, and deme” as well as 
the same information pertaining to himself (753c1-4). Fourth, for thirty days anyone who 
wishes is allowed “to remove any tablet he finds objectionable and put it on display in the 
market-place” (753c5-7). Fifth, the officials “must exhibit to the state at large the three 
hundred tablets that head the list” (753c7-d1). Sixth, the electors again record their 
nominations “on the basis of this list” (753d1-2). Seventh, the “hundred names that head 
the list” are to be publicly displayed as before (753d2-3). Eighth, “anyone who wishes” 
must “walk between the victims of a sacrifice” and record which of the hundred he 
chooses (753d3-5).123 Finally, the thirty-seven “who receive most votes” are declared 
elected (753d5-6).124 In addition, the Athenian further specifies that only citizens between 
the ages of fifty and seventy may serve as nomophylakes (755a4-b2). 
                                                            
123 Here is the full text: τὸ δὲ τρίτον φερέτω μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἑκατὸν ὁ βουληθεὶς ὃν ἂν βούληται, διὰ τομίων 
πορευόμενος (735d3-5). Saunders translates ἐκ τῶν ἑκατὸν as “which of these three hundred,” presumably 
taking ἑκατὸν (which I suspect is an error, perhaps being inserted as a faulty parallel with the use of ἑκατὸν 
in the second round of voting or a corruption of ἑκάτων or ἕκαστος) with τὸ δὲ τρίτον before. However, τὸ 
δὲ τρίτον clearly functions to mark this round of voting as the third round, exactly as δὲ τὸ δεύτερον 
functions a few lines before and indeed as Saunders himself translates: “on the third occasion.” It is thus 
unquestionably the case that the third and final round of voting is conducted on the basis of the outcome of 
the second round (i.e., the hundred) rather than of the first round (i.e., the three hundred). There is also a 
dispute about the meaning of ὁ βουληθεὶς in 743d. Saunders, Notes on the Laws of Plato, 35. 
124 Again, here is the full text: ἑπτὰ δὲ καὶ τριάκοντα, οἷς ἂν πλεῖσται γένωνται ψῆφοι, κρίναντες 
ἀποφηνάντων ἄρχοντας. Saunders translates κρίναντες ἀποφηνάντων ἄρχοντας as “must then submit to 
scrutiny and be declared elected.” Presumably, he is taking κρίναντες to mean something like “having been 
scrutinized” even though δοκιμασία and its cognates, not κρινεῖν and its cognates, provide the usual lexicon 
for the scrutiny. However, κρίναντες actually just means “elected,” exactly as it does in several nearby 
lines, e.g. κριθέντα (755c7) or προκριθέντας (755d2). That said, Saunders is surely correct to suppose that 
the nomophylakes were scrutinized. This is confirmed a little later when the Athenian prescribes that the 
67 
 
 
2.3.1. Military membership for electors 
 The duty to participate as an elector in the election of the nomophylakes is 
enjoined upon all who serve “in the cavalry or infantry” or “fought in the field while 
young and strong enough to do so” (753b4-7). Similarly, the generals are to be elected by 
“all those who have served in the armed forces at the proper age, or are serving at the 
time” (755c5-7). Restricting the electorate to this group has important political effects. 
Specifically, it designates the “military ethic” native to Magnesia as the preferred 
“political culture” in a way that hopefully mitigates what Plato takes to be an anarchical 
danger inherent to democracy. 
 In Book XII, Plato provides a “great deal of advice [πολλὴ μὲν συμβουλή]” and a 
“large number of regulations [πολλοὶ δὲ νόμοι]” on the subject of military service 
(στρατιῶν δὲ ἕνεκα) (942b5-6). Among them the following principle is deemed to be of 
the utmost importance (μέγιστον): no one must at any time exist “free from authority” 
(ἄναρχον) (942a6-7).125 Accordingly, Plato warns, “nobody must get into the habit [ἔθει 
ψυχὴν εἰθίσθαι] of acting alone [κατὰ μόνας] and independently [αὐτὸν ἐφ’ αὑτοῦ]” 
(942a7-b1). Instead, it is necessary that we condition ourselves (διδάξαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἔθεσι) 
to an “instinctive rejection of the very notion [μήτε γιγνώσκειν μήτ’ ἐπίστασθαι] of doing 
anything without our companions [τὸ χωρίς τι τῶν ἄλλων πράττειν]” (942c1-3) and that 
we “live a life in which we never do anything, if possible, except by combined and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
generals be “scrutinized in the same way as the guardians of the laws [δοκιμασθέντων καθάπερ οἱ 
νομοφύλακες]” (755d6). In any case, I myself will discuss the scrutiny qua electoral device not in the 
present section, but in connection with the election of the βουλή in Chapter 3. 
125 Here is the full sentence: μέγιστον δὲ τὸ μηδέποτε ἄναρχον μηδένα εἶναι, μήτ’ ἄρρενα μήτε θήλειαν 
(942a6-7). Saunders translates, “The vital point is that no one, man or woman, must ever be left without 
someone in charge of him” (942a6-). 
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unified action as members of a group [ἀλλ’ ἁθρόον ἀεὶ καὶ ἅμα καὶ κοινὸν τὸν βίον ὅτι 
μάλιστα πᾶσι πάντων γίγνεσθαι]” (942c3-4). Plato claims that there is no “more powerful 
or efficient weapon” than this practiced solidarity (942c4-6), which he additionally 
glosses as a readiness to rule others and be ruled by them (ἄρχειν τε ἄλλων ἄρχεσθαί θ’ 
ὑφ’ ἑτέρων) (942c7-8). 
 Thus, the military ethic Plato envisions for the citizens of Magnesia is above all 
an anti-anarchical ideology according to which citizens are encouraged to take turns 
ruling each other and being ruled as part of a group.126 To this extent, it differs from an 
atmosphere of mere obedience, as Guthrie rightly recognizes.127 It is intended to be 
thoroughly dispositional (e.g., ἔθει ψυχὴν εἰθίσθαι in 942a8, or διδάξαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἔθεσι 
in 942c2) even to the extent that citizens find repellant the “very notion” (e.g., γιγνώσκειν 
and ἐπίστασθαι in 942c2-3) of not behaving in accordance with it. Perhaps the most 
salient aspect of the military ethic of Magnesia is its emphasis upon communal-
mindedness: adherents are quite literally instructed to live their life as a κοινὸς βίος. 
 The language with which Plato restricts the right to participate in elections to the 
military directly recalls the communal-mindedness central to the military ethic. In the 
case of the election of the nomophylakes, Plato decrees that everyone “who fought in the 
field [καὶ πολέμου κεκοινωνήκωσιν]” should “participate [κοινωνούντων] in the 
election of the officers” (753b4-7).128 Thus, not only does Plato’s use of the verb 
                                                            
126 The link between sociality (i.e., group-formation) and authority, which may appear arbitrary to us, is 
quintessentially Platonic. Indeed, for Plato to truly be part of a group means to be one with that group, and 
for a group to act “as one” means that all members must act in immediate concert with the will of the group 
as a whole.  
127 Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 351–52. 
128 The emphasis is mine. I have also modified Saunders’ translation slightly: he omits any translation of 
τῆς τῶν ἀρχόντων αἱρέσεως (“in the election of the officers”). 
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κοινωνεῖν anticipate the communal-minded rhetoric of the κοινὸς βίος of Book XII, but 
in addition he uses the very same verb to describe military and political forms of 
participation in immediate succession. Likewise, in the case of the election of generals, 
Plato explicitly restricts participation in the electoral process to οἱ τοῦ πολέμου κοινωνοὶ 
of past and present (755c6-7). Clearly, Plato wishes to employ for political purposes the 
anti-anarchical, communal-minded ideology associated with the military ethic of 
Magnesia. This ethic should in no way be reduced to an atmosphere of unquestioning 
obedience; rather, one is accustomed to alternating between ruling and being ruled, in all 
things attending to and being cognizant of the interests of the group.129 Of course, this is 
certainly not without Athenian precedent: Balot stresses the close proximity between the 
military and the political as joined by common associations regarding shame and 
honor.130 Likewise, we should be attuned to the trans-institutional character of such a 
military ethic, regardless of its contingent activation in the case of the election of the 
nomophylakes, again an Athenian legacy.131 It is precisely with the support of such extra-
institutional circulating ideologies that political institutions function.132 In the case of 
ancient democracy, Cartledge asserts that it “like any other politeia, was a total social 
phenomenon, a culture and not merely an institutionalized political system (as we would 
understand that).”133 
Book III contributes additional evidence regarding the association between 
κοινωνία and the military, the status of κοινωνία as a political desideratum, and the 
                                                            
129 Cf. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 351–52. 
130 Balot, Greek Political Thought, 4. 
131 Ibid., 5. 
132 Balot, Greek Political Thought. 
133 Cartledge, Ancient Greek Political Thought in Practice, 57. 
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moral-intellectual ramifications of κοινωνία.134 In the age of Cyrus the “rulers [ἄρχοντες] 
granted a degree of liberty [ἐλευθερίας] to their subjects [ἀρχομένοις] and put them on 
the same footing as themselves [ἐπὶ τὸ ἴσον ἄγοντες]” (694a6-7). The result was 
immediate military success: the soldiers (στρατιῶται) became more friendly (μᾶλλον 
φίλοι) toward their commanders (στρατηγοῖς) and “displayed greater zeal in the face of 
danger” (694a7-b1). The element of communal-mindedness is eminently visible here: the 
ἀρχόμενοι merge their interests with those of the ἄρχοντες, and the στρατιῶται theirs 
with those of the στρατηγοί. Moreover, the success of the Persians due to their 
communal-mindedness extended beyond military affairs. Whenever there was “some 
sensible man” (τις φρόνιμος) among them who “had some advice to offer” (βουλεύειν 
δυνατός), Cyrus “felt no jealousy” presumably because he correctly imagined his 
interests were identical with those of his subjects (694b1-3). Accordingly, not only did 
Cyrus grant his subjects “free speech” (παρρησίαν), but in addition he actively “valued 
those who could contribute to the formulation of policy [τοὺς εἴς τι δυναμένους 
συμβουλεύειν]” (694b3-4).135 Any intelligent person could therefore make use of his own 
intellectual capacity (κοινὴν τὴν τοῦ φρονεῖν… παρείχετο δύναμιν) for the sake of the 
common cause (εἰς τὸ μέσον) (694b4-5). Thus, the great κοινωνία that obtained among 
the Persians in the age of Cyrus facilitated not only military success, but also the 
formation of a kind of extraordinary communal intellect (κοινὴν τήν τοῦ 
φρονεῖν...δύναμιν in 694b5, νοῦ κοινωνίαν in 694b6) oriented toward communal interests 
                                                            
134 On Plato and the philosophy of history, see Bury, “Plato and History.” and, especially, Dombrowski, 
Plato’s Philosophy of History. 
135 Schöpsdau characterizes παρρησία as “das Kennzeichen der Demokratie überhaupt und der attischen im 
besonderen.” He provides much other interesting information on the historicity of, sources of, and parallels 
with Plato’s comments on the Persians. Schöpsdau, Nomoi, Buch I-III, 461, 457ff. 
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(εἰς τὸ μέσον). Clearly, this is to be compared with the passage in Book XII on the 
military ethic of Magnesia: in neither case, is obedience tout court a political 
desideratum, but rather an active commitment to the aims of the group and the 
willingness to employ one’s deliberative intellect to that end.136 
Similarly, after Darius introduced a “certain degree of equality for all [ἰσότητα 
κοινήν τινα]” and oversaw the disbursement of “tribute” (δάσμον) among the people, he 
was able to stimulate “a feeling of community and friendship among them [φιλίαν…καὶ 
κοινωνίαν πᾶσιν Πέρσαις]” and to “rally all the people to his side” (τὸν Περσῶν δῆμον 
προσαγόμενος) through “his generosity in money and gifts” (695d1-3).137 Once again, the 
achievement of κοινωνία issues in military success: “his armies regarded him with such 
affection that they added to the territory Cyrus had bequeathed at least as much again” 
(695d4-6). 
 Finally, let us consider the negative evaluation Plato assigns the reigns of 
Cambyses and Xerxes.138 Here as well we receive testimony, if of an indirect sort, 
regarding (i) κοινωνία as a political desideratum, (ii) κοινωνία as an orientation toward 
communal interests, and (iii) the permanent association between κοινωνία and military 
efficacy. Plato claims that Cambyses and Xerxes “were too strict in depriving the people 
of liberty and too energetic in introducing authoritarian government” (697c7-9). As a 
result, they came to destroy all “friendship” (τὸ φίλον) and “community of spirit” (τὸ 
κοινὸν) as existed in the state (697c9-d1). The lack of κοινωνία, in turn, means that the 
                                                            
136 Cf. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 351–52. 
137 I have modified Saunders’ translation in a few negligible ways here. 
138 Dusanic believes Book III in general to be a Platonic political statement to his contemporaries regarding 
the threat from Philip of Macedon. Dusanic, Istorija i politika u Platonovim “Zakonima” = History and 
politics in Plato’s “Laws.” Post, likewise, reads a set of political instructions into Book III. Levi Arnold 
Post, “The Preludes to Plato’s Laws.” 
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“policy of the rulers” (ἡ τῶν ἀρχόντων βουλὴ) is not formulated (βουλεύεται), as it was 
under Cyrus and Darius, in combination with others and with regard to communal 
interests (ὑπὲρ ἀρχομένων καὶ τοῦ δήμου), but rather exclusively by themselves and “to 
support their own authority [ἀλλ’ ἕνεκα τῆς αὑτῶν ἀρχῆς]” (697d1-3). The lack of 
κοινωνία also has dire repercussions for the military: “When they come to need the 
common people [τοὺς δήμους] to fight on their behalf [περὶ ἑαυτῶν], they discover the 
army has no loyalty [οὐδὲν κοινὸν], no eagerness to face danger and fight” (697d6-e1). 
The indifference of the δῆμος to the plight of the rulers perfectly mirrors the indifference 
of the rulers to the plight of the δῆμος.  
 Likewise, the narrative of the Athenians in Book III emphasizes the close 
connection between κοινωνία and the military as well as the political desirability of 
κοινωνία. In both key instances of Athenian military success in the Persian Wars, their 
ability to cooperate with one another and their pro-social attitudes play a key role in the 
eventual outcome. Furthermore, these things are also associated with an affective 
deference toward the laws of the community. Let us first consider the case of the battle at 
Marathon. The Athenians at this battle are said to have “displayed a tremendous spirit of 
cooperation [σφόδρα φιλία]” (698c2-3). In addition, they are said to have done so – at 
least, in part – thanks to the “Lady Modesty [δεσπότις …αἰδώς]…a despot who made us 
live in willing subjection to the laws then in force” [δουλεύοντες… ἠθέλομεν].” (698b5-
6) Second, let us consider the invasion of Xerxes. Once again, the Athenians are said to 
have possessed “a spirit of solidarity [πάντα φιλίαν ἀλλήλων]” (699c1-2), and once again 
they are said to have done so partly on account of the fear “they had learned to 
experience as a result of being subject [δουλεύοντες] to an ancient code of laws” (699c2-
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c4). In sum, by activating militarity as a preferred context of association, Plato arguably 
promotes a sense of κοινωνία and deference to authority among his prospective electors. 
Note, also, the functionality of shame – a mode of social fear contraposed against 
physical fear – to the link between the political concept of κοινωνία and militarity.139 
 We can derive additional information regarding the valence of militarity in the 
elections of Magnesia from key details of the election of the various military officials 
themselves. These elections take place amid the assembly of everyone who has 
undergone or is undergoing military training (755c5-7) convened by the nomophylakes 
“in the holiest and most capacious place they can find” (755e5-6). The different kinds of 
soldiers – the hoplites, cavalry, and other ranks – all sit apart from one another in an 
organized way (755e7-8). The generals and cavalry-commanders are elected by the entire 
assembly, the phylarchs by the cavalry, and so on in the case of the company-
commanders (taxiarchs), et al., with the exception of certain light troops (755e8-a3). 
However, as is made explicit in the case of the cavalry (756b1-2) and is implicit for all 
the military elections, the whole assembly beholds both the elections in which the 
individual electors participate and those put on by others. 
 In effect, the series of military elections functions as a giant spectacle of the 
constitution of order beheld by those taking part. The typical onlooker will behold both 
the entire assembly along with its individual constituents, all organized in such a way as 
to show the composition of the whole, electing their leaders in a methodical and rule-
                                                            
139 And see Balot, Greek Political Thought, 4. 
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bound way. 140 These details of ceremony accord precisely with the military ethic 
described in Book XII (942a-d): (i) no one is “free from authority” (ἄναρχος), but instead 
the setting of authorities over all is put on display; (ii) no one acts “alone and 
independently,” but rather all vote “by combined and unified action as members of a 
group;” and (iii) all are prepared and further conditioned for “the exercise of authority 
over others and submission to them in turn.” (942a-d) In sum, the election of the military 
offices can be viewed as a kind of rigorously controlled theatrocracy. It sheds additional 
light on the valence of militarity in Magnesia and how we might expect that militarity to 
influence the electoral process. 
 
2.3.2. The function of religiosity 
 Religious signifiers and paraphernalia are abundantly distributed throughout the 
election of the nomophylakes. Each round of nominations is to take place in the “temple 
which the state considers to be the most venerable [τιμιώτατον]” (752b7-c1). Here the 
electors place their inscribed πινάκια directly “on the altar of the god” (752c1-3). The 
temple as a site of religiosity contrasts with the marketplace as a site of secularity, where 
those who wish may within the specified time-period remove πινάκια from the temple. 
As part of the third round of nominations, anyone who wishes to participate must “walk 
between the victims of a sacrifice” on the way to recording his vote (753d3-5). Indeed, 
the very duration of the election-period (at least thirty days) along with the cumbersome 
                                                            
140 Thus, note the significant theatricality of this electoral process, a tendency which also applies to that of 
the nomophylakes. Monoson, in her otherwise trenchant analysis of the role of the theatês in Plato, gives 
short shrift to the function of theatricality and spectatorship in the Laws. Monoson, Plato’s Democratic 
Entanglements. 
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series of necessary steps and the alternation of the public display of names and collective 
submission of πινάκια, is reminiscent of a religious ritual.141 
 This atmosphere of religiosity extends to other elections. The various military 
officers are to be elected by everyone once convened “in the holiest [ἱερώτατόν] and 
most capacious place they can find” (755e4-6). The selection of priests by lot is framed 
as the direct solicitation of divine intervention: “one should leave it to the god himself to 
express his wishes, and allow him to guide the luck of the draw” (759b7-c1). Likewise, 
the ultimate stage in the election of the exegetes requires that “nine names should then be 
sent to Delphi for the oracle to select one from each group of three” (759d7-8). Finally, 
with respect to the use of the lot in the election of the members of the βουλή, the 
Athenian comments, “even then we prayed to the gods of good luck to make the lot give 
the right decisions” (757e4-6).142 
 The religiosity appropriate to Magnesia functions, much like the military ethic, as 
an anti-anarchical ideology in harmony with the preferred political culture of the state.143 
Plato’s liberal use of the signifiers and paraphernalia of religion in the electoral process is 
politically efficacious inasmuch as these things instill in the citizens a generalized sense 
of reverence or piety that Plato thinks beneficial.  As in the case of militarity, there is 
strong Athenian precedent for the link between religion and the political. As Balot 
comments, “As a result, the political was always intertwined with religious custom, 
                                                            
141 Additionally, there may be religious significance to the number three (as in three rounds of nomination), 
and the placement of the πινάκιον on the altar may be supposed to mimic the ritual of a religious offering. 
142 See Chapter 3. 
143 Schofield suggests that an important function of religion in Magnesian society is to facilitate inter-
personal knowledge among the citizens. Schofield, Plato, 314–15. If this is the case, then the markers of 
religiosity will also function to an end similar to the one I delineate under the heading of the “expanded 
ballot” below. Schofield also cites the utility of a “cohesive power of an ideology grounded in religion” 
more generally. Ibid., 333. 
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belief, and practice.”144 Similarly, we should note that the political significance of an 
atmosphere of religiosity is certainly not limited to certain institutional operations, but 
rather possesses a trans-institutional or extra-legal character wholly in keeping with the 
traditional Athenian practice Plato sought to bend to his purpose.145 Such trans-
institutional ideologies function to tie together and undergird the official institutions of 
the state.146 They are part of the “total social phenomenon” with which Cartledge 
identifies the politeia, beyond an “institutionalized political system.”147 
 Plato’s most comprehensive statement regarding the form religiosity should take 
in Magnesia can be found in the “theological address” to the colonists in 715e-718a. 
There he presents a sympathetic portrait of a man “who means to live in happiness” and 
adheres to justice “with meekness and humility” (716a3-4), followed by a scathing 
portrait of a man “whose soul is afire with the arrogant belief [μεθ’ ὕβρεως] that so far 
from needing someone to control and lead him [ὡς οὔτε ἄρχοντος οὔτε τινὸς ἡγεμόνος 
δεόμενος], he can play the leader to others [ἄλλοις ἱκανὸς ὢν ἡγεῖσθαι]” (716a7-b1).148 
The Athenian refers to the latter as deserted by god (ἔρημος θεοῦ) and claims that “in his 
desolation he collects others like himself, and in his soaring frenzy he causes universal 
chaos…and brings himself, his home and state to rack and ruin” (716b1-5). In the wake 
of all this, the Athenian proposes to examine “what action” (τί…δρᾶν) a sensible man 
(τὸν ἑμφρονα) should take and “what outlook” (τί...διανοεῖσθαι) he should possess 
                                                            
144 Balot, Greek Political Thought, 4. 
145 Ibid., 5. 
146 Ibid., 49. 
147 Cartledge, Ancient Greek Political Thought in Practice, 57. 
148 The rhetoric of “anarchy” (e.g., οὔτε ἄρχοντος) is of course quite familiar. 
77 
 
(715b5-7). This quickly takes the form of examining “what conduct” (τίς πρᾶξις) is 
favored by and in accordance with the wishes of god (φίλη καὶ ἀκόλουθος θεῷ) (716c1).  
 The Athenian justifies his account of the inner orientation that best fits the above 
description by reference to two principles:(i) the “old saying” that “like approves of like” 
(716c1-4) and (ii) his own anti-Protagorean, anti-anarchic contention that “it is god who 
is preeminently the measure of all things [ὁ δὴ θεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον], 
much more so than any man, as they say” (716c4-6). Thus, if one wishes to become 
favored by someone of this sort (τῷ τοιούτῳ προσφιλῆ), it is necessary as much possible 
to become of this sort oneself (αὐτὸν τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαῖον γίγνεσθαι) (716c6-d1). In other 
words, it is the moderate man (ὁ σώφρων) who is “god’s friend” (θεῷ φίλος) by reason of 
being similar to god (ὅμοιος), while it is the “immoderate and unjust man” (μὴ σώφρων, 
ἄδικος) who is god’s enemy (διάφορος) by reason of being dissimilar to god (ἀνόμοιός) 
(716d1-3).149 
 To live one’s life according to the principle that god rather than any man is the 
measure of all things is the very opposite of the anarchic worldview held by the man 
bereft of god (ἔρημος θεοῦ), who vainly imagines that “so far from needing someone to 
control and lead him [ὡς οὔτε ἄρχοντος οὔτε τινὸς ἡγεμόνος δεόμενος], he can play the 
leader to others [ἄλλοις ἱκανὸς ὢν ἡγεῖσθαι]” (716a7-b1). According to Plato, this is the 
most essential expression of piety and the most important form of worship; engaging in 
other forms of worship in its absence will be useless at best and counterproductive at 
worst (716d-717a).150 Still, the good man is instructed to dwell in the company of the 
                                                            
149 In addition, “The same reasoning applies to the other vices” (716d3-4). 
150 We receive perhaps an intimation of this belief-complex in the Euthyphro. 
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gods at all times (προσομιλεῖν ἀεὶ τοῖς θεοῖς) via prayers, offerings, and every form of 
worship (συμπάσῃ θεραπείᾳ θεῶν) (716d6-e1). Moreover, the supreme piety which Plato 
declares the “target [σκοπὸς] at which we should aim [οὗ δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι]” (717a3-4) 
issues in a descending hierarchy of objects we owe reverence. We are also to honor the 
gods of Olympus, the gods of the underworld, the spirits (δαίμονες), heroes, ancestral 
gods (πατρῷοι θεοί), and finally our living parents (717a-718a). 
Thus, Plato privileges under the auspices of the state religion a very specific inner 
orientation or mode of piety according to which we are to (i) look to god as the measure 
of all things, (ii) imitate god by cultivating moderation, etc., and (iii) engage in a range of 
traditional activities with a general attitude of “reverence.” Furthermore, as in the case of 
militarity above, the narratives from Book III can help illustrate the mode of piety 
activated and propagated by the electoral process. In the course of the narrative of 
Athenian decadence, the average member of the “bad” audience gains the “arrogance to 
set himself up as a capable judge” in musical matters (700e5-6). Subsequently, this 
arrogance spreads to non-musical matters as well: everyone comes to possess “the 
conviction that he was an authority on everything” (701a5-6). This doubly universal 
arrogance gives rise to “effrontery” (ἀναισχυντία) – i.e., the willingness to traduce or 
gainsay all standards outside oneself (701a7-8). The great chain of piety is here 
anticipated as a ladder of impiety as the effrontery of the citizens increases: defiance of 
authorities, then of parents and relatives, of the laws, and finally of “oaths and promises 
and religion in general” (701b-c). 
In sum, an atmosphere of religiosity functions in Magnesia inasmuch as the latter 
is associated with a generalized reverence for what is beyond or due deference from the 
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self. It is thus inherently anti-anarchical and counters the inherently anarchical framework 
of elections. Electors, suitably primed by the religious elements that figure in the 
electoral process, are encouraged to make their electoral decisions in a manner that has 
the best interests of the state at heart – i.e., to choose as if they were not themselves the 
source of effective choice, but rather to make their choices in the light of social and 
cultural standards arising from subordination to the good of the community. 
 
2.3.3. The expanded ballot 
 When the electors of the nomophylakes submit their nominations, they do so by 
placing a small tablet (πινάκιον) on the altar inscribed with eight pieces of information: 
(1a) the name of the nominee, (1b) his father, (1c) his tribe, and (1d) his deme; as well as 
(2a) the name of the elector, (2b) his father, (2c) his tribe, and (2d) his deme (753c1-4).151 
Needless to say, this differs considerably from what most conceive traditional voting to 
be, as well as from the Greek χειροτονία. According to Morrow, the written ballot was an 
innovation of Plato’s.152 Both of these things are “simpler” than the expanded ballot, and 
there is no permanent record of who voted for whom.153 Plato’s use of the “expanded 
ballot” is significant in two main ways. First, it forces voters to contextualize their votes 
                                                            
151 Plato explicitly details this process for the first round of nominations. It is unclear if the same must be 
done for the second and third round of nominations. In the case of the second round of nominations, it 
depends on how one interprets the ὡσαύτως in τὴν δὲ πόλιν ὡσαύτως ἐκ τούτων φέρειν πάλιν ὃν ἂν 
ἕκαστος βούληται (753d1-2). However, whether the full “expanded ballot” is used in the subsequent rounds 
does not really affect the two main arguments. This is because the “Kleisthentic considerations” I adduce in 
the case of (1a)-(1d) would also apply to subsequent rounds of voting via expanded ballot, but what I say 
about “signed votes” versus “unsigned votes” would only apply to rounds of nomination followed by the 
right of removal (for which see 753c5-7) – i.e., the first round alone.  
152 Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City, 231. 
153 Of course, in the American case, there is a record of who received how many votes (since this is how 
victory is determined), and there is a record of whether someone voted, but there is no record of the 
candidate for whom each person voted. 
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and specifically take account of father, tribe, and deme. Second, the “signed” nature of 
ballots activates pro-reputational concerns lest, as a result of the elimination-round, 
invidious inferences are made as to the elector. 
 By forcing the voter to inscribe on his πινάκιον the apparently “gratuitous” 
information of the nominee’s father, tribe, and deme, Plato in effect forces the voter to 
make his nomination with these things in mind – i.e., Plato “thematizes” them as items of 
interest. To see what the political significance of such a thematization would be, we must 
examine it in the context of the incredibly important set of political reforms associated 
with the Athenian politician Kleisthenes. For the details of these reforms, I rely on the 
excellent account contained in the Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία (part of the corpus 
Aristotelicum).154 
Kleisthenes was famous as a democratizing reformer. According to Aristotle,155 
Kleisthenes “won the support of the common people [δῆμον] by promising to give the 
state into their hands [ἀποδιδοὺς τῷ πλήθει τὴν πολιτείαν]” (21.1-2). In the aftermath of 
the fall of the Peisistratids, Kleisthenes became the “chief and leader of the people 
[ἡγεμὼν ἦν καὶ τοῦ δήμου προστάτης]” (21.4). In addition to inventing (or reviving) the 
ostracism (22.1), the most important political reform of Kleisthenes was his 
reorganization of the tribal system. 
                                                            
154 It is necessary here to distinguish between history and historiography. The history itself is frankly 
irrelevant; what matters in the present context is what the Greeks told themselves and thought about their 
history (i.e., their historiography) and thus how Plato situated his own projects in relation to accepted 
historiography. 
155 With regard to the Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία, it is the consensus of scholars that, while Aristotle himself is 
probably not the author, the work was certainly produced by someone in his school. Nevertheless, I will 
continue to refer to the author of this work as Aristotle, but only as a façon de parler. For English and 
Greek versions of this text, see Fritz and Kapp, Aristotle’s Constitution of Athens and Related Texts,; 
Thalheim, Aristoteles Πολιτεία Αθηναίων. 
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Before Kleisthenes, the voting population of Athens belonged to one of four 
“tribes” (φυλαί). These tribes were regionalized – i.e., concentrated in specific regions of 
Attica – and they were dominated by powerful, aristocratic γενή. The right to vote was 
contingent upon tribal membership, which in turn was established via genealogical 
records. However, after Kleisthenes, the situation would be considerably different. First, 
he replaced the old set of four tribes with a new set of ten tribes in order, Aristotle tells 
us, to mix up the population (ἀναμεῖξαι βουλόμενος) “so that a greater number would 
share in the administration of the state [μετάσχωσι πλείους τῆς πολιτείας]” (21.2). This 
would occur because the right to vote (i.e., to participate in the πολιτεία, to be a πολίτης) 
was made no longer contingent upon one’s tribal membership as genealogically certified, 
but rather upon one’s registration with a certain deme (locality). Thus, Aristotle cites the 
political slogan contemporaneous with the reforms of Kleisthenes, “No tribe-
investigation [τὸ μὴ φυλοκρινεῖν]” (21.2), which was directed, he claims, against “those 
who wanted to check on family backgrounds [πρὸς τοὺς ἐξετάζειν τὰ γένη 
βουλομένους]” (21.3). Likewise, Kleisthenes instituted the practice of citizens referring 
to one another not by their fathers’ names, but rather by the names of their demes 
(demotic) (21.4). Interestingly, the inherently regional concept of a deme itself underwent 
something of a de-regionalization: one need not actually live in one’s deme. As Traill 
comments, “After the time of Kleisthenes, every Athenian, regardless of his domicile, 
bore one and only one demotic, almost invariably his father's, which he obtained on being 
enrolled in the deme register after completing his eighteenth year."156 Thus, the deme was 
                                                            
156 Traill, The Political Organization of Attica; a Study of the Demes, Trittyes, and Phylai, and Their 
Representation in the Athenian Council, 73–74. 
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a semi-local unit of affiliation that was heritable from one’s father, yet ultimately 
deriving not from heritability per se so much as official registration with the deme. This 
obviously contrasts greatly with the pre-Kleisthenic situation, described by Balot thus: 
“The early polis was controlled by members of the wealthy landed elite, who usually 
constructed for themselves elaborate aristocratic genealogies in order to solidify their 
places in the political hierarchy.”157 By contrast, the result of demic certification for 
citizenship was to render “citizens more secure in their status as citizens.”158 
Furthermore, each of the new tribes was divided into three τριττύς (literally, “a 
third”), and each τριττύς in turn comprised a group of demes from a different region of 
Attica (24.4). Thus, the political reforms of Kleisthenes worked to (i) de-regionalize the 
tribes and thus disable them as units of στάσις by making them supervene upon demes 
widely distributed over all Attica, (ii) expand the franchise of voting by making the rights 
of citizenship dependent upon demic association rather than genealogical status, and (iii) 
lessen the political power of aristocratic γενή by drastically altering the nature of the 
φυλαί in which they operated. In sum, as Cartledge puts it, Kleisthenes “transformed the 
whole nature of Athenian politics, precisely by finessing or overriding the previously 
taken-for-granted, aristocratic factionalism model of political infighting.”159 
 Unlike the ten tribes in post-Kleisthenic Athens, the twelve tribes of Magnesia 
occupy contiguous territories. However, Plato very cleverly arranges the tribal territories 
as radial “spokes” extending from the center of Magnesia. This arrangement effectively 
                                                            
157 Balot, Greek Political Thought, 28. 
158 Ibid., 48–49. On the centrality of the deme to the new Kleisthenic order, see Cartledge, Ancient Greek 
Political Thought in Practice, 61. 
159 Cartledge, Ancient Greek Political Thought in Practice, 60. 
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“deregionalizes” the tribes even while leaving them contiguous. In addition, Plato 
equalizes the tribes with respect to the membership of the four property-classes. The 
effect of both of these reforms is to disable, à la Kleisthenes, the tribe as an effective 
source of στάσις. However, the tribes still persist as a corporate ordering-principle of the 
population. Thus, members of the same tribe are much more likely to be acquainted with 
one another. 
 Plato’s expanded ballot represents a philosophical synthesis of the pre-Kleisthenic 
and post-Kleisthenic voting regimes. To see this, let us examine each element of it as 
specified by Plato. First, there is the inclusion of the name of the candidate’s father. This 
would appear to be a throwback to the pre-Kleisthenic regime. After all, Kleisthenes 
attempted to substitute address by deme for address by father’s name as a cultural reform 
parallel to the political reform that substituted demic association as certified by 
registration for tribal membership as genealogically certified. However, even if the 
inclusion of the candidate’s father’s name represents a certain “return of genealogy” to 
political practice in Plato’s Magnesia, it is a transfigured sort of genealogy or “tribal 
research” (φυλοκρινεῖν). Put simply, Plato replaces political genealogy with moral 
genealogy: i.e., the point of becoming aware of a candidate’s father is not to assess the 
candidate’s right to citizenship (or membership in a defined faction) but rather to assess 
the candidate’s character by reference to his father’s character. This, of course, is exactly 
the kind of βασάνος Plato advocates at the beginning of Book VI.160 
 Next, consider the inclusion of deme and tribe. Confusingly, the combination of 
the two appears to mix elements of both pre-Kleisthenic and post-Kleisthetnic regimes. 
                                                            
160 See 2.2 for the part devoted to systematic strategies consequent to the analytic of government. 
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However, the key is to see how, once again, the apparently pre-Kleisthenic throwback 
represents in reality something more sophisticated. Specifically, because Plato has in 
effect already “Kleisthenized” the tribes due to the way they were set up, the kind of 
tribal faction Kleisthenes sought to avoid cannot really happen. True, it may be more 
likely that each elector may vote for members of his own tribe, but this effect, as we will 
see below in the section devoted to the election as an intelligent process, may actually be 
a beneficial effect – i.e., it utilizes the affective connection between members of the same 
tribe as a way of having each tribe pay enough attention to itself to discern the most 
deserving candidates among their fellow tribesmen. This is of a piece with general post-
Kleisthenic trend of empowering the deme as a political unit.161 
 In addition to the candidate’s name, father, tribe, and deme, each tablet also 
includes the elector’s name, father, tribe, and deme. In other words, as opposed to 
anonymous or “unsigned” nominations, the nominations for the nomophylakes are 
“signed” by their nominators.162 The significance of signed ballots for the electoral 
process of the nomophylakes, I would argue, is considerable. Taylor, for instance, 
describes the practice of signed votes as a “precaution against an irresponsible vote.”163 
In brief, the significance of signed ballots lies in the conspicuous publicity of the 
electoral process.164 This publicity, in the case of the electoral process of the 
                                                            
161 Similarly, one could advert here to the portrait of the contemporary Athenian polis drawn by, e.g., 
Josaiah Ober, featuring “a constant give-and-take between center and periphery, between specific local 
understandings, local critics, and the generalized polis-wide democratic ideology.”Ober, The Athenian 
Revolution, 150–51. 
162 Schofield emphasizes that the publicity of this manner of voting represents a real departure from 
contemporaneous Athenian practice. Schofield and Griffith, Plato: Laws, 202. 
163 Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work, 479. 
164 Connected with the publicity of the electoral process is its theatricality. The witnessing faculties of the 
citizens are drawn in, and the citizen himself or herself partly participates in the process as a theatês or 
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nomophylakes, comes to the fore in two essential ways. First, as part of the first two 
rounds of voting each elector proceeds to the “temple which the state considers to be the 
most venerable” (753b7-753c1), where he places his tablet with the requisite information 
“on the altar of the god” (753c1-2). Thus, each elector is required in effect to avow his 
vote in a religiously charged context such the content of his voting decision is visible to 
all. The ties in a public and almost ceremonial way his own name, patronymic, etc., to 
that of the candidate endorsed. Likewise, as part of the final round of voting each elector 
is instructed to “walk between the victims of a sacrifice” and record his vote (753d3-5). 
Again, each elector is forced to avow his choice in a public and spectacular way which 
potentially opens the elector himself up to scrutiny. One’s fellow citizens are theatai to 
the political proceedings.165 
 Indeed, the most powerful evidence of the efficacy of potential scrutiny in the 
elections of the nomophylakes is the existence of the two elimination-rounds. In 
accordance with this, after the tablets are displayed in the temple, anyone who wishes 
may “remove any tablet he finds objectionable [μὴ κατὰ νοῦν αὑτῷ γεγραμμένον] and 
put it on display in the market-place [εἰς ἀγορὰν θεῖναι]” (753c5-7). In both locales 
(temple and marketplace), the tablet was publicly displayed, and this includes the 
signature of the elector. However, given the opposite valences of these locales, for one’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
theatrical spectator. In this sense, Monoson is incorrect when she claims that, “In the Laws, Plato does not 
use the image of a theatês, a spectator of local events, but turns instead to the image of the theôros, the 
foreign traveler-spectator, to represent serious, independent intellectual labor.” Indeed, Plato significantly 
relies upon forms of political theatricality in the Laws both in the electoral processes and in the theorization 
of culture in general (see the present Chapter and Chapter 3). Monoson is correct, however, to emphasize 
the centrality of the figure of the theôros to the Laws (see Chapters 6 and Chapter 7), and although she 
does not do justice to the full panoply of theatrical effects at work in the Laws, she is nevertheless correct 
that the philosophical-epistemological form of theatricality favored by the Republic (via the Cave, etc.) 
disappears from the Laws. Monoson, Plato’s Democratic Entanglements, 208, 232. 
165 Cf. Monoson, Plato’s Democratic Entanglements. 
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nomination to be publicly removed from the temple and publicly displayed in the 
marketplace could not be received as anything other than a humiliating bouleversement. 
Thus, the elimination-rounds accomplish “vote-policing” in two different ways. First, 
they shame those voters with evidently poor judgment in a way that alerts others to that 
bad judgment. Second, they force all potential voters, in order to avoid such a moment, to 
vote in ways that are publicly avowable without undergoing a risk of the contagiously 
shameful elimination.  
 The overall effect of this combination of signed votes with functional publicity is 
easy to imagine. If I do not want my vote to be eliminated in a way that will bring shame 
upon me, I must take into account the likely elimination proclivities of others. In other 
words, I am forced into making my voting decision in a pro-social way that favors 
consensus choices over mavericks. To the extent I vote in accordance with prevailing 
culture, culture votes through me. This pattern makes sense in the specific context of 
Magnesian society, within which individual innovations are primarily viewed as 
dangerous deviations from a basically reliable and beneficial public order. 
 In conclusion, the expanded ballot electors use is of significance in two ways. 
First, the more complete slate of information is thematized by Plato in various ways 
reflecting a synthesis of the pre- and post-Kleisthenic status quo such that it serves his 
own, philosophical, ends and is conducive to the overall order and best functioning of the 
state. Second, by insisting ballots are “signed” by the voters Plato forces them to vote in 
more socially conscious and solicitous ways. Both of these effects are in agreement with 
the systematic approach. 
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2.3.4. Intelligent process 
 The election of the nomophylakes is a temporally and spatially extended process 
in which large numbers of actors participate in defined and orderly ways. Moreover, not 
only is its outcome in some way the collective result of the separate contributions of 
individual actors, but in addition these individual actors themselves make their successive 
contributions to the process in light of, and in reaction to, the contributions of other 
actors.166 Furthermore, these actors are – at least, to some degree – heterogeneous with 
respect to the contingent knowledge of others they possess, the amount of time and effort 
they have devoted to political considerations in general, and their character dispositions. 
They are also heterogeneous in the more mundane respects of tribal, demic, and property-
class membership. 
 The election is an intelligent process inasmuch as it is capable of producing an 
outcome that is likely superior to that capable of being produced by any individual 
participant in the process. The “choice” (κρινεῖν) of the process as a whole comes about 
via the solicitation, manipulation, and aggregation of individual expressions of volition 
(βούλησις) in an essentially intelligent way. Of course, the “intelligence” of the process 
does not exactly devolve upon a collection of mere mechanism, form, or procedure. 
Rather, it is precisely through the involvement of these intelligent individuals that the 
system, paradoxically, is able to exceed them in intelligence. The combination of the 
citizens into an “intelligent process” superior to them individually is compatible with the 
“increased optimism” attributed by Bobonich to Plato regarding the capacities of non-
                                                            
166 And thus, Magnesian citizens contribute to the process both as actors in their own right and, contra 
Monoson, as theatai or spectators. Plato does in fact, then, live up to this aspect of Athenian democratic 
practice. Ibid. 
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philosophers, i.e., ordinary citizens.167 It is precisely these ordinary citizens who make up 
the reliable constituents of this process. Moreover, to the extent that their powers and 
discretion contribute to the excellence of the process as a whole, we can see how the 
society of Magnesia departs from the “rule of law” tout court paradigm suggested by the 
Statesman and embraced by many, e.g., Guthrie.168 
The intelligence shown by the electoral process for the nomophylakes can be 
subdivided in a few key ways. Whereas a process endowed with combinative intelligence 
works by combining the contributions of various actors in an intelligent way, a process 
endowed with iterative intelligence works by the suitably modified repetition of some set 
of steps based on the outcome of previous iterations. Additionally, combinative 
intelligence can be subdivided into supplemental and oppositional intelligence: whereas 
aggregative intelligence works by combining diverse sources of data into a total portrait, 
oppositional intelligence does the same, but also may attempt to “settle conflicts” among 
these sources of data. With regard to the electoral process under discussion, I will attempt 
to exhibit its aggregative intelligence through the first round of nominations, its 
oppositional intelligence through the removal-period, and its iterative intelligence 
through the final two rounds of nomination. 
 In most contemporary scenarios that involve voting, voters vote for one among a 
set of given options or slate of candidates. Call this “closed voting” because the slate of 
candidates is “closed.” In some voting scenarios, however, either there is no such slate of 
pre-given candidates, or it is not necessary to make one’s choice from among them. For 
                                                            
167 Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics, 374. However, see the caveats 
regarding Bobonich. 
168 Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 335. 
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example, in the American presidential elections, voting is nominally “open” (since, 
strictly speaking, one can “write in” the name of whoever one wishes) but de facto 
“closed” (since only candidates on the ballot stand any real chance of winning). In the 
first round of the election of the nomophylakes, voting is open. There is no pre-given 
slate of candidates. Rather, each elector is instructed to prepare a πινάκιον with the name 
of whoever he wishes to vote for (753c1-4). Thus, both nominally and actually, voting is 
open in the first round of the election of the nomophylakes. Electors may select whoever 
they wish or think best (so long as they remain unworried about the potential shame 
which would accrue to them should their nomination be publically removed to the 
market). 
 In addition, it is reasonable to assume that different electors have knowledge of 
different people or different levels of knowledge regarding the same people. In general, 
each elector will be reasonably well-informed with regard to those who make up his 
circle of acquaintance. It is also reasonable to assume that these circles of acquaintance 
track the partition of Magnesia into tribes and demes. Indeed, this assumption is 
confirmed in Book V: the Athenian ordains that there be allocated “to each division of 
citizens a god or spirit or perhaps a hero” (738d1-2). Subsequently, the citizens belonging 
to that division will “gather together at fixed times” for religious ceremonies and 
“recognize and greet each other at the sacrifices in mutual friendship.” (d4-e1). The 
intended result is that “the citizens should be well-known [γνωρίμους] one to another]” 
(738e1-2). There is “no greater benefit for a state” (738e1) than such an effect, and it 
permits each citizen – among other things – to “fill the office he deserves [ἀρχῶν... 
δίκης… τυγχάνοι]” (738e2-5). As Bobonich points out, Plato’s political schemes require 
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an implied trust in the ability of the citizens. 169 The importance of corporate deliberation 
and gathering allows the citizens to exercise these abilities, and the aggregative 
intelligence of the election of the nomophylakes allows each citizen to make his or her 
special contribution to the process as a whole, a contribution backed by Plato’s basic 
belief in the competence of the citizens. This “respect for the capacities of individuals” 
along with the attempt to utilize the human propensity for “free political associating” are 
in fact borrowed from actually existing Athenian political practice.170 Moreover, an 
aggregatively intelligent process that depends on the contributions of many individual 
citizens with different circles of experience on the basis of which they are empowered to 
make their own political judgments activates and presupposes a spirit of equality 
associated with democratic institutions.171 It is probably in this spirit that Guthrie labels 
the election-process for the nomophylakes as taking place on “mainly democratic 
lines.”172 
Thus, Plato presumes that the citizens will have different circles of acquaintance – 
or different circles of acquaintance sufficient for nominating for office – that track their 
membership in tribe and deme. Accordingly, if each citizen nominates the person from 
among his circle of acquaintance who he thinks best merits the office of nomophylax and 
if different citizens have different circles of acquaintance, then the result will be a first 
round of nominations which captures a wide variety of local maxima. In other words, the 
first round of voting for the nomophylakes will exhibit aggregative intelligence: it 
                                                            
169 Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics, 381–82. 
170 Balot, Greek Political Thought, 15. 
171 Ibid., 49. 
172 Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 333. 
91 
 
aggregates the individual and incomplete knowledges of the electors into a more 
complete collective result. 
 Finally, let us remember that, as we argued above, tribal and demic identity are 
thematized by the very form of the ballot. Thus, the form of the ballot itself promotes 
patterns of voting in accord with the affective community and superior knowledge we 
have of those within our circle of acquaintance as dictated by tribal and demic 
membership. The expanded ballot, therefore, only bolsters the aggregative intelligence of 
the process.173 
 Next, let us consider how the concept of oppositional intelligence pertains to the 
election of the nomophylakes. Oppositional intelligence consists in the weighing of 
diverse sources of data such that certain sources may cancel out other sources in 
prescribed ways. Like aggregative intelligence, oppositional intelligence is a form of 
combinative intelligence. However, unlike aggregative intelligence, oppositional 
intelligence attempts in some defined way to “settle conflicts” among the sources to be 
otherwise merely aggregated.  
 The removal-round of the election for the nomophylakes – according to which, 
for thirty days, anyone who wishes may “remove any tablet he finds objectionable and 
put it on display in the market-place” (753c5-7) – exhibits oppositional intelligence. If 
certain citizens disagree strenuously with the nominations of certain other citizens, the 
first group may remove the nominations of the second group. In other words, the 
knowledge contributed by certain participants is used to check that of others. The total 
effect of the power of elimination will be a field of candidates none of whom inspire 
                                                            
173 Cf. Ober, The Athenian Revolution, 151–151. 
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strongly negative sentiments from anyone; for if they did, they would be eliminated by 
those they offend. In addition, since to receive a nomination a candidate must have 
inspired strongly positive sentiments in someone, the remaining candidates must inspire 
strongly positive sentiments in some and moderately positive or negative sentiments in 
everyone else. However, there are no “controversial” candidates – i.e., those who inspire 
both strongly affirmative sentiments and strongly negative sentiments from different 
groups. Instead, all the candidates will be “safe.” It is important to recognize the stability-
promoting effect – eminently systematic – which the elimination-round has in virtue of 
the oppositional intelligence it employs. Once again, Plato’s use of oppositional 
intelligence – a form of combinative intelligence – marks a way in which Plato, like 
traditional Greek thought, exhibits a respect for, and a desire to bend to his own purposes, 
the capacities of ordinary citizens and their propensity for free political associating.174 In 
addition, the removal-round helps bring about the general condition of Athenian 
democracy whereby hubris (i.e., claims to extreme superiority) was forbidden, but scope 
was specifically granted for the differential emergence of talent.175 
 Finally, let us note the difference between passive correction and active 
correction. To passively correct something is merely to fix it. To actively correct 
something is both to fix it and to bring the fact of the error itself to the attention of the 
one who made it in such a way that he is unlikely to make it again. The elimination-round 
uses active rather than passive correction. Since the rejected tablet is displayed in the 
marketplace in a way that brings shame upon its original depositor, this action must be 
                                                            
174 Balot, Greek Political Thought, 15. 
175 Ibid., 79. 
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seen as somehow signaling something about or to him. I will discuss this further in the 
next section. 
 The last way in which the process for the election of the nomophylakes can be 
said to be “intelligent” lies in its possession of “iterative intelligence.” Unlike 
combinative intelligence, which proceeds through combining the contributions of diverse 
actors in a hopefully intelligent way, iterative intelligence proceeds through the suitably 
modified repetition of an original series of steps in a way that presumably adds value by 
producing an even better result. The final two rounds for the election of the 
nomophylakes exhibit iterative intelligence. After the first round of nominations and 
eliminations have yielded “three hundred tablets that head the list,” then the electors 
again are to cast their votes, but this time “on the basis of that list.” (753c7-d2). The 
“hundred names that head the list” are retained, and the same procedure is repeated to 
select the final thirty-seven nomophylakes (753d-6). In other words, the output of the first 
stage becomes the input for the second stage, and the output of the second stage becomes 
the input for the third stage. While a single instance of the above was common in Greek 
constitutions (the so-called “prokrisis”: see, for example, the selection by lot after an 
electoral prokrisis), to use multiple rounds of prokriseis was invented by Plato, according 
to Morrow.176 
 Without an iterative component, the cognitive contribution made by electors who 
voted for candidates who did not make the cutoff for each round is effectively wasted. 
However, each iteration of the process recovers and puts to use the cognitive abilities of 
the otherwise marginalized voters by forcing them to select from among those who did 
                                                            
176 Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City, 231. 
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make the cutoff. Thus, the total effect for the process is a beneficial one: by iteratively 
functioning upon its own output, the process will deliver a better list of thirty-seven 
nomophylakes than could be obtained by means of a single stage of voting. The electoral 
process for the nomophylakes in virtue of the ways it combines, balances, and solicits 
cognitive contributions from the citizens to produce a collective result superior to an 
individual one may be labeled an intelligent process, and a key component of this 
intelligence is its iterative intelligence, as I have described it. Note, finally, the overlap 
between the verbs used to describe various parts of the process and an intellectual 
vocabulary more generally: αἵρεσις (753b3, b7), κρίνω (753c7, d6), βούλομαι (753c5, d2, 
d4), and δείκνυμι (753c8, d3). It is as if the gathered body of electors is deliberating 
within itself as a kind of “hive-mind” with regard to the identity of the best 
nomophylakes. I will have more to say about this element of the process, especially as 
this kind of simulacral intelligence intersects with visibility and publicity in the 
intermediate and final stages of the election, in the section below. 
 
2.3.5. Scene of instruction 
 We have seen above how the election of the nomophylakes can be analyzed as an 
intelligent process. However, in addition to selecting candidates with a collective 
intelligence superior to that of any individual participant, the electoral process also works 
to improve its very participants, to leave them more discerning. To the extent that it does 
so, the electoral process may be a labeled a “scene of instruction.” It also remains true to 
the aspects of Athenian democracy embodied by Athenian public rituals and forms of 
civic participation identified as important by Monoson but withheld from the government 
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in Plato’s Laws.177 Indeed, ultimately all the various processes of Magnesia function 
together as part of a polis-wide, self-improving process of processes. The price of 
stability in a world of corruption, Plato seems to require, is eternal vigilance, play, and 
religiosity lest a part of the city go off-track. In other words, all the functions of 
government in Plato’s Magnesia, in addition to their instrumentality, also carry forward a 
project of continual education, training, and moral and cognitive improvement. 
 There are three ways in which the election of the nomophylakes may be labeled a 
scene of instruction. First, the elimination-round functions to educate the electors 
concerning acceptable candidates and trustworthy fellow electors. Second, the 
intermediate and ultimate stages of publicity built in to the process propagate knowledge 
regarding the higher echelons of candidates. Third, the mandatoriness of voting “locks 
in” electors to giving their formal approbation of candidate in fact worthy of that 
approbation, thus educating and habituating the electors to similar performances in the 
future. The edifying functionality built in to the process which I will describe is, again, by 
no means at odds with the supposition of Bobonich regarding Plato’s “increased 
optimism” in the capacities of non-philosophers, but rather it presupposes a certain kind 
of competence if these processes are to have any hope of success.178 Likewise, that 
anyone may withdraw the nomination of anyone else speaks to the robust spirit of 
equality animating the political institutions of Magnesia, which Plato borrows from 
                                                            
177 Monoson, Plato’s Democratic Entanglements, 6–7. 
178 Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics, 374. Nevertheless, it broadly tells in 
favor, I think, of the systematic approach as opposed to the form of the democratic approach Bobonich 
advances. 
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actually existing Athens.179 Finally, it once again demonstrates the distinctness of 
Magnesia from a society merely premised upon the rule of law.180 Magnesia is much 
more than this, as the idea of a pool of continuously self-edifying collection of powers 
would imply.181 
 Recall that, in accordance with the elimination-round for the election of the 
nomophylakes, anyone who wishes may remove a tablet from the altar of the god which 
he finds objectionable and instead put it on display in the marketplace (753c5-7). 
Previously, I have argued concerning this elimination-round that it (a) functions as an 
incentive upon the electors worried about having their tablets publicly removed to the 
marketplace and (b) contributes to the election as an intelligent process in virtue of its 
oppositional intelligence by ensuring that no candidates remaining inspire seriously 
negative sentiments from any elector. In connection with the latter point, I also 
distinguished between passive and active correction, and I claimed that the elimination-
round constituted active rather than passive correction inasmuch as it brings attention by 
design upon the fact that a correction is being made rather than merely and silently 
correcting it. Here I would like to return to the notion of “active correction” and examine 
such activity in connection with the theme of this section – namely, as a scene of 
instruction. Specifically, there are three forms of “education” with regard to the electors 
we should see in operation as a result of the “active correction” of the removal of a tablet 
from the temple to the marketplace. 
                                                            
179 Balot, Greek Political Thought, 49. 
180 I am sorry to adduce as whipping-boy, once again: Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 335. 
181 Such continuity extends even to the toys of children in Magnesia. See, e.g., Rankin, “Toys and 
Education in Plato’s Laws.” 
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First, when someone eliminates the nomination of a candidate by another, he does 
not merely remove that candidate from contention. Rather, by publicly displaying the 
tablet with the rejected candidate’s name upon it in the marketplace, he publicizes the 
fact that the candidate in question was and should be rejected. He “advertises,” in other 
words, the normative rejectability of the candidate he is rejecting. Thus, anyone who 
beholds this tablet in the marketplace can adjust their own views accordingly and will 
beware, in the future, of nominating, associating with, or regarding highly these rejected 
candidates. 
Second, when someone nominates a candidate only to witness the public, 
shameful rejection of that candidate, he himself – the original nominator – receives a 
lesson which is above and beyond that received by a bystander elector. The intensity and 
personal relevance of the removal will exert an especially intense effect upon the 
elector’s own views. This, of course, makes sense because the elector is, presumably, 
already in the wrong regarding their views of suitable candidates. Thus, the ordeal of 
rejection exerts, as we would expect is needed, a specially intense educative effect upon 
the nominator of the rejected candidate in comparison with those who are merely 
bystanders to the rejection. 
 Third, when someone submits a nomination which is rejected, his name in 
addition to that of the rejected candidate is cast into disrepute. Thus, the bystanders to the 
elimination now have reason to downgrade the reputation of the nominator in addition to 
that of the nominee. They have been appropriately “educated” in regard to this, as well. 
The election-process for the nomophylakes not only functions to select the best 
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candidates for the job, but in addition improves and informs the electors so as to make 
better decisions in the future as a the result of these dynamic updates. 
 The elimination-round alone is not what makes the election of the nomophylakes 
a scene of instruction. In addition, the public displays built-in to the intermediate and 
ultimate stage of the election function to edify the electorate. Plato’s emphasis on these 
rounds of display is noticeable and significant. First, Plato specifically instructs the 
officials in charge of the election to “exhibit [δεῖξαι] to the state at large [ἰδεῖν πάση τῇ 
πόλει] the three hundred tablets that head the list” (753c8-d1). Thus, Plato particularly 
emphasizes the viewing (ἰδεῖν) by everyone (ἰδεῖν) of these leading tablets to be displayed 
(πάση τῇ πόλει). Second, after the three-hundred names on the tablets have been 
narrowed down to one-hundred, Plato specifies that, “the hundred names that lead this 
second time must be publicly displayed as before [δεῖξαι πάλιν ἅπασιν].” (753d2-3) Thus, 
once again Plato emphasizes the display (δεῖξαι) of the tablets to everyone (ἅπασιν). 
Finally, after this group of one-hundred has been narrowed down, for the final time, to 
just thirty-seven, Plato specifies that the “thirty-seven who receive most votes must then 
submit to scrutiny and be declared elected [ἀποφηνάντων ἄρχοντας].” (753d6) Here we 
see the public declaration (ἀποφηνάντων) of the power of those elected. 
 There is, first of all, a straightforward instrumental rationale for these rounds of 
public exhibition. They are needed to inform the electorate with regard to which 
candidates remain in the running and which have won the contest. However, in addition 
each round of public exhibition serves an edifying role with regard to the electorate as a 
whole. It advertises to, and impresses upon, the electorate the pool of esteemed 
individuals. Thus, those who perhaps didn’t vote for these candidates initially receive 
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now a kind of “correction” inasmuch as they are successively alerted to who they should 
have voted for. The result of these edifying displays is to better educate the electors to 
make better and more reliable electoral decisions. 
 The final and third way in which the election of the nomophylakes constitutes a 
scene of instruction is connected with the second way. After the first, second, and third 
rounds are complete, the roster of remaining names is publicly displayed before all, or in 
the case of the third round, that of the elected nomophylakes. In addition, the names 
generated by the first and second rounds serve as the candidate pool for the second and 
third rounds. Thus, whoever votes for a candidate in the second or third round is forced to 
vote from the lists produced by the first and second rounds. The vocabulary employed to 
describe these instances, however, is significant. First, for the second round of voting, 
“on the basis of this list [ἐκ τούτων] the voters must then again record their nominations 
[ὃν ἂν ἕκαστος βούληται].” (753d1-2) Literally, the Greek for “their nomination” reads 
“which he wishes [βούληται]” – i.e., the individual choice and wishes of the voter are 
emphasized. However, this individual preference must be exercised from among the 
candidates advanced from the first round (ἐκ τούτων). Likewise, in the case of the final 
round of voting, each voter is instructed to record which of the hundred (ἐκ τῶν ἑκατὸν) 
he chooses (ὃν ἂν βούληται) (753d3-5). Again, voters are instructed to exercise 
individual preference (ὃν ἂν βούληται) from within a pregiven group of acceptable 
candidates (ἐκ τῶν ἑκατὸν). However, in effect this procedures forces such voters to 
“own” the result of their constraint. In other words, a vote which may not have been 
completely their choice in the final analysis becomes their actual choice. Thus, parallel to 
the other ways in which the election of the nomophylakes is a scene of instruction, voters 
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are habituated and trained to vote for candidates they should vote for as a result of the 
very voting process itself. The elections both solicit and educate the choices of the 
electorate. 
Glenn Morrow comments regarding the “demiurgic” orientation of the Laws that, 
“To accept the disadvantages is the mark of the demiurge in Plato.”182 Here, as we see, 
Plato not only makes provision for certain kinds of disadvantages that accrue to normal, 
finite human beings; but in addition he seeks to take advantage of the “disadvantages.”183 
He makes the bad discretion of those who would make bad nominations a learning-
opportunity for the rest of the community in the three ways I have described and attempts 
to reform these public bunglers themselves. 
Moreover, in marking both some as edifiers and others to be edified, Plato manifests a 
healthy respect for the political capacities of ordinary citizens – taken all-together in 
concert, over the long-term – such as we find in traditional Greek political thought.184 
 
2.3.6. The use of age restrictions 
 His unabashed belief in the superiority of the soul to the body notwithstanding, 
biology is a real concern for Plato. If nothing else, it certainly affects the operation of soul 
in the world in the broad sense. Of course, “his” biology is certainly not “our” biology. 
Nevertheless, both biologies exhibit a degree of regularity that in turn permits certain 
technical manipulations. At the same time, the nature of the corruptible, material world 
for Plato means that his biology will possess nothing like the complete scientificity and 
                                                            
182 Morrow, “The Demiurge in Politics,” 12. 
183 In Chapter 1, I refer to this as “creative demiurgy” as opposed to “concessionary demiurgy.” 
184 Balot, Greek Political Thought, 15. 
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manipulability (in theory) ours does. Plato puts into place “systematic” strategies in 
multiple ways in Magnesia which take as their object or rely upon some biological 
medium for their efficacy. Here, I would like to examine the effect of the age-restrictions 
put in place for the nomophylakes as an example of one of these biological strategies. 
 The only citizens who may stand for election as nomophylakes are those between 
the ages of fifty and seventy (755a4-b2). Other age-restrictions apply to other offices. For 
instance, the agronomoi must be between twenty-five and thirty years old (760b-c), and 
priests, priestesses, and exegetes must be older at least sixty years (759b-d, 759d-e). 
Finally, the minister of education must be older than the age of fifty (765d-766c); 
however, this requirement is supererogatory since he must be elected from among the 
nomophylakes in any case. All of these age-restrictions have their own or shared 
rationales, I believe, but I will not attempt so comprehensive a thesis at this time. Instead, 
I would just like to examine the case of age-restrictions for the nomophylakes. I will note, 
however, that it is ultimately impossible to analyze almost any of these age-restrictions in 
a complete way in isolation from a consideration of the nocturnal council, whose diverse 
and age-discontinuous membership supplies the hidden logic that connects them all. 
 The age-restrictions for the nomophylakes include both a floor and a ceiling of 
allowed age. One must be at least fifty, but no more than seventy. To the extent that we 
suspect there is a rationale at work, therefore, behind this age-restriction, it must have 
something to say about both excessive youth and excessive age. We find exactly such a 
rationale whose main points are articulated in Books II and III of the Laws. 
First, the Athenian notes that when “we are children, the first sensations we 
experience are pleasure and pain, and it is in terms of pleasure and pain that virtue and 
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vice first develop in our souls” (653a). Subsequently, “when we are old, we are lucky if 
we have also developed wisdom and stable true opinions” (653a-b). Ultimately, “virtue in 
its entirety” consists of the agreement between our feelings of pleasure and pain and the 
“account” (653b).185 However, the nurturing of pleasure and pain in the right way among 
the young is what the Athenian calls “education” in this circumstance (653b-c). It is 
advisable then, even before the awakening of our full reasonable powers, to have our 
pleasures and pains nurtured when you “so that we hate what we should hate and love 
what we should love from beginning to end” (653b-c). 
The rub lies in what happens to this “education” – i.e., the “condition of having 
correctly nurtured pleasures and pains” (653c) – over time. Specifically, it “tends to 
slacken and be undone over the course of human life” (653c).186 In this context, the 
Athenian recommends festivals and their accompanying choral music as one way of 
mitigating or reversing the inevitable age-related decay of our passional education; the 
gods bestowed music upon men “to set them back on the correct course” (653d). At the 
same time, it is precisely the elderly citizens who supply or reinforce the standard of 
propriety that informs all education. The Athenian asserts, “education draws and guides 
children toward the correct account that is articulated by the law and accepted as correct 
by the worthiest and eldest citizens on the basis of their experience” (659d). Furthermore, 
“the soul of a child must not become trained to feel pleasure or pain that opposes the 
law….it must follow the law and be pleased and pained at the same things as are the 
elderly” (659d-e). Music, then, when superintended in the right way by the elderly, is also 
                                                            
185 An excellent overview may be found in Schöpsdau, Nomoi, Buch I-III, 253–56. 
186 This sentence in the Greek can be construed in multiple ways. Nevertheless, “Der Sinn des Satzes ist im 
großen und ganzen eindeutig.” Ibid., 258. 
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intended to guide the young:  this “agreement” is brought about by “charms in the playful 
guise of songs” (659a). 
 Finally, more information on the effects of aging can be found in the passages 
describing the “third and remaining chorus, that of Dionysus” (665b). This chorus 
comprises the “best element of the city, whose collective age and wisdom makes it the 
most persuasive group of citizens” (665d). However, it is not only wisdom which age has 
brought about or made more likely, but in addition it has brought about for these chorus-
members a reluctance or embarrassment at the prospect of singing (665d-e). Special 
measures are necessary in order to counteract the latter in the form of proposed 
regulations concerning the consumption of wine. These regulations presuppose a schema 
of age-related effects. For instance, those under the age of eighteen are forbidden to drink 
wine since “one should not pour additional fire into their bodies or souls”; the Athenian 
refers to the “manic condition of youth” (666a). Likewise, those “up to thirty years of 
age” are allowed to drink wine, but they “must abstain completely from drunkenness and 
from drinking large quantities of wine” (666a-b). Finally, however, those “approaching 
forty” are encouraged to partake of wine to a much greater extent than their younger co-
citizens because the effect of wine is a “remedy for the crabbedness of old age” (666b). 
Wine “makes us grow young again and forget our ill temper as our soul’s hardened 
character softens, like iron that becomes pliable when placed in the fire” (666a-b). This 
effect, in turn, facilitates those choral performances in whose benefit the Athenian and his 
companions are especially interested. In sum, the policies of Book II on alcohol and 
communal music suggest the following theses with regard to the effects of aging: (i) one 
is more likely to have the correct intellectual position or be wiser in general in a way that 
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corresponds to complete virtue, and (ii) the passional education which is also part of 
complete virtue grows weaker over time. These two theses account for why Plato (a) 
wants to use the wisdom of the old to influence the younger in special ways and also (b) 
wants to counteract the weaknesses of age with “rejuvenating” effects: these two 
tendencies of age can and must be balanced in social concert. 
 This portrait of the contrasting faculties of age and youth is confirmed by similar 
statements in Book III in the section dealing with the Spartans. To explain why the 
Dorian states other than Sparta suffered ruin, the Athenian explains, “the mortal soul 
simply does not exist, my friends, which by dint of its natural qualities will ever make a 
success of supreme authority among men while it is still young [νέα] and responsible to 
no one” (691c-d). The soul of a young person is “full of folly [ἀνοίας πληρωθεῖσα]” and 
“inevitably has its judgment [διάνοιαν] corrupted.” (691d) Thus, “to have a sense of 
proportion [τὸ μέτριον] and to guard against this danger” is a “first-class lawgiver’s job” 
(691d).187 In the case of Sparta, certain “metrical” devices are at work to protect against 
the danger of youth in power: (i) there are two kings rather than a “single line,” (691d), 
(ii) there is a council of elders (the Spartan gerousia) with “the same authority in making 
important decisions as the kings” (691d-e), and (iii) there is the institution of the ephors, 
“a power which came very close to being held by lot” (692a). Taken together, these  three 
devices transformed Sparta “into a mixture of the right elements, so that thanks to its own 
stability it ensured the stability of the rest of the state.” (692a) However, whereas the first 
and third devices function in a mode which is more purely one of youth-oriented restraint 
                                                            
187 Plato is interested in history from the perspective of eliciting patterns useful for legislative rationality. 
Compare the interest of Polybius, who sought to create a “pragmatic history” useful to statesmen or 
politicians. See Fritz, The Theory of the Mixed Constitution in Antiquity, 40–44. 
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– the dyarchy “restricts its [the kingship’s] powers to more reasonable proportions” 
(691d), and the ephors serve as “a kind of bridle” for a government “still fretting and 
fuming with restless energy” (692a) – the second device takes advantage of the full gamut 
of age-related effects. Lycurgus, its legendary inventor, is said to have “blended 
[μείγνυσιν] the obstinacy and vigor of the Spartans [τῇ κατὰ γένος αὐθάδει ῥώμῃ] with 
the prudent influence of age [τὴν κατὰ γῆρας σώφρονα δύναμιν]” (692a). Thus, we see 
once again an attempt to blend or combine the respective (good and bad) effects of youth 
and age. 
 What does this mean for the nomophylakes? Recall that, according to the age-
restrictions for candidacy put into place for the nomophylakes, one must be no younger 
than fifty and no older than seventy. Thus, we should expect some rationale for each of 
the floor and ceiling respectively. The doctrine of age-related effects I have claimed is to 
be found in Books II and III of the Laws provides exactly such a rationale. According to 
this doctrine, individuals tend to become less impassioned yet wiser over time. Therefore, 
we should expect the age-restrictions to enforce a reasonable balance – automatically, 
merely by sorting the candidates on the level of biological generality – between passion 
and wisdom. 
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3. ELECTING THE COUNCIL 
 In this chapter, I will discuss those points of systematic interest which are 
specially implicated in the election of the council (βουλή). Of course, some of what 
applies to the election of the nomophylakes also applies to that of the council. In 
particular, I would cite the themes of the election as intelligent process and scene of 
instruction.  Nevertheless, here I will focus on topics particular to the βουλή or – at least 
– first broached in the context of the βουλή. As before, I will first provide an overview of 
the electoral process for the council as a whole and then examine pertinent themes to the 
election of the council. The specific themes I will examine are (1) the schedule of 
incentives and (2) the function of the lot. 
 
Overview of the electoral process for the council 
 The council is to be made up of a total of “thirty-dozen” (i.e., 360) council-
members (βουλευταί), an amount Plato judges a “convenient number for subdivision” 
(756b7-b8). Ninety council-members are to come from each of the four property-classes 
of Magnesia (756b8-c2). Each council-member holds office for one year (756e5-8. Their 
election takes place over a period of five days (756b-e). The three customary forms of 
political selection – “nominative” (i.e., open voting), “calculative” (i.e., closed voting), 
and “sortitive” (i.e., by lot) – figure as distinct stages of the electoral process for the 
council. Nomination rounds confined to candidates from each of the four property-classes 
take place on the first four days, while closed voting and the lot are used on the last day. 
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 On the first day, the nomination of candidates from the highest property-class 
takes place (756c3). Participation is compulsory for everyone upon threat of a fine 
(756c3-4). The names of the resulting nominees are to be written down (756c5). On the 
second day, the nomination of candidates from the second highest property-class takes 
place (756c5-6). As on the first day, participation is compulsory for everyone upon threat 
of a fine, and the names of the resulting nominees are to be recorded (756c6-7). On the 
third day, the nomination of candidates from the third property-class takes place (756c7-
8). Participation is compulsory for members of the first three classes upon threat of a fine, 
but members of the “fourth and least wealthy property-class” are exempt from the fine if 
they do not wish to make a nomination (756c8-d2). On the fourth day, the nomination of 
candidates from the “fourth and least wealthy property-class” takes place (756d3-4). 
Although everyone is encouraged to participate, members of the third and fourth property 
class are exempt from the normal fine if they do not wish to make a nomination (756d4-
5). However, members of the first and second property-class who do not make a 
nomination are to pay triple or quadruple the normal fine respectively (756d6-e1). On the 
fifth day, the officials in charge of voting display to the whole citizen body the inscribed 
nominees (756e2-4). Everyone must vote for one of the nominees (ἐκ τούτων) or pay a 
fine (756e4-5). Based on the results a list is drawn up of 180 candidates from each 
property-class (756e5-6). Finally, ninety from each group of 180 are chosen by lot 
(756e6-7). These must be scrutinized, and if they pass the scrutiny, they will serve as 
council-members for one year (756e6-7). 
 
3.1. Schedule of incentives 
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 Perhaps the most interesting feature of the election of the council is the complex 
combination of incentives placed upon the Magnesian voters over the first four days of 
voting. These incentives are sensitive to both the class of the candidate and the class of 
the elector. Here is a table that collects all of the relevant facts: 
 
 1st-class 
voters 
2nd-class 
voters 
3rd-class 
voters 
4th-class 
voters 
1st-round 
(nominees 
from 1st-class) 
Mandatory 
to vote or 
pay fine. 
Mandatory to 
vote or pay 
fine. 
Mandatory to 
vote or pay 
fine. 
Mandatory to 
vote or pay 
fine. 
2nd-round 
(nominees 
from 2nd-class) 
Mandatory 
to vote or 
pay fine. 
Mandatory to 
vote or pay 
fine. 
Mandatory to 
vote or pay 
fine. 
Mandatory to 
vote or pay 
fine. 
3rd-round 
(nominees 
from 3rd-class) 
Mandatory 
to vote or 
pay fine. 
Mandatory to 
vote or pay 
fine. 
Mandatory to 
vote or pay 
fine. 
Exempt from 
fine if choose 
not to vote. 
4th-round 
(nominees 
from 4th-class) 
Mandatory 
to vote or 
pay 
quadruple 
fine. 
Mandatory to 
vote or pay 
triple fine. 
Exempt from 
fine if choose 
not to vote. 
Exempt from 
fine if choose 
not to vote. 
5th-round 
(180 top in all 
classes) 
Mandatory 
to vote or 
pay fine. 
Mandatory to 
vote or pay 
fine. 
Mandatory to 
vote or pay 
fine. 
Mandatory to 
vote or pay 
fine. 
 
6th-round (90 
selected by lot)  
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
In my judgment, there are three points to make based on an inspection of this 
table. First, we should note that differential incentives apply exclusively to the 
“nominative” phase of the election. Everyone must participate in the “calculative” phase 
(i.e., the 5th round) or be fined, and all incentives are irrelevant to the “sortitive” phase as 
this phase requires no active participation from anyone. 
109 
 
Second, we should note that, as one moves down the schedule of classes, it 
becomes more important for members of the first two classes to make their nominations. 
Failure to nominate members of the fourth class on the part of members of the first or 
second class carries a penalty of paying a triple or quadruple fine respectively. 
Third, we should note that, again as one moves down the schedule of classes, it 
becomes less important for members of the last two classes to make their nominations. 
Members of the third class are exempt from fine if they choose not to make a nomination 
from the fourth class (although of course they may do so if they wish), and members of 
the fourth class are exempt from fine if they choose not to make a nomination from either 
the third class or the fourth class (although, again, they may do so if they wish). 
 It is important to realize that the details of the table above are basically irrelevant. 
Rather, what is important are the two general tendencies described – namely, that as one 
moves down the schedule of classes it becomes more important for the members of the 
upper classes to vote and less important for those of the lower classes. Of course, it may 
be possible that the specific numbers Plato uses are of numerological or philosophical-
mathematical significance, but what I am interested to presently explain is the rationale 
significance for political philosophy of the two general tendencies. In addition, it is worth 
repeating the insight of Taylor that because the less wealthy are incentivized to vote for 
the wealthier and the wealthier for the less wealthy a moderating, centrist position will be 
favored: “neither a Coriolanus nor a Cade will stand much chance of election.”188 
 Before we analyze and seek to explain these two tendencies, it is first worth 
regarding what relation Plato thinks economic class has with political competence in the 
                                                            
188 Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work, 480. 
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first place. In the Republic, of course, one class is entrusted with complete political power 
to the exclusion of other classes. In the Laws, by contrast, while all classes of citizens are 
enfranchised in a general sense, there are class-regarding differences with respect to the 
eligibility for various offices as well as the specific ways those offices are filled. Thus, 
we should seek a reason for the minor class-differences of the Laws in contrast to the 
major class-differences of the Republic.189 
 A key clue comes in the discussion of the election of the city-wardens 
(ἀστυνόμοι) in 763d-e. This position is restricted to members of the highest property-
class. However, in this case Plato explains the rationale: “these officials too must be men 
of some caliber [δυνατούς], with time [σχολάζοντας] to go in for public affairs [τῶν 
κοινῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι]” (763d4-6). Those with more power and means (δυνατοί) [check 
accent] are best suited for the role of city-warden precisely because they have more time 
(σχολή) to devote to oversight of public or political matters (τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι). 
They presumably have more such time (σχολή) because their own greater personal 
resources liberate them from the constant necessity of overseeing the economic 
reproduction of the household. Thus, since wealthier citizens need occupy themselves 
less often with personal-economic matters, they in turn have more σχολή available for the 
consideration or management of what is public or political in the strict sense. As a result, 
if a certain office or task requires σχολή, then it stands to reason that members of the 
higher-classes are more suitable candidates for that office or task. In some cases, this 
may be reflected on the level of eligibility sans phrase. For instance, city-wardens must 
                                                            
189 Samaras points out, “In the Laws, no citizen class is sustained on the labor of another, as is the case with 
the Republic.” Samaras, Plato on Democracy, 227. 
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be members of the highest class (763d-e), market-wardens must be members of first or 
second highest class (763e), and so on. In other cases, while eligibility per se may not be 
an issue, the incentives for participation (or disincentives for non-participation) may 
differ. Thus, in the case of the council, as Taylor points out, since participating in voting 
requires losing a day of economic activity, the lower classes may not necessarily want to 
participate unless they are forced to.190 Finally, it is important to keep this class-particular 
criterion distinct from the class-particular criterion of differential susceptibility to 
corruption or peculation. The thought in typical Athenian practice was that the more well-
off were less vulnerable to such things, and certain aspects of Magnesia seem to reflect 
this bias – for instance, the temple-treasurers must be elected from the members of the 
highest class (759e-760a). However, at the same time, many Greeks found extremes of 
wealth just as politically problematic as extremes of poverty. For instance, as Balot points 
out, Hesiod criticizes the very rich for their desire for bribes as well as the very poor for 
being lazy or imprudent.191 Likewise, Solon – whom Plato emulates in key ways – 
favored a “middling ideology” whose favored population were moderately wealthy, non-
aristocratic hoplites.192 Plato in his division of classes by economic criteria seems to have 
reflected the same avoidance for extremes while at the same time favoring the moderately 
wealthier in certain ways.193 
 In sum, as we have seen, it is a consequence of Platonic assumptions that the 
higher one’s economic class, the more suitable one is for common political 
                                                            
190 Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work, 480. 
191 Balot, Greek Political Thought, 30. 
192 Cartledge, Ancient Greek Political Thought in Practice, 52–53. 
193 If one assumes that there are more members of lower tiers than the upper tiers, then the very equality of 
the number of their representatives will also be biased in the above manner. Morrow, “Aristotle’s 
Comments on Plato’s Laws,” 151. 
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responsibilities in virtue of the greater σχολή one enjoys. This general tendency or 
consequence gives rise in turn to two more specific tendencies or consequences. First, 
since the members of the higher classes will have more time for activity in pursuit of 
public affairs, they are more suitable with regard to the slate of responsibilities incumbent 
upon the members of the council. Thus, they are all, to some extent, “good” candidates in 
comparison with other classes. To nominate good candidates from this class is therefore 
easier than it would be to do so from others. 
 In the “scene of instruction” section above, I argued in the case of electing the 
nomophylakes that being constrained to vote for someone from a good group of 
candidates has a beneficial effect inasmuch as it habituates voters to choose as worthy of 
office those who are (more likely to be) actually worthy of office. A similar effect is at 
work here. Since the members of the highest class are more likely to be suitable 
councilmembers than is customarily the case, then to be forced to nominate 
councilmembers from among this class is to be forced to nominate candidates of a better 
caliber than average. In the same way, therefore, we should expect that the mandatory 
requirement of voting for all classes in the nomination stages for the first two classes will 
haven edifying and positive effect upon those voters. It subtly engineers a situation 
without the use of force in which electors are likely to nominate superior candidates and 
thus themselves become better at nominating superior candidates. However, in the case of 
the nomination-stage for the last two classes, since the assumption no longer holds true, 
then also the effect would not be produced, and so therefore we see voting is optional for 
the members of the lower classes. 
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 Let us now turn to the second, more specific tendency or consequence of the 
ground tendency that the higher one’s economic class, the more suitable one is for the 
exercise of common political responsibilities in virtue of the higher degree of σχολή one 
enjoys. Not only is it the case that members of the higher classes will be, on average, 
better candidates, but in addition, it is the case that members of the higher classes will be, 
on average, better electors. Both the first and second tendencies are consequences of the 
ground tendency due to σχολή. 
 If the members of the first two classes are better electors in general than others, 
then we especially want to utilize their superior powers of political discernment in cases 
where the field may be particularly thin. This is exactly what the schedule of incentives 
actually in place does. In the case of the nomination stage for the fourth class, members 
of the first and second class who do not vote must pay confiscatory fines. Members of the 
third and fourth class, by contrast, suffer no penalty for failing to vote, and members of 
the fourth class suffer no penalty for failing to vote in the nomination stage of the third 
class. This is as it should be since those members will not make an electoral contribution 
as high in quality as that of the other two classes. The incentives in place makes sense 
against the background of the two assumptions, (1a) members of the upper classes are 
better candidates in general and (1b) members of the upper classes are better electors in 
general, which are themselves justified on the basis of Plato’s beliefs regarding the 
efficacy and availability of σχολή, within a general framework such that all parts of 
society, including even its electoral machinery, are to be put to an edifying turn. 
 Lastly, let us consider the schedule of incentives put in place in relation to the 
politics of apathy. Apathy rather than disenfranchisement is the appropriate 
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characterization of non-participation in the case of the election of the council. Indeed, 
note that the absence of explicit disenfranchisement in favor of the implicit affordance for 
the political discretion of the higher classes is absolutely of a piece with Plato’s larger 
political strategy: i.e., the sovereignty of the demos is left intact even as the most 
important forms of political contribution are slanted toward “persons of maturity and 
experience.”194 No one is disallowed or disenfranchised from participating in any stage of 
the election of the council. However, potential outbreaks of apathy on the part of the 
electors are handled in different ways. Specifically, the electoral apathy of the higher two 
classes is never simply tolerated; rather, it is made to incur a fine, even an egregious fine 
in the case of the last two nominative stages. Plato wants to avoid the effects of such 
apathy, I have argued, because he wants to utilize the superior electoral discernment of 
the members of these two classes. However, in the case of the two lower classes, electoral 
apathy is penalized for the earlier nomination stages, but permitted in the case of the later 
nomination stages. Here, I have argued, Plato is content to utilize the apathy of the lower 
classes in cases where they risk making a bad electoral contribution and thus lowering the 
quality of the process, but wants to counteract it in cases where voting would prove an 
edifying experience in its own right. 
 Note that in the calculative stage all are required to vote. If we expect the 
nominative stages to work reasonably well in producing a good roster of candidates for 
the council, then even as we prune down this roster of candidates, we also want to exploit 
the edifying effect of mandatory voting. 
                                                            
194 Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City, 230. Additionally, the equal in number membership of council-members 
from different classes attests to a spirit of equality in Magnesia; see subsequent discussion of this in regard 
to the lot. Samaras, Plato on Democracy, 234–35. 
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 Finally, with regard to the capacities implicitly attributed to the electors along the 
lines of Bobonich’s thesis of “increased optimism,” first note that the permitted 
participation of all citizens in all stages of the election certainly shows a healthy respect 
for their abilities and values.195 Second, note that this is not at all contradicted by the 
numerous curbs and guiding-strings applied to the electoral contributions of the citizens. 
An increased optimism is not a belief in perfect optimality as such. The citizens of 
Magnesia are very much finite individuals – prey, at times, to laziness or bad judgment – 
and Plato takes steps to ameliorate these possibilities. However, these lapses and those 
steps in no way detract from the essential fact that the citizens as a body bear chief 
responsibility for electing and serving in their own government. Of course, the use of the 
capacities and propensity toward political association of everyday citizens is a hallmark 
of actually existing Greek political thought.196 Likewise, the use of such capacities and 
propensities within political frameworks to which all citizens have access is tied up in the 
ideological production of the stability-promoting spirit of equality (ἰσότης).197 And 
finally, let us the formal institutional realities of the schedule of incentives, etc., later 
considerably when situated against the background of the discretionary use by the 
citizens of their own powers, etc. Contra, e.g., Guthrie, what is going on in the Laws is 
more than what I have called the condition of the rule of law tout court, but involves a 
                                                            
195 Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics. Of course, it should also be stated that 
making use of their capacities does not presuppose a Bobonich-style thesis, and to the extent that the 
systematic approach can imagine a nonetheless effective use of their capacities without being underwritten 
by a Bobonich-style revision of Plato’s opinion on non-philosophers, the systematic approach is to be 
preferred. 
196 Balot, Greek Political Thought, 15. 
197 Ibid., 49. 
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sort of systematic specificity of key utility as well.198 As Cartledge reminds us, the 
politeia is a “total social phenomenon” over and above the “institutionalized political 
system.”199 
 
3.2. The function of the lot 
 The election for the council, as I have described, is divided into three stages: 
nominative, calculative, and sortitive. I have discussed the nominative and calculative 
stages above; I will now discuss the sortitive stage. After the nominees for each class 
have been narrowed down to 180, 90 of those remaining are selected by lot (765e5-7). 
Uniquely with regard to the political devices figuring this book, Plato gives a lengthy and 
elaborate justification – and also a critique – of the device of drawing lots (756e-758a). 
The method of election (αἵρεσις) for the councilmembers arrives at a mean (μέσον) 
“between a monarchical and a democratic constitution [μοναρχικῆς καὶ δημοκρατικῆς 
πολιτείας].” (756e8-9) It is right (δεῖ) for a constitution (πολιτεία) to strike exactly such a 
mean (μεσεύειν) (756e9-10). As the ensuing discourse goes on to show, the rationale for 
this arises from the different forms of equality, their relation to friendship, and the 
necessity of friendship to the stability of the state. 
 The reference to a mean between a monarchical and democratic form of 
government is a clear callback to Book III of the Laws. The subsequent importance in the 
discourse of friendship (φιλία) also ties back to Book III. However, Plato also goes on to 
contribute new information in respect of how to achieve this balance and why, strictly 
                                                            
198 Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 335. 
199 Cartledge, Ancient Greek Political Thought in Practice, 57. 
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speaking, this balance is necessary. In sum, each section of the text enriches our 
understanding of the other. Before moving on to examine the discourse in justification of 
the partial use of the lot in itself, let us recapitulate some of the principal, relevant points 
from Book III. 
 In the course of the historical-methodological overview of legislation we find in 
Book III, the Athenian cites three orienting values with regard to which it necessary to 
legislate: freedom (ἐλευθερία), wisdom (φρόνησις), and friendship (φιλία) (693b-c).200 
Moreover, these values are ultimately co-constitutive: one cannot aim at, and bring about, 
one without aiming at, and bringing out, the others (693b). By way of explaining “what in 
the matter of friendship and good judgment and liberty” with reference to which it is 
necessary to aim (693c-d), the Athenian declares “there are two mother-
constitutions…which you could fairly say have given birth to all the others:” monarchy 
and democracy (693d). Whereas the Persians took the former principle too far, the 
Athenians took the latter principle too far (693d-e). Neither state “achieved a balance [τὰ 
μέτρια κέκτηται] between the two” (693e5-7). Yet in reality it is “absolutely vital” for a 
political system to “combine them [μεταλαβεῖν ἀμφοῖν τούτοιν]” if freedom and 
friendship, along with wisdom, are to reside in the state (693d7-e1). 
The two ensuing narratives, one devoted to the Persians and one devoted to the 
Athenians, are intended to demonstrate the necessity of a compromise between monarchy 
and democracy to the attainment of a state with freedom, friendship, and wisdom. For 
instance, in the case of the Persians, under Cyrus the Persians enjoyed a “judicious blend 
                                                            
200 For an excellent discussion of the ways in which Plato uses the adjective ἐλεύθερος, see Laks, 
“Freedom, Liberality, and Liberty in Plato’s Laws.” 
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[τὸ μέτριον μᾶλλον] of liberty and subjection [δουλείας τε καὶ ἐλευθερίας]” (694a3-4). 
As rulers, the Persians “granted a degree of liberty to their subjects and put them on the 
same footing as themselves [ἐπὶ τὸ ἴσον ἄγοντες]” (694a6-a7). As a result, “soldiers felt 
more affection [μᾶλλον φίλοι] for their commanders,” (694a7-b1) and the Persians 
enjoyed the condition of φιλία in general (694b6-b7). Under Cambyses, however, the 
situation took a radical turn for the worse. Part of what leads to Cambyses’ downfall is 
that he was “unwilling to tolerate an equal [ἴσῳ ἀγακτῶν]” (695b5). With the rise of 
Darius, who introduces a “certain degree of equality [ἰσότητα κοινήν τινα]” (695c10-d1), 
there reigns a “feeling of friendship and community [φιλίαν...καὶ κοινωνίαν]” (695d2-3).  
Thus, there is, throughout the Persian narrative, more-or-less of a correlation between the 
degree of freedom offered to one’s subjects, often described as a matter of “equality” (τὸ 
ἴσον, ἰσότητα, etc.), and the spirit of friendship (κοινωνία, φιλία) between ruler and 
subjects (see also 697c-d, where the point is made explicit). 
 The Athenians run to the opposite extreme. At first, when the so-called “ancient 
constitution [πολιτεία...παλαιὰ]” of the Athenians was in force (698b4-5), they lived in a 
sort of moderate, internalized subjection to the laws via the modality of shame, “the 
mistress of our hearts [δεσπότις ἐνῆν], a despot who made us live in willing subjection 
[δουλεύοντες… ἠθέλομεν] to the laws then in force” (698b5-6). At the time of the 
Persian attack, thanks in part to the operation of this social fear enforcing obedience to 
the laws, the Athenians exhibited a “tremendous spirit of cooperation [σφόδρα φιλία]” 
(698c2-c3) and were able to ward off the Persians at Marathon. Subsequently, when the 
Athenians met the Persians again, at Salamis, for the same reasons, they displayed the 
same “spirit of solidarity [φιλίαν]” (699c1-2). In the case of music, this moderate, 
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internalized subjection of the Athenians took the following form. Since, after all, the 
“people” (δῆμος) was not the controlling element (κύριος), instead “they lived in a kind 
of ‘voluntary slavery’ [ἑκὼν ἐδούλευε] to the laws” (700a3-5).Thus, the Athenians in 
musical matters deferred to the authority (τὸ...κῦρος) which possesses knowledge and 
issues judgments on the basis of that knowledge rather than allowing “catcalls,” “uncouth 
yelling,” and “the applause that indicates approval” to exert any effect in musical matters 
(700c-d). However, over time this reign of internalized subjection became corrupt – and 
the aristocracy of good laws yielded to the “theatrocracy” (701a2-4) or “democracy” of 
each man judging for himself. Everyone gained “the arrogance to set himself up a 
capable judge.” (700e6) Worse, “music proved to be the starting point of everyone’s 
conviction that he was an authority on everything.”201 (701a5-6) A spirit of “effrontery” 
(ἀναιχσυντία) – described by Plato as “the reckless lack of respect for one’s betters” 
(701a8-b1) – took root in Athenian society. This spirit of effrontery ripened and 
deepened: first, the people refused to submit to the authorities, then to their parents and 
elders, then to the laws themselves, and finally “they cease to care about oaths and 
promises and religion in general.” (701b5-c2) Note the functioning of “effrontery” 
(ἀναισχυντία) as a kind of transmogrification of the ideal of “freedom” (ἐλευθερία) as 
well of the related one of “equality” (ἰσότης). The total social breakdown of Athenian 
society does represent a kind of extreme-point of the unconstrained life (ἐλευθέρος βίος) 
(see 700a7-8: τοῦ ἐλευθέρου λίαν...βίου), just as it also represents one of extreme 
equality: each individual regards himself as ἴσος to anyone else, even the very gods, a 
                                                            
201 Schofield helpfully connects this passage in the Laws with Republic 424b-425c. Schofield and Griffith, 
Plato: Laws, 136. 
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tendency Plato describes as having “the character of the ancient Titans [παλαιὰν 
Τιτανικὴν φύσιν]” (701c2-3). But this sort of absolute, anti-social equality is just as 
incompatible with φιλία as was the absolute tyranny of Cambyses and Xerxes. Malcolm 
Schofield puts the point very well when he writes of φιλία that it is a “way of articulating 
the harmony in society that is generated in a system which properly blends wisdom and 
freedom in the functions that are exercised by different agencies within it although the 
Athenian couples it particularly with the equality that goes with political freedom in these 
circumstances.”202 Friendship, then, is a success-predicate applied to certain conditions 
which balance wisdom with freedom. 
 In Book VI of the Laws, Plato returns as part of the justification of the partial use 
of the lot to this nexus of power, equality, and friendship described in Book III. Here, 
however, he introduces a crucial distinction hidden beneath our everyday ways of 
speaking: “we use the same term [ὁμωνύμοιν μέν] for two concepts of equality 
[δυοῖν...ἰσοτήτοιν οὔσαιν], which in most respects are virtual opposites [ἔργῳ 
δὲ...ἐναντίαιν]” (757b1-3). The first kind of equality (henceforth: “arithmetical 
equality”)203 (a) pertains to “measures, weights, and numbers” and (b) is “within the 
competence of any state and any legislator” because (c) to actualize it “one can simply 
distribute equal awards by lot” (757b3-5)” The second kind of equality (henceforth: 
“geometrical equality”)204 is (a) the most “genuine [ἀληθεστάτην]” and “best [ἀρίστην]” 
kind of equality, with the twist that it (b) is “not so obvious [οὐκέτι ῥᾴδιον παντὶ ἰδεῖν]” 
                                                            
202 Schofield, “The Laws’ two projects,” 19-20. 
203 With this term, I follow Aristotle in Book V of the E.N.  (= Book IV of the E.E.). Aristotle also 
sporadically returns to the subject in the Politics, e.g., Book VI, Ch. 3 (1318a-131b). Aristotle and Lord, 
The Politics. 
204 Again, I follow Aristotle. 
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and “needs the wisdom and judgment of Zeus” (757b5-7). Furthermore, it (c) helps the 
human race “only in a limited number of ways,” but (d) when “states or even individuals 
do find it profitable, they find it very profitable indeed.” (757b7-c1) Whereas the root 
principle of arithmetical equality is to treat everyone absolutely equally in virtue of their 
personhood (thus, the indifference of the lot), the root principle of geometrical equality is 
to “grant much to the great and less to the less great” and to bestow appropriate amounts 
(μέτρια διδοῦσα) relative to “the real nature of each [πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ἑκατέρῳ] ” 
(757c1-4). Thus, in practice the results of applying the geometrical principle of equality 
may be grossly unequal: for instance, while it will be appropriate “to confer high 
recognition on great virtue,” in the case of the “poorly educated in this respect” one must 
do no more than “treat them as they deserve” (757c4-6). 
 Both forms of equality are totally incompatible with one another: τοῖς γὰρ ἀνίσοις 
τὰ ἴσα ἄνισα γίγνοιτ' ἄν, εἰ μὴ τυγχάνοι τοῦ μέτρου (757a2-4), which Saunders translates 
as “Indiscriminate equality for all amounts to inequality,” but which could also be 
translated as “Rigidly equal treatment for the unequal is itself unequal.” Moreover, both 
forms of equality give rise to political discord: “both fill a state quarrels between its 
citizens.” (757a4-5) This may seem particularly surprising in light of the “old saying” 
(παλαιὸς λόγος) that “equality leads to friendship [ἰσότης φιλότητα ἀπεργάζεται].” 
(757a5-6) Indeed, the Athenian does not shy away from endorsing the old saying, which 
he calls “right enough and true.” (757a6) However, he continues, it must be essentially 
qualified: “what kind of equality [ἥτις…ἰσότης] has this potential [ἡ τοῦτο αὐτὸ 
δυναμένη] is a problem which produces ripe confusion [διὰ τὸ μὴ σφόδρα σαφὴς εἶναι 
σφόδρα ἡμᾶς διαταράττει].” (757a6-b1) It is important to understand the relevant syntax 
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of this last sentence with a little more precision than Saunders retains.205 Men are thrown 
into confusion because it is so unclear (διὰ τὸ μὴ σφόδρα σαφὴς) which kind of equality 
is productive of actual friendship. The lack of clarity in this relation between equality and 
friendship is a positive fact in the world with real effects. Ultimately, it is rooted in, or at 
least deeply related to, the opacity of soul and virtue. Whereas arithmetical equality is 
“within the competence of any state and any legislator” because every man is equal to 
every other on the basis of the lot (757b3-5), geometrical equality, which requires an 
assessment of intrinsically opaque φύσεις (757c1-4), is “not so obvious” (οὐκέτι ῥᾴδιον 
παντὶ ἰδεῖν) – i.e., it is not easy (οὐκέτι ῥᾴδιον) for anyone (παντὶ) to see (ἰδεῖν) – and in 
fact requires the discernment (κρίσις) of Zeus himself (757b5-7). 
 Plato does not believe that arithmetical equality is productive of genuine 
friendship. Honest men (σπουδαῖοι) and scoundrels (φαῦλοι) will not become friends 
(φίλοι) despite the proclaimed equality between them (757a1-2). Moreover, it opens the 
door to quarrels launched by those citizens who think they are entitled to more than their 
“equal” share. The possibility of such quarreling is implied by the statement, immediately 
following the assertion of unequal treatment meted out to the unequal under a regime of 
strict equality, “both fill a state quarrels between its citizens.” (757a4-5) Of course, a 
regime of geometrical equality is also likely to spur quarrels. This possibility not only is 
implied by the statement that both forms of equality fill a state with quarrels, but in 
addition is demonstrated at length in the Persian narrative. 
                                                            
205 This is, of course, not a critique of his translation. All kinds of nuance has to be sacrificed for the sake of 
a readable translation. It just so happens the nuance elided in this case is germane to the point I am trying to 
make. 
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The discourse intended to justify Plato’s partial use of the lot began with the 
assertion that the method of election for the council achieved a mean (μέσον) between 
monarchy and democracy and that it was a normative desideratum (δεῖ) to strike such a 
mean (μεσεύειν) (756e8-10). If it is a normative desideratum to strike a balance between 
two things, we should expect there are normative reasons for pursuing each of those 
things. In the case of geometrical equality, the Athenian explains that such equality – i.e., 
that which bestows appropriately (μέτρια διδοῦσα) to each with regard to his or her 
nature (πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ἑκατέρῳ) (757c1-4) – is nothing less than “strict justice 
[αὐτὸ τὸ δίκαιον]” (757c6-7). The administration of strict justice, however, is the very 
essence and ideal of statesmanship (τὸ πολιτικὸν) (757c6-7). Therefore, to the extent that 
geometrical equality is the aim of statesmanship itself, then it must also be the aim of 
present enterprise of legislation (Magnesia), as well as any such enterprise of legislation 
(757c7-d1). The legislator, qua legislator, “must always make justice his aim,” and this 
means the actualization of geometrical equality (757d1-5). Thus, we see that bringing 
about geometrical equality is a strongly normative desideratum for reasons that speak to 
the very essence of good statesmanship and legislation. 
 However, we are nevertheless compelled also to make use of arithmetical equality 
to the extent that we want our state to possess stability (σωτηρία). The Athenian cites the 
“anger of the man in the street [δυσκολίας τῶν πολλῶν]” as a reason to instate the 
equality of election of by lot (τῷ τοῦ κλήρου ἴσῳ) (757e3-4). Likewise, he invokes the 
possibility of factional conflicts (στάσεων) in the state (757d7-e1). It is not difficult to 
analyze the source of this anger and factional temptation. As the Athenian earlier 
asserted, both forms of equality – arithmetical and geometrical – give rise to intra-
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political conflict (757a4-5). In the case of geometrical equality, which distributes power 
on the basis of the intrinsically opaque qualities of men’s souls, its deliverances are 
immediately open to challenge and objection. The very opacity of geometrical equality – 
i.e., the fact that it is not easy (οὐκέτι ῥᾴδιον) for just anyone (παντὶ) to see (ἰδεῖν) 
(757b5-7) – is the basis for its propensity to generate conflict. 
 Accordingly, it is necessary (ἀναγκαῖόν) for a state “to apply these concepts in a 
rather rough and ready way [τούτοις παρωνυμίοισί]” (757d5-7). The word παρωνυμίοισι 
is crucial in this context: it does not mean, pace Saunders, simply “rough and ready,” but 
rather, “in a way deviating from the normal sense of a word.” The English derivative 
“paronymy” is familiar from Aristotle’ Categories. To make use of genuine “equality” 
(i.e., geometrical equality) in a “paronymous” way means to make use of arithmetical 
“equality” – a kind of “equality” which, Plato seems to suggest, is a sort of 
misunderstanding or derivative offshoot of geometrical or genuine equality. The 
paronymous recourse to arithmetical equality will be undertaken in a spirit of 
“complaisance and toleration [τὸ...ἐπιεικὲς καὶ σύγγνωμον]” (757e1). The word 
“complaisance” (τὸ ἐπιεικές) could also be translated “convenience;” what is ἐπιεικής is 
frequently contrasted with what is δίκαιος.206 Here it is necessary to deviate from strict 
justice (τὸ δίκαιον) for the sake of convenience (τὸ ἐπιεικές). As for “toleration” (τὸ 
σύγγνωμον), the word can also mean “disposed to pardon or forgive.”207 In the same way 
that in political pardoning or forgiving we “overlook” faults or crimes (often for the sake 
of the resumption of social harmony),  so here the use of arithmetical equality requires a 
                                                            
206 LSJ, ἐπιεικής. 
207 LSJ, σύγγνωμος. 
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kind of overlooking of the real differences in quality of soul for the sake of the 
maintenance of social harmony. Such complaisance and toleration, however, “wreck 
complete precision [τοῦ τελέου καὶ ἀκριβοῦς...παρατεθραυμένον]” and “are the enemies 
of strict justice [δίκην τὴν ὀρθήν].” (757e1-2) Yet it is necessary withal to partake of 
them given the visible contingencies of this unwieldy world in which strict justice by 
itself is insufficient to hold a state together. Indeed, Plato uses the word “necessary” 
(757d5, e3, e6, 758a3: ἀναγκαῖόν, ἀνάγκη, ἀναγκαίως, ἀναγκαῖον) multiple times to 
characterize the use of arithmetical equality. It is a concession to material necessity in the 
form of the opacity of the soul – regrettable, perhaps, but no less necessary for that – that 
we should understand the normative desirability of arithmetical equality as endorsed by 
Plato in the Laws. It is also as keeping with the historical, visible character of Athenian 
democracy – for arithmetical equality, unlike the geometric, is easy for anyone to see 
(ἰδεῖν) – that we should see the normative desirability of arithmetical equality. Plato 
certainly does include in his scheme concessions to the visible, theatrical aspect of 
Athenian democracy described by Monoson.208  
 Thus, as a result of compassing the normative desirability of each of the two 
modes of equality, we are in a position to see why we must necessarily employ (χρηστέον 
ἀναγκαίως) “both sorts of equality.” (757e6-758a1) The necessity of the second form of 
equality has not always been recognized.209 However, we are also in a position to see, as 
                                                            
208 Monoson also notes the special importance of the spectacle of political equality – i.e., arithmetical 
equality – to the maintenance of Athenian democracy in the broad sense: “…the Athenians ideally 
imagined routine acts of public participation -- that is, the enjoyment of political equality (jury service, 
attending meetings, voting, serving as a magistrate, sponsoring a poet, being a Council member) -- to have 
grand significance.” Monoson, Plato’s Democratic Entanglements, 37. 
209 Thus, for example there is no explanation at all of the important, stability-providing functionality of 
arithmetical equality in Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 340. 
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a result of compassing the very different forms of normative desirability which 
necessitate each of the two modes of equality, that “we should use the second [sc. 
arithmetical equality], which inextricably involves an element of chance, as little as 
possible.” (757a1-2) To the extent that it is necessary, we should yield to that necessity, 
but we should nevertheless try to minimize its extent. This concludes the “justification of 
our policy” which the Athenian also calls the “policy a state must follow 
[ἀναγκαῖον...δρᾶν] if it means to survive [τὴν μέλλουσαν σῴζεσθαι].” (758a3-4) In other 
words, the stability (σωτηρία) of the state is the ultimate rationale for the policy.210 
 Now let us examine how the details of election by lot for the council actually 
track Plato’s explanation in terms of excellence and stability. The sortitive phase comes 
after the nominative and calculative phases, and even afterwards successful candidates 
must undergo the scrutiny (δοκιμασία) before assuming office. Each of these things 
minimizes the potential negative effects of an unlucky sortition. First, the nominative 
phase is skewed – though not coercively so – to favor those reasonably expected by Plato 
to manifest a higher degree of political competence. Thus, the slate of candidates 
selectable by sortition will be, to some extent, bettered. In addition, the calculative phase 
                                                            
210 Thus, I cannot agree with Samaras’s judgment that Plato’s use of the lot is "little more than an empty 
gesture" or a "half-hearted concession." Samaras analyzes Plato’s use of the lot something which is not 
“indispensable for good government” but rather a “burden for it.” That Plato countenances it at all is the 
mark of an “increased political realism” organized under the judgment “that common people can have a 
claim to power and that this claim is not completely illegitimate.” Samaras, Plato on Democracy, 239, 245. 
Samaras here uses the word “legitimate” in a rather descriptive sense; thus, it is not that the people “ought” 
to have some share in power in some contexts, but that the “realist” legislator is nevertheless forced to 
concede it. But to make democratic concessions is necessary to the production of philia, itself an 
indispensable desideratum of society, and as Plato knows, one must use the material at one’s disposal. 
Thus, democracy in the Laws is not an alien, unwelcome organization of society which is begrudgingly 
made use of, but rather part of the demiurgic-legislative use of material at hand in the service of making as 
excellent as a society as possible. If it is a concession from excellence, then it also an enabling element of 
excellence and to that extent “legitimate.” In general, we should see Plato’s demiurgy in the Laws as 
“creative” rather than “concessionary,” as I have argued throughout. 
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narrows down this slate of candidates to 180 per class, 90 of whom will be selected by 
lot. This massively mitigates the danger of an unlucky sortition, as only the 180 “best” 
candidates are even available to be selected. Finally, the scrutiny functions as a final 
safeguard in the event a truly unsuitable candidate nevertheless makes it through the first 
three stages. Thus, we can see that Plato does indeed use the lot in ways that mitigate its 
potentially detrimental effects and that correspond to the justification he gives. However, 
to the extent that he nevertheless does employ the lot, he also reaps its psychological-
political benefits. Membership in the council is sortitively determined to some extent, and 
thus, to some extent, anyone could serve as a councilmember. In this way Plato exploits 
the “stabilizing” effects of the lot vis-à-vis its maintenance of civic φιλία while at the 
same time conceding as little as possible to its “flattening” effects vis-à-vis the quality of 
officers. This procedure is compatible with Plato’s general approach of granting wide 
rights of political participation within structures intended in various ways to favor the 
elite among the group. As Morrow points out, this represents Plato’s attempt to make the 
Magnesian constitution a “"mixture of monarchy and democracy, of authority and 
liberty.”211 Finally, we can see Plato’s approach in this matter– yielding to the necessity 
of using the lot in elections, but also utilizing its visibility for the philia-effects – as 
emblematic of his creative, rather than concessionary, demiurgy at work in the Laws. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
211 Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City, 230. 
128 
 
4. CULTURE AS PROBLEM 
4.1. Introduction 
The full name of the second study (comprising Chapter 4 and Chapter 5) is 
“Culture as problem, culture as solution.” It refers to two phenomena, or two moments of 
the same phenomenon – namely, culture as a “problem” and culture as a “solution.” I will 
devote to each of these topics its own chapter. In this chapter – Chapter 4 – I will focus 
on the first of these phenomena, and in the next chapter – Chapter 5 – I will focus on the 
second. 
With the phrase “culture as problem” I mean to refer to Plato’s deep concern with 
– and careful theorization of – self-propelling cycles of influence which possess the 
potential to harm, destabilize, or destroy the city. With the phrase “culture as solution,” I 
mean to refer to Plato’s attempt to mitigate, curtail, or recuperate these tendencies as part 
of the self-regulation of Magnesia. I use the word “culture” in a broad sense to refer to 
the interactive zone of influence among persons. 
Both of these components depend upon a special sense of the word “culture” 
which it is necessary to explain before proceeding. In essence, I claim that both Plato’s 
theoretical concern with and his attempted utilization of culture are novel and significant 
features of the text of the Laws which command our attention. Furthermore, both 
phenomena exemplify the systematic approach the present work is intended to carry out. 
In the remainder of this section, I will explain the sense of culture I intend and situate 
what I take to be Plato’s main claims in reference to this concept against the background 
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of the systematic approach. Finally, I will situate my own forays against the background 
of relevant secondary literature in its broad tendencies. 
 
4.1.1. Culture in the broad sense 
By culture, I mean culture in the broad sense as opposed to culture in the narrow 
sense. Culture in the narrow sense comprehends works of art, musical compositions, and 
similar artifacts or activities. Culture in the broad sense comprehends the totality of 
attitudes regarding what is good and bad, pleasurable and unpleasurable, and honorable 
and shameful, along with the attitude-possessors in the ways they possess these attitudes, 
as both influence and are influenced by one another, over both the short term and long 
term, in accordance with patterns of interaction which they themselves, at least in part, 
dictate.212 In essence, culture is a conversation, with words and without, held in parallel 
and in series, between an ever changing cast of interlocutors associating in ever new 
combinations.213 It is culture in the broad sense that I claim Plato “problematizes” in the 
Laws – i.e., (i) he recognizes it as a threat, (ii) designates it an object of political-
philosophical attention, and (iii) attempts to repurpose it for his own ends.214 
                                                            
212 Germane to his point of view would certainly be the work of Ober, who claims to examine Athens as 
part of a “history of ideologies.” Ideology, Ober insists, is “not a mask” for the real phenomena at work in a 
society, but rather “among those elements that constitute historical reality.”Ober, The Athenian Revolution, 
3,4,8. Indeed, if Ober’s view of Athenian democracy – a “sociopolitical” phenomenon rather than a 
constitutional one – is correct, it certainly behooves us to examine Plato’s society in the Laws 
likewise.Ibid., 114. 
213 In regard to the partially constitutive power of the spectator in theatrical encounter, cf. Monoson, Plato’s 
Democratic Entanglements, 104. 
214 Furthermore, as the natural locus of culture in the broad sense in this context is the polis, Plato’s 
attention to culture could also be seen as part of what Laks calls the “politisation” of Platonic political 
thought. Laks, Médiation et Coercition, 35. 
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Of course, this is not to deny Plato’s longstanding worry concerning and desire to 
reform culture in the narrow sense. Both themes are evident in the Laws. However, 
Plato’s concern with culture in the narrow sense must be assessed in light of the deep 
connection between the two kinds of culture – a connection which Plato himself 
recognizes, repeatedly emphasizing the equivalence in certain respects of life and art and 
employing one as a metaphor for the other. Specifically, culture in the narrow sense 
embodies or propagates tendencies of culture in the broad sense often through the 
assistance of technologies affording them a more spectacular presentation or a more 
durable existence. The same connection renders culture in the narrow sense a crucial tool 
for controlling or shaping culture in the broad sense.215 
 
4.1.2. Relevance to the systematic approach 
In this Part, I will be canvassing and analyzing some of the ways in which Plato 
theorizes and attempts to utilize in the Laws the special new object of culture in the broad 
sense. This object itself is of the utmost relevance for the systematic approach. The 
systematic approach is an attempt to provide a fundamental account of the political 
philosophy of the Laws as it is embodied by the construction of the prospective ideal city 
of Magnesia. It supposes that the government of Magnesia is best characterized as a 
system model, as opposed to a cadre model in the style of the city of the Republic. 
Whereas the cadre model relies on (1a) producing a small cadre of perfect or nearly 
                                                            
215 To this end, Prauscello analyzies the role of choruses in bringing about a “sense of human solidarity and 
communal belonging” via “collective dancing and singing.” These choral performances are among the 
“whole set of communicative strategies that are deeply indebted to the social and religious fabric of the 
Greek polis” which the “divinely inspired lawgiver” must employ in order to “provide Magnesia with a 
communal ideology.” Prauscello, Performing Citizenship in Plato’s Laws, 131, 106. 
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perfect individuals such that (1b) all power in the city emanates from them, the system 
model relies on (2a) maintaining a large, mutually-interacting body of citizens who (2b) 
take turns serving as their own leaders according to the outcome of fixed and orderly 
electoral procedures. 
Clearly, “culture in the broad sense” is one way of characterizing the dynamic and 
complex self-affectivity of the “large, mutually-interacting body of citizens.” On the one 
hand, these citizens “govern themselves” by means of the democratic or broadly 
democratic political institutions in which they participate. On the other hand, they 
“govern themselves” by means of taking an active hand in forming and participating in 
the social culture that determines the shape of life and society and is inherently political. 
How Plato conceives of, attempts to mitigate, or attempts to appropriate this special 
object – culture in the broad sense – therefore, is absolutely of interest to the systematic 
approach to Plato’s Laws. In particular, it is by a focus on culture, I contend, that the case 
for preferring the systematic to the legal approach becomes especially clear. It makes 
more sense to characterize the desiderated set of conditions that make up Magnesian life 
as an “orderly culture” in general than as a rigidly legal order neatly specified under 
exception-less clauses. The systematic approach supersedes the legal approach by 
situating laws within their human and social environment and properly cognizing the 
efficacy of that environment. 
To that end, here I seek to analyze the operation of culture in general in the Laws 
from a systematic perspective. First, I will analyze the extent to which Plato judges 
various aspects of culture problematic. Second, I will analyze Plato’s political-legislative 
response to problematic aspects of culture. The conclusions of this analysis can be most 
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easily grasped in the form of three “systematic” theses: (i) the durable existence of state 
and society presupposes the maintenance of some kind of equilibrium; (ii) the circular 
causal chains characteristic of the concrete forms of culture familiar to Plato threaten this 
equilibrium; and (iii) these circular causal chains can be combatted or repurposed for the 
sake of preserving the city. 
 
4.1.3. Selected aspects of relevance to the secondary landscape 
The systematic resources of which Plato avails himself for the self-governance of 
culture go beyond mere “laws” even as they help constitute a cultural environment of 
general “lawfulness” (εὐνομία). The extra-legal, pro-εὐνομία measures taken by Plato in 
the realm of culture parallel the passage, as described by Charles Kahn, from the 
Statesman to the Laws along the legislative dimension: just as we pass from “the utopian 
rule of an expert and blind obedience to whatever laws are in force” in the Statesman to 
“a legal procedure of legal reform” in the Laws, so in the Laws we also see more 
sophisticated patterns of obedience and forms of contributing to the εὐνομία of the 
state.216 While such a reliance on the rule of law may remain “second best” from Plato’s 
standpoint, the detailed attempts of the philosopher to make it work and mitigate its 
inherent weaknesses nevertheless testify that, as Kahn puts it, “Plato has made his peace 
with the second best solution.”217 The cultural solutions to cultural problems undertaken 
here are part of this solution and part of this peace. By helping us to understand the full 
scope of the complex Magnesian εὐνομία, we can better understand Plato’s evolving 
                                                            
216 Kahn, Plato and the Post-Socratic Dialogue, 230. 
217 Ibid., 231, 232, 235. 
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position in relation to the nature and desirability of the rule of law. Likewise, in view of 
Plato’s ubiquitous and trenchant criticisms of the law-form itself, we should see the 
systematic means of which he avails himself as methods of compensating for the 
deficiencies inherent in law itself.218 
In addition, these citizen-participant patterns and citizen-led contributions to the 
εὐνομία of the state, at their heart, are borrowed from actual Athenian practice.219 To the 
extent that Plato draws upon the wealth of actually existing Greek practices and customs, 
suitably modified and rigged together on the basis of his own philosophical insight, to 
enable that “full” εὐνομία which goes beyond mere obedience to, and conformity with, 
the law, he duplicates, as Glenn Morrow has persuasively argued, the intelligent labor of 
the demiurge of the Timaeus in relation to the brute materials at the latter’s disposal.220 
Just as “the world craftsman in the Timaeus has to use the stuff that is available, with its 
determinate but unorganized and irregularly co-operating powers, so the political 
                                                            
218 Bobonich discusses a few of these deficiencies and analyzes the preludes as well as prelude-like 
dynamics of the legislation as a whole in relation to them. See Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast: His Later 
Ethics and Politics, 97–99. Perhaps the most striking upshot of one of Bobonich’s criticisms of the law-
form attributed to Plato, namely, the status of traditional law as mere command, is his argument that the 
famous phrase applied in Book III to the Athenians under the ancient constitutions, that they lived in 
“willing subjection to the laws” (698b), is actually meant to be a derogatory description of the Athenian 
relation to law. 
219 E.g., “Athenians recognized that justice, the laws, democracy, freedom, and equality could become pale 
abstractions unless citizens understood their value and took responsibility for implementing and where 
necessary, enforcing them." Balot, Greek Political Thought, 53. Monoson, in her otherwise very perceptive 
and entirely admirable book, which is devoted to precisely these forms of Platonic homage to the concrete 
practices of Athenian democracy, unfortunately does not do justice to these Platonic debts in the case of the 
Laws. As I attempt to show in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, Plato is well aware of the theatrical possibilities 
of citizenship and attempts to turn these possibilities to his own advantage. Monoson, Plato’s Democratic 
Entanglements, 208, 232. Similarly, Prauscello, in her supremely perceptive and insightful work, confines 
her analysis of theatricality to the specifically choral and other artistic performances, as opposed to 
theatricality as a metaphor for social interaction in general, as I have done. Prauscello, Performing 
Citizenship in Plato’s Laws. 
220 Morrow, “The Demiurge in Politics,” 7, 8, 10, 15. 
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demiurge has to use the institutions, customs and traditions of fourth-century Greece.”221 
Similarly, in a different article, Morrow himself canvasses the diverse ἐπῳδαί or 
“enchantments” Plato utilizes, many of them drawn from actually existing Greek 
practices, etc., from the perspective of bringing about proper character-formation on the 
part of the citizens.222  Cultural self-regulation and maintenance of a cultural condition 
parallel to, and suitable for, the rule of law constitute an especially interesting form of 
Plato’s demiurgic capacity. In sum, Plato harnesses the powers of materiality itself, 
whose very chaos and danger he diagnoses in the case of the social field, for the 
decidedly immaterial end of a stable, virtue-promoting civic order. I have elsewhere (in 
this dissertation) argued that Plato’s mode of demiurgy in the Laws should be 
conceptualized as “creative” rather than merely “concessionary” and that by not attending 
to this we miss an important aspect of the dialogue.  
Finally, Plato’s willingness to authorize the cultural work performed by 
individuals acting essentially on their own initiative – an area which, as we are well 
aware, he is convinced holds great dangers – testifies to what Christopher Bobonich has 
called the “Plato’s increased optimism” (relative to the Republic and Phaedo) regarding 
the capacities of non-philosophers.223 On the one hand, the kind of cultural modalities I 
describe in this chapter – constitutive of the systematic approach in general – are not only 
compatible with the rise of optimism attributed to Plato by Bobonich, but in addition they 
                                                            
221 Ibid., 15. 
222 Morrow, “Plato’s Conception of Persuasion,” 239–40. 
223 Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics. See, e.g., 377ff. Bobonich’s thesis 
regarding the shift from the Republic to the Laws is oriented around the following four assertions, arguably 
denied by Plato in the Republic but arguably endorsed in the Laws: (1) non-philosophers are capable of 
genuine virtue, (2) non-philosophers are capable of valuing virtue for its own sake, (3) non-philosophers 
are capable of valuing the genuine well-being or happiness of others for its own sake, and (4) non-
philosophers are capable of living happy lives. 
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could be said to be dependent on it. I.e., it is because of the increased optimism Plato has 
in the capacities of ordinary citizens that he can entrust them with important components 
of their own self-governance which nevertheless do not mimic rule by experts, but are in 
fact “true in spirit” to the idea of a self-governing collectivity. On the other hand, the 
development of such modalities could be analyzed as an alternative to Bobonich’s thesis. 
I.e., it is because non-philosophers can work together in certain organized ways that we 
need not entertain the possibility of a revision of view on Plato’s part concerning their 
capacities. 
Yet, at the same time, they are not merely mechanical, formulaic rituals 
completed without understanding, but rather, forms of action, speech, etc., that 
effectively mobilize the (not necessarily perfect) capacities of ordinary citizens to grasp 
the reasons for things. It is precisely these reasonable capacities that are activated by the 
systematic ensembles Plato brings to bear. To some extent, Plato is following the proto-
systematic lead of actually existing Greek practice. Ryan Balot, for instance, foregrounds 
within ancient Greek political thought the “respect for the capacities of individuals” as 
well as the “human importance of free political associating” pursuant to the operation of 
the polis itself.224 In addition, Plato appropriates and uses to his own philosophically-
informed advantage such proto-systematic elements of Greek political life as a culture of 
participation, need for the super-legal, social enforcement, and the close connection 
between culture and politics.225 
                                                            
224 Balot, Greek Political Thought, 15. Likewise, Ober’s view of the Athenian politeia as a “sociopolitical” 
(rather than strictly “constitutional”) phenomenon is highly germane. Ober, The Athenian Revolution, 114, 
150–51. 
225 Balot, Greek Political Thought, 49, 53–55. 
136 
 
 
4.2. Culture as a problem in the Laws 
4.2.1. The equivalence of culture in the narrow and broad sense 
 Culture is the broad sense is the proper object of this treatment. However, as I 
declared above, by focusing on culture in the broad sense I certainly do not mean to 
minimize the role of culture in the narrow sense. Plato takes both as a theoretical object 
of potential danger and attempts to enlist both in the maintenance of civil order. In 
addition, as I previously emphasized, both are inherently connected: for one, culture in 
the narrow sense is a spectacularly effective tool for, or a conspicuous instance of, culture 
in the broad sense. In addition, as I will begin to argue in the next few sections, there is 
reason to suppose that both forms of culture are equivalent in a certain sense: namely, 
with regard to their habituating effects. 
 For instance, in Book II of the Laws Kleinias asserts that it seems “likely” (εἰκός) 
to him that the enjoyment of “gestures or tunes characteristic of badness” as part of some 
cultural performance will harm the one who enjoys them (656a6). The Athenian claims 
that it is not likely (εἰκός), but indeed necessary (ἀναγκαῖον), that this take place (656b1). 
In addition, he claims that the necessity of the connection is identical with the necessity 
of a similar connection. Specifically, in the same way it is necessary for someone who 
associates with men of wicked character and “enjoys and welcomes their company” 
(656b3) to become worse, so it is also necessary for someone who enjoys the 
performance of wickedness to become worse.226 Thus, Plato regards these two modes of 
                                                            
226 Schöpsdau points out that both “Umgang” and “Musik” have “mit Charakteren zu tun.” Schöpsdau, 
Nomoi, Buch I-III, 272. 
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cultural encounter as equivalent with regard to the habituating effects they produce. Let 
us examine further what Plato says about interactions within the field of culture in the 
broad sense in their own right. 
 
4.2.2. The cultural logic of habituation 
 Furthermore, Plato also regards the dynamic of such encounters as necessary, 
repeatedly using forms of ἀνάγκη to make this point (ἀναγκαῖον: 656b1, ἀνάγκη: 656b4, 
ἐκ πάσης ἀνάγκης: 656b7).227 In other words, the series of events Plato describes here is a 
repeatable and reliable principle of human interaction; it forms a part of the “logic of 
habituation,” or the rules for how individuals come to resemble one another. According 
to this logic, if certain conditions are satisfied for an individual, then a certain result will 
ensue for that individual. In particular, it supplies the part of the logic of habituation 
corresponding to a group I will call the “susceptible.” In this case, the first condition is a 
circumstantial one: he must find himself somehow in association with or in the presence 
of (συνὼν) “bad men of wicked character [πονηροῖς ἤθεσιν…κακῶν ἀνθρώπων]” 
(656b2).228 The susceptible individual exhibits apparently contradictory behavior in their 
presence. On the one hand, instead of feeling contempt for such men, he “enjoys and 
welcomes their company.” On the other hand, he is ashamed to praise them, and in fact 
                                                            
227 However, in the case of 656b7 (ἐκ πάσης ἀνάγκης), Meyer argues that the “necessity” referenced 
derives from the urgency of the stated goal. Meyer, Plato, 236. 
228 Strictly speaking, the susceptible individual must be present (συνὼν) not with the individuals sans 
phrase, but with the wicked habits (πονηροῖς ἤθεσιν) of bad individuals (κακῶν ἀνθρώπων). To be present 
with the bad habits of bad people, I take it, is not merely to be present with bad people, but rather to be 
present with bad people somehow manifesting their badness – e.g., through discourse or gesture. This 
connects with the theme above of the “gestures or tunes characteristic of badness” regarding whose effect 
the Athenian queries Kleinias (656a6). On a deep level, Plato’s theory of influence – notwithstanding its 
paranoia – is entirely naturalistic. There are no mysterious mechanisms in play here. 
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may even condemn them in a half-hearted way. The cognitive deficiency of the 
susceptible individual with regard to the wickedness of the κακός – he has only a 
“dreamer’s grasp” of it – lies behind this contradictory behavior and serves as the second 
condition. It is very common for Plato to use the metaphor of dreaming as a figure for 
deficient modes of attaining or possessing the truth. In any case, the defective 
understanding of the susceptible individual is sufficient to produce the kind of mild 
shame behind his insincere condemnation, but insufficient to forestall or overmaster the 
simultaneous pleasure he experiences. 
The necessary result of these encounters between the wicked and the susceptible 
is for the susceptible to become more like (ὁμοιοῦσθαι) whatever he enjoys – in this case, 
the wicked individual (656b4-5). Thus, the wicked individual exerts negative influence 
upon the susceptible individual as a result of their encounter and the cognitive deficiency 
of the latter. In the absence of sufficient cognitive guidance, pleasure is the vector of 
habituation within the context of free encounters.229 
 
4.2.3. The significance of susceptibility. 
 Allow me to make three brief points before proceeding. First, the mode of 
habituation associated with the susceptible differs from traditional or direct habituation 
according to which doing x makes one more like the sort of person who does x. Here, in a 
kind of indirect habituation, by doing nothing oneself but nevertheless being in the 
company of those who do x, one becomes more like those who do x. (Of course, one 
could add here that, strictly speaking, it is not enough to be in the company of those who 
                                                            
229 I.e., by “vector” I mean it determines the direction of change. 
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do x, but in addition one must be in the company of those who do x in a situation where 
this characteristic is made manifest.) What these two modes of habituation, direct and 
indirect, have in common is the operation of pleasure in relation to the states of character 
associated with some behavior.230 
Second, the susceptible individual is not identical with the akratic individual. 
Although both kinds of individual have a more or less impaired intellectual grasp of 
wickedness, only the akratic actually does anything wrong.  The susceptible individual is 
not – or at least not yet – so bold as to actually do anything wrong, whatever reason we 
have to think he is headed in that direction.  Third, if the susceptible individual is superior 
to the akratic individual, then he is also – a fortiori – superior to the wicked individual, 
the κακός. 
Indeed, it is precisely the potential for the susceptible to become wicked over time 
as the result of such encounters – whether social, theatrical, or musical in line with the 
equivalence of culture in the narrow and broad sense – which so impresses upon Plato the 
urgency of preventing them altogether, devising ways to bolster the effective power of 
the intellect within them, or summarily countering them with counter-spectacles of his 
own. At a minimum, the properly established laws concerning education and music 
should certainly not give poets carte blanche to include in their compositions “whatever 
they please [αὐτὸν τὸν ποιητὴν ἐν τῇ ποιήσει τέρπῃ]” (656c4)231 and then teach these 
                                                            
230 And of course, while direct habituation also includes this behavior itself, indirect habituation does not. 
Perhaps this makes the latter more insidious. 
231 Actually, there are two things offensive about elevating the pleasure of the poet as the criterion of good 
poetry: (i) the subjectivity of the poet, as opposed to someone who actually knows about moral matters, 
etc., and (ii) the specification of what pleases the poet as what pleases him in poetry (ἐν τῇ ποιήσει). 
Similar to the portrait of the susceptible above, it is perfectly possible that the poet may have a favorable 
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compositions to the “children of the good citizens.” In light of the effect these 
compositions “may have on their development toward virtue or wickedness,” it would be 
foolish to empower the potentially idiosyncratic pleasures of the poets in a position where 
their ability to influence others is so greatly magnified (656c). Of course, a similar lesson 
applies to non-theatrical or straightforwardly social encounters. 
In sum, the case of the susceptible individual – in contrast to the wicked or akratic 
individual – is in many ways a paradigm case of the default condition of individuals. The 
susceptible are recognized as dangerous within the audience of culture in the narrow 
sense. To the extent that the two forms of culture are equivalent, we should expect 
susceptibility to prove equally dangerous, if no steps are taken, in the social field. In the 
next section, I discuss Plato’s treatment of the danger of the susceptible within the social 
field in the specificity of this danger. 
 
4.2.4. The intrinsic danger of the social field 
Indeed, the freedom to consort and associate with whomever one wishes – a 
freedom intrinsic to social encounter – clears the way for new, potentially dangerous 
forms of circular causality. For instance, in Book V the Athenian complains that 
“practically no one” calculates (λογίζεται) the so-called “greatest judgment” passed on 
wrongdoing (κακουργία) (728b2-4). This “judgment” takes the form of a three-step 
causal sequence. First, the primary consequence of wrong-doing is that one comes to 
resemble (ὁμοιοῦσθαι) evil individuals or κακοί (728b4). This, of course, is nothing other 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
attitude to certain things in a poetic context of which he would disapprove if they took place in real life, 
thereby inadvertently sowing the seeds of subsequent corruption. 
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than what we called above traditional or direct habituation. Second, because one has 
come to resemble evil men, one now socially avoids good men (ἀγαθοί) and their 
conversation in order instead to attach oneself (προσκολλᾶσθαι) to evil men and seek out 
their company, their συνουσία (728b5-7). Third, it is a necessary consequence of 
associating with such people that what one does and endures will coincide with exactly 
what such people do and say to one another (728b7-c2). Since the κακοί by definition are 
engaged in the doing of κακουργία, this means that the result of association with the 
wicked is wrongdoing, just as the result of wrongdoing is association with the wicked. 
One is trapped in a seemingly inescapable cycle of wrongdoing, resemblance of the 
wicked, and association with the wicked.232 Thus, susceptibility in the social field proves, 
given the logic of habituation, the starting-place for a potentially catastrophic slide into 
vice, vicious acts, and vicious socialization. 
 
4.2.5. The relevance of the concept of positive feedback 
Here, a concept from systems theory may be germane – the concept of positive 
feedback. Positive feedback refers to the operation of certain causal chains within a 
system such that something produces an effect which in turn produces more of itself, 
thereby priming the cycle to begin anew at an even higher level of intensity. The most 
familiar example of positive feedback is the screeching produced by an improperly set-up 
amplifier: the amplifier literally amplifies its own product unto a kind of sonic 
                                                            
232 Cf: “It is a wonderful thing to / see the semblable coherence of his men’s spirits / and his. They, by 
observing him, do bear themselves like foolish justices; he, by conversing / with them, is turned into a 
justice-like servingman. / Their spirits are so married in conjunction with the / participation of society that 
they flock together in / consent like so many wild geese.” –Falstaff, Henry IV: Part 2, Act V, Scene 1. 
142 
 
catastrophe. Similarly, the circular causality enabled by culture in the broad sense – in 
this case, patterns of association that are dictated by the associating individuals, who are 
themselves further affected by these very patterns – poses a great danger for individuals, 
and by extension, the societies made up of these individuals. Allowed to increase 
unchecked, even the smallest deviations may portend total ruin in the form of cultural 
catastrophe.233 Perhaps this is why Plato emphasizes in his instructions the maximal 
degree of effort and forethought that is incumbent on us – e.g., we are to refrain from 
what is “disgraceful and wicked” with the aid of every contrivance (πάσῃ μηχανῇ), and 
we are to cleave to what is “fine and good” to the limit of our power (σύμπασαν κατὰ 
δύναμιν) (728a3-4). Otherwise, the susceptible, as described above, may set off a 
disastrous chain of positive feedback. 
 
4.2.6. Egyptian aesthetics 
 The discourse surrounding Egyptian aesthetics in Book II (656d-657b) comports 
with Plato’s worries regarding the possibility of vicious positive feedback; it is 
illustrative of the care that must be taken against the possibility of even the smallest 
deviation from a set of sanctioned norms. Specifically, the Athenian cites the Egyptian 
principle of deeming it necessary for the young to “be trained to practice fine gestures 
and songs [καλὰ μὲν σχήματα, καλὰ δὲ μέλη]” (656d7-8). Furthermore, once they 
established (ταξάμενοι) the different sorts of what was καλά, it was declared forbidden to 
                                                            
233 Cultural catastrophe is a possibility that haunted Plato. Cf: “The nightmare of society tearing itself apart 
in mutual hatred and the pursuit of self-interest is a spectre omnipresent in Plato's thinking about politics: a 
nightmare for our own times.” Schofield, Plato, 3, 282.  “Ideology,” according to Schofield, is the weapon 
Plato deploys to avert it. 
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innovate (καινοτομεῖν) or contrive (ἐπινοεῖν) anything but these ancestral forms (τὰ 
πάτρια) in every form of music (ἐν μουσικῇ συμπάσῃ) (656d8-e4). As a result of their 
legislation, the Egyptians have achieved complete aesthetic stability over an immense 
period of time: no work they produce is either καλλίονα or αἰσχίω than the works of the 
past. Regardless of any other aspects of Egyptian society we might have reason to 
criticize, the Athenian says, the aesthetic stability of the Egyptians certainly deserves our 
attention and praise: it is a superb accomplishment in legislation and statecraft (657a4). 
Indeed, were it possible for us to know what is correct in these matters (τὴν ὀρθότητα), 
then it would be necessary to install Egyptian-style reforms codifying what is correct and 
forbidding departures from it (657b). In this way, as in Egypt, the desire for pleasure and 
avoidance for tedium which lead to novelty will be prevented from corrupting what might 
seem old-fashioned in comparison (657b). Stability is an important desideratum, and 
innovation is a dangerous force to be curtailed.234 
 
4.2.7. Case study (I): 658e-659c 
Theatrical and musical performance also lend themselves to the development of 
dangerous forms of circular causality. This is illustrated by two lengthy passages in Book 
II and III of the Laws (658e-659c, 700a-701c). Each juxtaposes a good condition of 
culture (an “ideal culture”) with a bad condition of culture (a “pathological culture”). The 
first passage comes from a treatment of the normative rationality underlying various 
aspects of government and society in Book II. Different groups are observed to draw 
                                                            
234 Schöpsdau reasonably points out, however, that it not so much the stability in itself of the Egyptian 
aesthetic regime which captivates the Athenian as its purported “naturgemäß Richtigkeit.” Nevertheless, its 
stability is nonetheless to be guarded for the reasons I describe. Schöpsdau, Nomoi, Buch I-III, 277. 
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pleasure from and approve as good different forms of theatrical performance. Thus, it 
does not seem possible to single out any one form of theatrical performance as best 
simpliciter; instead, since the varying judgments consistently track the pleasures of the 
varying judges, it seems possible only to assert pleasure – whoever’s pleasure – is the 
criterion of excellence in theater (658e). The Athenian resolves this quasi-relativism of 
taste through a modification of the previous formula: pleasure is indeed the criterion of 
excellence in theater, but it is the pleasure belonging to the individual of singular virtue 
and education, not “anybody and everybody” (658e-659a). To justify the assignment of 
these two qualities – i.e., virtue and education, later identified as courage and intelligence 
– to the ideal judge, the Athenian explains how such a judge would function within the 
ideal theatrical culture reputed to have existed under the “ancient law of the Greeks” 
(659a-659b). 
 
4.2.7.1. Ideal theatrical culture (I): 658e-659b 
 A judge has not done his job properly “if he reaches his verdict by listening 
[μανθάνοντα] to the audience” or lets himself become distracted by the audience’s clamor 
and his own “lack of training [ἀπαιδευσίας]” (659a4-6). Thus, in this consists his 
“intelligence” or “education” – a complete cognitive grasp of the performance at hand 
such that he can make his decision based on it. Notably, the judge does not listen to or 
“learn from” (the more natural translation of μανθάνειν, translated by Saunders as 
“listening” in this context) the audience. In addition, the judge must never alter his 
judgment on the basis of a lack of courage or timidity (659a-b) – thus, in this consists his 
“virtue” or “courage.” In sum, the ideal judge sits not as the “pupil” (μαθητής) but as the 
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“teacher” (διδάσκαλος) of the audience, even going so far as to oppose and correct the 
audience should they exhibit appropriate or illegitimate pleasure (659b). The didactic 
relationship between judge and audience is essential. It is the judge who exerts his 
influence over the audience, even correcting them when necessary, and not the other way 
around. Of course, the judge also exerts influence, qua judge, over the poets tailoring 
their compositions to meet his approval. Finally, the poets exert influence over the 
audience via their compositions. However, the scope of this influence is ultimately 
predetermined by the judges. The diagram of “Model 1” is meant to capture these 
relations of influence: (1) the judge influences audience, (2) the judge influences poets, 
and (3) poets influence audience. The end result is that the judge serves as a kind of 
immutable, trustworthy anchor for the other relationships of influence. The audience, by 
contrast, has its own influence absolutely minimized: it is not to influence any other 
group. The poets are allowed a certain degree of influence, but they are ultimately just a 
transitional form of the knowledge-backed influence of the judges. There is no possibility 
for vicious positive feedback because the flow of influence over the network of actors is 
unilateral from judge to audience. 
 Plato’s description of an ideal theatrical culture supposedly instituted under the 
“ancient law of the Greeks” supplies an implicit description of a form of pathological 
theatrical culture opposed in every respect to the ideal one. If the judge lacks either the 
authoritative intelligence or sufficient courage required for the successful exercise of his 
office, then he ceases to serve as the teacher (διδάσκαλος) of the audience and begins 
instead to serve as its pupil (μαθητής). 
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Instead of exerting his own knowledge-guided influence over the audience, the 
audience will instead exert its influence over him. This of course would enable a new 
form of causal circularity along with the potential for vicious or vice-promoting positive 
feedback. The “susceptible” proclivities of the audience will issue in erroneous 
judgments of praise and dispraise on their part: if the judge is swayed through weakness 
to these judgments or accedes to them against his own better judgment, then they will 
have a determinate effect upon the content of the productions of the poets. Thus, the 
pleasure of the susceptible will again prove the vector of their habituation in a way 
detrimental to themselves and the city itself. The diagram of “Model 2” is meant to 
capture these relations of influence: (1) the audience influences the judge, (2) the judge 
influences the poets, and (3) the poets influence the audience. Unlike the case before, the 
judge is no longer an immutable, trustworthy anchor, but is himself submerged in the 
self-interacting flow of culture, in a fashion structurally identical to the audience and 
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poets. There is a definite possibility for vicious positive feedback as influence travels the 
cycle from audience to judge to poets and back to audience. 
 
4.2.7.2. Pathological theatrical culture (I): 700a-701c 
 Indeed, the Athenian next turns to critique the theatrical law reportedly in force 
among the Greek colonies of Sicily and Italy (659b-c). In these cities, the winner of 
theatrical contests is decided on the basis of a “show of hands [χειροτονία]” (659b8) of 
audience-members.235 Thus, there is no “judge” per se; rather, everyone is a judge. Under 
this regime, then, the victory-conscious poets – whom the regime is said to have 
“corrupted” – will naturally produce their compositions with an eye towards the 
“depraved pleasure of their judges.” As a result, the audience-members “educate 
[παιδεύουσιν]” (659c2) the poets – i.e., they exert their own destructive influence 
regarding what is good and bad in theatrical matters. Furthermore, since the poets 
themselves in the usual way exert influence over the audience via their compositions, the 
law sets the stage for cycles of vicious positive feedback to develop. The pleasures of the 
susceptible audience-members ratify the theatrical standards of good and bad. To this 
end, the law is said to have “corrupted” (διέφθαρκεν) the pleasures – i.e., made them 
worse in a decisive way – felt by audience-members (659c2-3). Whereas they “ought” to 
experience “better pleasures” in the course of listening to “the portrayal of characters 
invariable better than their own”), instead the “complete opposite” has come to pass 
                                                            
235 Of course, the word χειροτονία is the classic Greek political word for elections. It is thus an important 
problem to reconcile Plato’s criticism of the very device here with his limited endorsement of the same in 
Book VI of the Laws. Indeed, “limited endorsement” might be too qualified an understatement – it is 
clearly the device he prefers to the lot. 
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(659c): these audience-members, presumably akin to the susceptible individuals we 
profiled earlier, take pleasure in the portrayal of wicked individuals worse than 
themselves, thereby themselves becoming worse. In addition, since it was as a result of 
their own input into the process that these corrupting characters were even put on display, 
the audience members have, as Saunders translates, “no one to thank but themselves” 
(659c5).236 However, even though their own bad proclivities were the proximate impetus 
in their own corruption, in a stricter sense it might be more accurate to blame the bad law 
or institutional situation which permitted these positive feedback cycles to develop in the 
first place.  
 The diagram of “Model 3” is meant to capture these relations of influence. Since 
the Sicilian-Italian aesthetic regime does not any institutional role for official judges, 
there are only two actors in the network: poets and audience. The poets influence the 
audience via their compositions, and the audience influences the poets via their votes. 
Thus, there is a definite possibility for vicious positive feedback as influence pings back 
and forth between poets and audience. 
 
4.2.8. Case Study (II): 700a-701c 
 The second passage thematizing culture-expedited catastrophe is presented in 
Book III by the Athenian in the course of a series of historical or quasi-historical 
narratives intended to establish the political-scientific claim that the best πολιτεία 
                                                            
236 The Greek that Saunders translates as “no one to thank but themselves” is αὐτοῖς δρῶσιν (659c5). 
Clearly, this translation in no way corresponds to the actual syntax of the Greek. However, the sense is 
arguably correct. The πᾶν τοὐναντίον has come about (συμβαίνει) as a result of their own doing (αὐτοῖς 
δρῶσιν) (659c4-5). 
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partakes of both democracy and monarchy (693d-702b). To establish this, he seeks to 
vitiate both extremes, and in the case of the extreme of democracy, he takes Athens as his 
exemplum (699e-701e). Under the “old laws” the Athenians voluntarily existed in a 
slave-like relation to the laws, and at this time Athens flourished (700a). However, the 
city has lately come to ruin upon the dissolution of this unique relationship between 
people and laws. The remainder of the Athenian’s discourse on Athens takes the form of 
an explication of this relationship along with an account of its progressive decay. It is 
especially important for the light it shines on shifts in epistemological culture and their 
attendant behavioral effects. 
 By way of explicating the voluntary slavery of the people to the laws, the 
Athenian refers to the primacy of the laws regarding music. This legislation makes an 
especially suitable “starting-place” (ἀρχή) from which to discuss the “excessive growth” 
of an anarchical life-style (τοῦ ἐλευθέρου…βίου), or literally, “free life” (700a7-8). 
Whether the word ἀρχή is better understood here as meaning cause or starting-place is 
ultimately irrelevant given the qualified equivalence between social and musical 
encounter with regard to the habituating effects they produce. Indeed, the very suitability 
of the first as an illustration of the second testifies to the homogeneity of the common 
processes underlying them. The process in question – which an examination of music is 
supposed to make evident – is the growth or increase (ἐπίδοσις), in an uncontrolled way 
or to an excessive extent (λίαν), of “free life” (ἐλευθέρου βίου). “Free life” – that is the 
political-cultural object in question; another way of translating this phrase might be 
“living without internalized constraints.” 
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4.2.8.1. Ideal theatrical culture (II): 700a-700d 
 Under the old laws, music was divided into different categories and forms such 
that the musical style of each form in some way especially befitted its implied content. 
The dangerous urgings of the audience which might inspire innovative deviations from 
this rule were strictly controlled by the ruling decorum. It was explicitly forbidden to 
employ one type of song with the content of another. The authority capable of 
recognizing musical excellence, issuing knowledge-based judgments, and punishing the 
disobedient was certainly not the whistles, ignorant shouts, and applause produced by the 
crowd (700c1-c4). Rather, it was a “rule” (a thing δεδογμένον, or believed, taken to heart 
like a dogma) regarding musical performance for people to listen in silence. Those 
incapable of adhering to this rule from their own volition are kept in line by the 
“admonition” (νουθέτησις) of the “controlling rod” (ῥάβδου κοσμούσης) (700c4-7). 
Thus, to put the whole matter in simpler terms, the crowd exerted no influence 
whatsoever over the poets. The poets themselves produced their compositions in 
conformity with the law, and the crowd willingly subjected itself to this regime. Note, 
however, that even under the “old law” not everyone willingly submits; a popular 
remnant requires the background threat of punishment in order to be kept in line. This 
dual method in the way a condition of lawfulness is preserved arguably anticipates the 
combination of rational appeal and stipulated punishment that characterizes Magnesian 
law in the main. In any case, the way in which the mass of citizens willingly subjects 
itself to the laws regarding music is meant to illustrate its relationship with the law in 
general at that time: they “wished to be ruled” (ἤθελεν ἄρχεσθαι) rather than themselves 
“passing judgment by shouting [κρίνειν διὰ θορύβου]” (700d1-2). The model of influence 
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here is similar to the previous one we observed in the case of the ancient law of the 
Greeks. However, the law itself has replaced the group of judges. Part of the population 
adheres to this law on the basis of their own inner strength, and part of the population 
adheres on the basis of threats. This combination of forms of suasion anticipates the 
“double-form” laws will take in Magnesian society, and on some level it corresponds to 
the psychological distribution of forces within the virtuous individual. 
The diagram of “Model 4” is intended to capture these relations of influence. 
Poets influence audience in the usual way. However, both audience and poets are 
influenced by, and under the control of, the law via the inner relation of force that is 
volitional adherence to the law on the part of the audience. Note the similarity between 
“Model 1” and “Model 4;” here, the law takes the form of the knowledgeable judge, but it 
also requires the willful commitment of the audience in order to stay maintained. As in 
Model 1, since the flow of influence is unilateral from law to audience, there is no 
possibility of cycles of positive feedback developing. 
 
4.2.8.2. Pathological theatrical culture (II): 700d-701c 
 In time, however, this ideal musical culture collapsed into a pathological one. The 
initial impetus toward collapse came at the hands of the poets. The members of this 
group, because they (a) lacked complete cognitive mastery with regard to the “correct 
and legitimate standards laid down by the Muse” and (b) were “gripped by a frenzied and 
excessive lust for pleasure,” began to manifest the behavior of παρανομία – a key word 
for Plato in this section, meaning a willingness to break the rules, to violate the law, or to 
transgress the bounds of decency (700d3-6). Specifically, they mixed the different styles 
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and categories of music with one another in an inappropriate way out of a lust for 
pleasure and innovation (700d6-e1). This will have consequences on the hitherto regnant 
policy of decorum. With their novelty-stimulated, inappropriate mixing, the artists 
“misrepresented their art” through their implicit claim that there is no standard of 
correctness (ὀρθότης) in music other than the pleasure of whoever enjoys it, regardless of 
the moral status of the one enjoying (700e1-5). This, of course, is the familiar popular 
ideology of art, even institutionalized under the Sicilian-Italian law. 
Since the poets continued to exert influence over the audience, before long they also 
transmitted the delusions of cognitive self-sufficiency which lay behind their own 
παρανομία (700e5-6). Since the audience-members now fervently believed they 
themselves knew “what was good and bad in music,” they no longer hesitated to vocalize 
their cognitive arrogance in the form of noise (700e6-701a2). Thus, the existing economy 
of influence was radically altered. First, the law ceased to exercise any influence over the 
audience at all because the audience no longer deferred to any authority outside itself. 
Second, the audience-members – taking the place of the law – now began to influence the 
composers via praise or dispraise of their shouts. Plato describes the transition as one 
from musical “meritocracy” (ἀριστοκρατία) to “a sort of vicious theatrocracy” 
(θεατροκρατία) (701a2-3). In other words, it is the audience, the θέατρον, which 
possesses the κράτος or power, a power it comes to exercise over itself via the medium of 
the composers.237 
                                                            
237 Monoson, tantalizingly, recognizes the relevance of this sequence to her own model of democratic 
citizenship, but glosses it as the exception proving the rule of Platonic neglect of the theatrical: “The 
passage decrying theatrokratia does not, for example, dismiss the experience of being a theates altogether, 
but laments the squandering of a resource, the metamorphosis of a possibility into a corrupting force.” 
153 
 
 With respect to the diagrams, Model 4 has decayed into Model 3. Since there are 
no longer any checks whatsoever  on the whims of the audience (the law been rendered 
effectlesss), there are only two actors (as before): poets and audience. Each influences the 
other in what is the paradigmatic cycle of vicious positive feedback. 
At this point, Plato makes an extremely intriguing qualification which he does not, 
unfortunately, especially develop. Immediately after describing the replacement of an 
“aristocracy” by a kind of vicious theatrocracy (θεατροκρατία...πονηρὰ), he comments, 
“But if this democracy [δημοκρατία…τις] had been limited to gentlemen [ἐλευθέρων 
ἀνδρῶν] and had applied only to music, no great harm would have been done.” (701a3-5) 
Plato includes here a double qualification: (i) a restriction in the affected population, or 
more precisely, a restriction in the population of who is allowed to affect the 
compositions of the poets via their feedback, and (ii) a restriction in domain – i.e., a 
restriction in what is drawn into the cycle of influence from audience to composers and 
back again. The second restriction amounts to the division – per impossibile – between 
culture in the narrow sense and broad sense. It is immediately and explicitly falsified: 
Plato asserts that an all-pervading cognitive arrogance began with music (ἐκ 
μουσικῆς...ἦρξε) and grew to overtake every aspect of Athenian society. 
The first restriction, however, amounts to the experiment of combining a certain 
institutional form permissive of a potentially dangerous dynamic of cultural transmission 
with a certain population. Only the “gentlemen” (ἐλεύθεροι) are allowed to influence the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Monoson is absolutely correct, but what she does not follow up on are the many correctives Plato devises to 
the corruptive power of theatrical encounters. Just because Plato pathologizes an extreme of the social-
theatrical situation does not mean he pathologizes the very concept. Monoson, Plato’s Democratic 
Entanglements, 104–5, 227. 
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composers of songs by means of their praise and dispraise. Undoubtedly, the assumption 
Plato is making here is that these ἐλεύθεροι have internalized the correct standards which 
they proceed to apply.238 Thus, so long as the less educated φαῦλοι are not permitted to 
similarly exercise their influence, the detrimental consequences will be minimized. Of 
course, the institutional form itself may still be potentially dangerous, but for Plato, form 
alone is neither salvific nor condemnatory. What is required, at nearly every stage and in 
nearly every place, is the combination of suitable agents with a suitable institutional 
form. Here, such a democracy, while not perhaps immediately bad, would nevertheless be 
deeply unstable. 
 From a systematic perspective, what is especially interesting about this aside is 
the potential shape it would take. “Model 5a” is intended to capture these relations of 
influence. It features two sites of agency – the poets and the gentlemen-audience – 
between whom influence is reciprocal. Note, however, that Model 5a – on an institutional 
or formal level – is identical with Model 3, the very paradigm of vicious positive 
feedback. It is the difference in the quality of the population engaged in this institutional 
form that determines whether the dual link of influence is stable and positive or 
extraordinarily catastrophic. 
 Of course, one could dispute that modelization of Model 5, claiming that it leaves 
out the vulgar portion of the population who are not allowed to voice their praise or 
dispraise, but are nevertheless exposed to the musical influence. Accordingly, we might 
                                                            
238 There are also social assumptions in the Athenian context concerning the identity of these ἐλεύθεροι. 
Schöpsdau nicely explicates the humor of Plato’s conspicuous lamenting of an extension of the franchise 
beyond the ἐλεύθεροι in the context of an Athens “das sich seiner ἐλευθερία rühmte.”Schöpsdau, Nomoi, 
Buch I-III, 513. 
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use “Model 5b” to model these relations of influence. Model5b is structurally similar to 
both Model 1 and Model 4. Like Model 1, Model5b relies upon the control of a select 
group to anchor the relations of influence. However, unlike Model 1, these “judges” qua 
audience-members are also exposed to the efficacy of music. Likewise, unlike Model 4, 
there is no anchoring law that structures the reactions and tastes of these audience-judges, 
but simply their own inertial preponderance of virtuous musical preferences. What we are 
left with is virtuous positive feedback, or merely stable positive feedback, at least for 
now. 
Unfortunately, this “theatrocracy” – or “democracy” Plato also calls it – is not 
limited to music. Indeed, the word θόρυβος or “noise” – used to contrast with the silence 
of audiences under the old law – already has democratic connotations. The willingness of 
audiences to political speeches to signal their assent or dissent via the noises they made 
was a kind of democratic politics, one that was already under suspicion for seemingly 
encouraging speakers to excessively defer to their audience.239 An all-pervading 
cognitive arrogance “began from music:” everyone possessed the conviction concerning 
himself that he was wise with respect to all possible domains (ἡ πάντων εἰς πάντα σοφίας 
δόξα) (701a5). Plato’s opposition to the intellectual diversity of the city was well-
known.240 
This cognitive arrogance culminates in “lawlessness” (παρανομία) and “license” 
(ἐλευθερία) in the following manner. Cognitive arrogance begets a kind of generalized 
fearlessness: individuals are fearless because they think they know. As such, they do not 
                                                            
239 Balot, Greek Political Thought, 67–68. 
240 Ibid., 58. 
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fear the opinions of their putative betters. However, not to fear on account of recklessness 
the opinion of one’s betters is the definition of “effrontery” or “shamelessness” 
(ἀναισχυντία). This account of shame goes back to Books I and II: specifically, shame is 
a future-oriented fear regarding possible damage to one’s reputation. As the cognitive 
arrogance of the population increases, so mounts as well the shameless disregard in 
which they hold all authorities outside themselves, and thus the forms of lawlessness and 
freedom they embrace also multiply: (i) refusing to willingly submit to the authorities, (ii) 
shunning the obedience they owe their familiar elders, (iii) ignoring the laws, and (iv) 
ceasing to pay any mind to “oaths and promises and religion in general” (701b-c).241 
 The end-result of theatrocracy as a general principle of culture is complete 
cultural catastrophe in a fashion familiar from our discussion of positive feedback. Of 
course, the notion of positive feedback could also be applied, if only in a derivative sense, 
to the condition of an ideal culture as well as to that of a pathological culture: after all, 
the more an audience experiences correctly formulated artistic products in conformity 
with appropriate audience-decorum, the easier it is for such an audience to do so. 
                                                            
241 Schöpsdau claims there is an important difference between the epistemic or historical status of the 
narrative in 700a7-701b3 (mostly dealing with music) and that in 701b5-d2 (extending to non-musical 
matters); the latter events are represented not as historical fact but merely as “eine bloße Möglichkeit” and 
their narrative as “eine von den attischen Verhältnissen gelöste und an den künfigtigen Gesetzgeber 
gerichtete Warnung.” Schöpsdau cites as evidence (i) the intervening interjection of Megillus (701b4: 
’Αληθέστατα λέγεις.) and (ii) the verb-tense used in 701b50d2. If we are not to take the causality here 
seriously, then my point would be damaged. Luckily, there are three responses to be made to Schöpsdau. 
First, the evidence he cites is compatible with his preferred account, but far from dispositive – especially 
(i), which is no significance whatsoever. The change in verb-tense by itself is insufficient as well. Second, 
Plato employs ἀρχή-language throughout – e.g., 700a7, but see especially 701a5-7: νῦν δὲ ἦρξε μὲν ἡμῖν ἐκ 
μουσικῆς ἡ πάντων εἰς πάντα σοφίας δόξα καὶ ἐγίγνοντο ὡς εἰδότες, ἡ δὲ ἄδεια ἀναισχυντίαν ἐνέτεκεν. 
This last quote (from the first narrative) by itself is sufficient to make the point. Third, even were I to grant 
Schöpsdau’s claim, my own would be safe since I only want to make an argument about Plato’s causal 
beliefs, not his historical ones. Indeed, even Plato himself is primarily interested in history in virtue of the 
causal patterns it exhibits amenable to legislative rationality and control. Schöpsdau, Nomoi, Buch I-III, 
507. 
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However, what is distinctive about chains of positive feedback is their instability with 
respect to any given standard: the more an audience or population departs from some set 
of standards, even farther will they depart from that set of standards in the future. In the 
case of the larger ramifications of Athenian theatrocracy, the cognitive arrogance 
enshrined successively destroys all forms of behavior implicitly predicated on deference 
to an extra-individual authority as to what is best. When the shame-like internalized 
social constraints constitutive of society itself have all been eliminated, anything is 
possible. This is the condition of “free life” – both antithetical to society itself and the 
necessary endpoint of certain self-propelling patterns of influence congenital to society. 
Additionally, relocating the source of ultimate judgment to the individual gives rise to 
patterns of cultural anarchy and pluralism which most Greeks would have seen as 
incompatible with life in the polis as such.242 Plato in particular “diagnosed contemporary 
culture as highly susceptible to skepticism and disorder” and laid part of the blame on the 
very structure of democratic assemblies: “The free circulation of opinions between 
leaders and demos created a vicious feedback loop in which leaders became the flatterers 
of demotic desire.”243  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
242 Balot, Greek Political Thought, 5, 12, 15. 
243 Ibid., 190. 
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5. CULTURE AS SOLUTION 
5.1. Orientation 
 In the previous chapter, we examined how Plato evinces in the Laws a deep worry 
regarding the self-propelling cycles of cultural influence which, if they are paired with 
vicious habits or dangerous epistemological attitudes, carry the potential to bring about 
catastrophic conditions. In this chapter, we will canvass the some of the ways Plato 
attempts to mitigate or recuperate these same pathways of cultural influence – i.e, the 
strategies of cultural management to which he has recourse. This section is itself divided 
into three – loosely delimited – sections: (a) general strategies of cultural management 
(5.2); (b) specifically social strategies of cultural management (5.3); and (c) and region-
targeted strategies of cultural management (5.4). By specifically social strategies of 
management, I mean those that utilize social interaction for their efficacy. By region-
targeted strategies of cultural management I mean those which are associated with, or 
intended to apply to, specific social or cultural domains. These distinctions are intended 
to draw out various points of emphasis, not to be utterly distinct from one another. 
 All three types of strategy of cultural management are vital to the complex culture 
of “lawfulness” (εὐνομία) Plato must foster in the state of Magnesia. They go beyond 
mere laws and should be considered in their extra-legal dimension. Plato’s utilization of 
the extra-legal supplements mere legality in the same way that Charles Kahn has argued a 
“legal procedure of legal reform” supplements the mere legality of the Statesman.244 If 
the law-condition nonetheless remains “second best” in Plato’s eyes, the special and 
                                                            
244 Kahn, Plato and the Post-Socratic Dialogue, 230. 
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extended “peace” Plato has made with this “second best” via the Laws commands our 
interest and attention.245 The strategies of cultural management retailed by Plato in the 
Laws shed crucial light on the concrete reality according to Plato of the rule of law 
itself.246 A full consideration of this concrete reality, I have argued, results in what I call 
the systematic approach. In other words, the systematic approach is intended, at least with 
regard to its origin, as an improvement of the legal approach which answers for its 
Platonic criticisms and can prove fully adequate to the rest of the Laws. The canvassing 
made here of the copious and subtle techniques oriented toward the extra-legal dimension 
can be considered part of the case for preferring the systematic to the legal approach. 
Additionally, Plato’s use of patterns of citizen-participation, citizen-contribution, 
and citizen-governance borrow from Athenian institutional reality in key ways.247 Thus, 
they instantiate the thesis of Morrow regarding Plato’s demiurgic use of “the institutions, 
customs and traditions of fourth-century Greece.” 248 These Greek materials, in addition, 
many of which incorporate infra-legal means, are vital to the super-legal environment 
necessary for the stability and legality of Magnesia.249 However, what we studied in the 
previous chapter as uniquely dangerous and threatening from a Platonic perspective, we 
will study here again as useful and re-appropriated, as pliable material turned to the 
maintenance of a stable and virtuous political order. Plato’s turn to precisely this source 
of danger and threat is part of what I have called his creative, rather than concessionary, 
demiurgy. 
                                                            
245 Ibid., 231, 232, 235. 
246 Likewise, Schofield praises in the case of religion Plato’s "systematic exploration of the way religion 
should perform its ideological role.” Schofield, Plato, 314–15. 
247 Balot, Greek Political Thought, 53. 
248 Morrow, “The Demiurge in Politics,” 15. 
249 Morrow, “Plato’s Conception of Persuasion,” 239–40. 
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 Lastly, let us recall the thesis of Bobonich asserting the reality of “increased 
optimism” regarding the capacities of non-philosophers, an optimism which he claims 
will have definite effects for Plato’s political philosophy. This thesis is certainly 
compatible with what follows: the cultural work, individual agency, and use of citizens’ 
capacities for their own common, whether formal or informal, self-governance.250 
Clearly, these special modalities of self-governance are additionally enabled by the kind 
of position Bobonich espouses. Part of what is so especially interesting about the 
government of Magnesia is the way it simultaneously testifies both to Plato’s own 
political-philosophical development and the extent to which he draws upon the proto-
systematic drift of contemporaneous Greek political practice. To allow oneself to be 
comfortable, in a Bobonich-style way, with the exercise by non-philosopher citizens of 
their own capacities for political governance in an extended way, in this case dovetails 
with the existence of a culture of participation, the operation of the super-legal, social 
enforcement, and the existence of a culturalized politics in general in Greek political 
life.251 However, at the same time, one need not necessarily pin these special modalities 
of self-governance to a Bobonich –style thesis. Indeed, if one rejects the starting-point of 
such a revision on Plato’s part, it is these modalities in particular that could explain how 
Plato “makes do” in its absence. Thus, ultimately Bobonich’s thesis is orthogonal to the 
systematic approach, and in some reckonings of evidence and hypotheses the systematic 
approach may be a preferable alternative. 
 
                                                            
250 Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics, passim. 
251 Balot, Greek Political Thought, 15, 49, 53–55. 
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5.2. General strategies of cultural management 
In this section, I will discuss two tendencies in the Laws: (1) the thematization of 
infra-legal “customs and usages” as an important domain for political theory; (2) some 
preferred patterns of interaction involving virtue, vice, and the distribution of 
intelligence. 
 
5.2.1. The thematization of the infra-legal 
At a certain point in Book VII, the Athenian reflects upon the unusually broad scope 
of their discussion – extending to many apparently mundane or trivial details of daily life 
– regarding the future state of Magnesia. He clarifies what seems to be a special focus of 
their discourse as what others have often called the “unwritten customs” (ἄγραφα νόμιμα) 
or “ancestral laws” (πατρίους νόμους) of a state (793a9-b2).252 Other terms used in this 
connection are “habits” (ἔθη), “practices” (ἐπιτηδεύματα), and “usages” (ἐθίσματα). It 
would be completely incorrect, the Athenian claims, to refer to these things as “laws,” 
and yet it would also be a grievous error to leave them undiscussed (793b2-b4).253 For in 
fact, these infra-legal practices and customs are nothing less than the “bonds of the entire 
social framework” (δεσμοὶ…πάσης…πολιτείας) (793b4). They link the laws that have 
already been written and established with those to be established in the future (793b4-6). 
When properly designed, they envelop and preserve written law: literally, they “cover it 
round” (περικαλύπτειν) with “safety” (σωτηρία) (b7-c1). The word σωτηρία is especially 
                                                            
252 Nightingale: “In the Athenian's lawcode, then, the unwritten laws are written down.” Nightingale, 
“Writing/Reading a Sacred Text,” 289. 
253 There seems to be a mild joke encoded in these lines. Although it is not right to call out these things 
(προσαγορεύειν) as laws, it would also not be right to leave them unspoken of entirely (ἄρρητα) (793b2-4). 
Additionally relevant, most likely, is the phrase “unwritten laws” (ἄγραφα νόμιμα). 
162 
 
associated with stability through time for Plato. However, if something causes them to 
deviate from the proper design, the result is catastrophic. The Athenian compares the 
ensuing catastrophe – exactly like the ones we examined above – to: 
“what happens when carpenters’ props buckle in a house: they bring the whole 
building crashing down, one thing on top of another, stays and superstructure 
(however well built) alike — all because the original timberwork has given way.” 
(793c) 
Laws alone are simply not stable absent a supportive infra-legal framework of customs, 
usages, and practices by which the state is literally “tied together” (συνδεῖν) (793c6). As 
such, it is incumbent upon the interlocutors to examine and discuss such matters at 
length, however trivial or mundane their details may appear. 
Plato’s recognition of the infra-legal – his marking it out as a crucial desideratum 
of political theory – should be seen in the context of his concern with catastrophe. Such is 
the utility of the infra-legal that failure of even a small part may snowball into total 
catastrophe. It is what unifies the citizenry and helps supply them with the social 
sensibility which enables the smooth running of the city. In addition, his resort to such 
“customs” (nomima) or “unwritten laws” demonstrates the demiurgic pattern, described 
by Morrow, according to which Plato attempts to instill a higher sense of law-abidingness 
as a character-trait as an organic consequence of the “material” of the civic 
environment.254 Plato scours the “traditions and practices of his countrymen” in order to 
find suitable “devices of persuasion” by means of which “the principles of the laws are 
woven into the very fabric of the citizens' mind and character."255 Elsewhere, Morrow 
emphasizes the total and super-legal reach of these “enchantments” (ἐπῳδαί) which are 
                                                            
254 Morrow, “The Demiurge in Politics,” 15, 16, 20. 
255 Ibid., 16. 
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intended “to bring about conformity to the law, not merely in the public relations of 
citizen to citizen, but in all the details, even the most intimate, of private life.”256 The 
“full” εὐνομία to which Plato aspires both requires and utilizes extra-legal conditions and 
resources.257 Morrow calls the legislation of Magnesia “one vast system of total 
persuasion, the climactic fulfillment of the art of psychagogy that he had outlined in the 
Phaedrus.”258 There is also precedent within Athenian society for the necessity of the 
extra-legal, broadly speaking, to the legal institutions and governing apparatus as such. 
Values like “courage, honesty, generosity, discipline, respect for others, patriotism, and 
self-control,” as well as “innumerable traditions and founding cultural myths,” Balot 
comments, were “critical to their shared project of making their democratic values 
practicable.”259 
 
5.2.2. Preferred patterns of interaction 
 Part of what renders culture problematic from the point of view of government is 
the potential for multiple and extended effects it affords to otherwise self-contained 
individuals and actions via the avenues of influence available to them. However, the 
same potential for multiple and extended effect via avenues influence can also be utilized 
for the sake of creating a resilient and intelligent culture of virtue. 
                                                            
256 Morrow, “Plato’s Conception of Persuasion,” 242. 
257 I use the phrase “extra-legal” as a generic term for “super-legal” and “infra-legal.” What is super-legal is 
above and beyond the law as such; what is infra-legal operates below the level of law. E.g., patriotic songs 
are an infra-legal means of promoting a super-legal condition in citizens. 
258 Morrow, “Plato’s Conception of Persuasion,” 242. As for the putative morality of this “vast system of 
total persuasion,” Morrow perceptively points out: "We cannot in truth condemn Plato's methods as unfair 
means of persuasion without at the same time condemning most of what has ever taken place under the 
guise of moral instruction. It is exactly what we try to do in our homes, in the church, in every organization 
or group that wishes to produce and perpetuate a type of character and behavior.” Ibid., 244. 
259 Balot, Greek Political Thought, 53–55. 
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5.2.2.1. Contest culture 
Thus, Plato attempts to manipulate the normative distribution of public honors in 
order to incentivize socially helpful patterns of behavior. For instance, while the “man 
who commits no crime” is certainly “to be honored” (τίμιος), the man who, in addition to 
committing no crimes, actively prevents the wicked from doing wrong is “worth” (ἄξιος) 
more than twice as much honor as the first man (730d2-4). This arithmetical claim is 
grounded in an analysis of social utility: the first man only has “the value” (ἀντάξιος) of 
an individual, whereas the second has the worth of a “legion” (πολλῶν...ἑτέρων) (730d4-
5). Plato ordains that the latter individual be publicly declared “the great and perfect 
citizen of his state” and “winner of the prize for virtue” (730d5-7). Such remarks are 
more than complimentary: they are socially orienting speech-acts delivered by the state to 
a population eager for distinctions. Furthermore, they seek to enlist the patterns of 
interaction displayed by citizens in the service of the state – indeed, in a very real sense 
they magnify the state and extend its reach. By distinguishing citizens who not only 
themselves act well, but influence others (in whatever fashion this occurs) to do likewise, 
they not only incentivize such maximally useful behavior among the citizens, but also 
mark it out for purposes of orientation. In sum, they recognize the potential for spillover 
in the social field and they attempt to direct it to the state’s own purposes. 
Likewise, Plato tells us, it is necessary to issue the same praise in regard to all the 
virtues potentially communicable to others by the individuals possessing them (730e). 
The notion of communicability is captured by the verb μεταδιδόναι and noun κοινωνός: 
to want to “communicate” (μεταδιδόναι) one’s virtues to others merits praise, but to be 
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wish to be a “partner” (κοινωνὸν) with no one in these virtues merits dispraise (730e3-6). 
In context, three concrete activities are mentioned – and therefore may be reasonably 
equated with the “communication” of virtues Plato has in mind: (i) informing the relevant 
authorities of the wrongdoing of others (730d), (ii) assisting the authorities in chastising 
(συγκολάζων) (730d), and (iii) not even countenancing (ἐπιτρέπων) wrong in others. 
Thus, the communication of virtues by these especially helpful citizens proceeds through 
a process of active education, assistance, and correction. The Athenian specifies a whole 
scale of honors quantifying this process. First, it is necessary to honor (τιμᾶν) “as in the 
top rank” the successful communicants of virtue (730e4). Second, it is necessary to honor 
“in the second place” those individuals willing but unable to communicate the virtues 
they themselves possess (730e4-5). Third, it is necessary to censure in a qualified way 
those jealous individuals unwilling but able to communicate the virtues they themselves 
possess (730e5-731a2). 
In general, Plato wants to inculcate a spirit of friendly competition for virtue among 
the citizens of the state (731a-b). The generous contestant for virtue is said to strengthen 
the state, whereas the jealous contestant, likely to resort to slander of his fellow 
contestants, not only hinders his own efforts to attain virtue, but in addition sows “lack of 
spirit” (ἀθυμία) among his fellow citizens and thereby harms the state (731a6-b3). In 
sum, Plato is perfectly aware the population of citizens he has to tend is not merely a 
group of isolated individuals, but a self-interacting, self-affecting community. By 
instituting the correct kinds of “competitive” social attitudes and incentivizing and 
promoting the most beneficial forms of interaction, Plato hopes to turn this self-
interacting, self-affecting dynamic to his advantage. 
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5.2.2.2. Memorial culture 
 Another way in which Plato attempts to re-appropriate cultural dynamics for his 
own ends – as we learn subsequently in Book V – has to do with the propagation of 
relevant maxims and bits of advice. By instituting an appropriate “memorial culture” – 
one within which individuals are meant continually to remind both themselves and others 
– Plato aims to mitigate or bolster the intellectual deficiencies arising from the unaided 
powers of individuals in isolation from one another. Thus, these preferred modes of 
interaction may be seen as a sort of intellectual corollary to the moral modes above. 
The particular content most suitable for this memorial culture is characterized in 
three ways. First, it is described as “more detailed [σμικρότερα]” (732b5) than those 
items of grand ideological significance compassed in the great hypothetical speech to the 
colonists that spans large parts of Book IV and V. The word σμικρότερα is the 
comparative form of σμικρός, which means “small or unimportant.”260 Second, it is 
described as “no less useful [χρήσιμα δὲ τούτων οὐχ ἧττον]” (732b6). Thus, the sense of 
“small” (σμικρός) activated here does not so much pertain to importance in general as to 
the level of detail in relation to a larger plan. It is important to pay attention both to the 
“petty” and to the “grand” items of ideology, as these things are equally useful from the 
point of view of the governance of society. Third, it as described as the kind of thing 
“which one hears often enough [ἅ…λεγόμενα πολλάκις]” (732b5).  As an example of this 
advice, Plato gives: “excessive laughter and tears must be avoided” (732c). In sum, we 
                                                            
260 LSJ, ad loc. 
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should understand the content of this memorial culture as a set of common maxims or 
slogans pertaining to how one ought to behave in society in a detailed way. 
Plato claims that it is necessary (χρὴ) to repeat such maxims or slogans to oneself 
(λέγειν ἑαυτὸν) by way of reminder (ἀναμιμνῄσκοντα) (732b6-7). However, at first 
glance this recommendation – the repetition to oneself of putatively beneficial moral 
maxims and the like – in no way differs from what one might associate with traditional 
culture. What marks it as especially Platonic is (a) the key term ἀναμιμνήσκω, invoking 
as it does the familiar Platonic theorization and lexicon of reminders, reminding, etc., on 
display in the Theaetetus, the Meno, and especially the Phaedrus261 and (b) the 
justification Plato immediately gives of this policy in the terms of what I will call the 
“hydraulic theory” of memory. In essence, Plato characterizes the “act of remembering” 
(ἀνάμνησις) as an influx of thought that has drained away (ἐπιρροὴ φρονήσεως 
ἀπολειπούσης) via the process of forgetting, likening its dynamic to a sequence of inflow 
(ἀπορρεῖν) and outflow (ἐπιρρεῖν) (732b7-c1). In the face of this perpetual and 
unavoidable outflow of intelligence, the economy of knowledge must be supplemented 
by periodic inflows of intelligence – i.e., ἀναμνήσεις. 
This pattern of inflow and outflow of intelligence is reminiscent of the “festival 
theory of education” the Athenian propounds in Book II (653c-d). The festival theory of 
education is introduced against the background of Plato’s conception of education as the 
correct training and orientation in pleasures and pains (653c). Since this training “wears 
off [χαλᾶται]” over the course of an individual’s life and in many cases “is destroyed 
                                                            
261 With regard to the lexicon of reminding/remembering, present here are ἀναμιμνήσκω (732b6-7), 
ἀνάμνησις (732b8), and ὑπόμνησις (732d4-5). 
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[διαφθείρεται]” (653c-7-10), it is necessary to give it certain forms of relief (ἀναπαύλας) 
and nourishment (τροφὰς) for the purpose of correction (ἲν’ ἐπανορθῶνται) (653d1-d5). 
Here is Plato is concerned with combatting the outflow and diminution of intelligence as 
opposed to that of the affective orientation of the soul. 
The social ubiquity of advice-giving plays a key role in the memorial culture 
Plato frames against this outflow of intelligence.  The advice he has in mind is such that 
“every man must give to every other [παραγγέλλειν δὲ παντὶ πάντ’ ἄνδρα]” (732c2). The 
density of these encounters will keep such knowledge fresh in everyone’s mind. 
Crucially, it is possible for an individual – who is perhaps no longer capable of reminding 
himself – nevertheless to be reminded by another more diligent than himself. In this 
sense, the unitary psychology argued by Bobonich perhaps lends itself more easily to 
such forms of cooperation than the bipartite or tripartite one.262 
Plato gives a total portrait of memorial culture such that it is necessary (χρή) for 
every individual (ἕκαστον) to live (ζῆν) in accordance with the expectations associated 
with a certain kind of moral advice (ταύταις δὴ ταῖς ἐλπίσιν) along with its reminders 
(ταῖς ὑπομνήσεσι πάντων τῶν τοιούτων) (732d4-5). No individual must spare any effort 
(μηδὲν φειδόμενον), “at work and in leisure time alike[ἀεὶ κατά τε παιδιὰς καὶ σπουδὰς]” 
(732d5-6), regarding the content of this advice to “recall it vividly 
[ἀναμιμνῄσκοντα…σαφῶς] to his own mind and that of others [ἕτερόν τε καὶ ἑαυτὸν]” 
(732d6-7). In sum, Plato advocates a memorial culture (a) designed to activate a series of 
action-structuring expectations, (b) bearing upon “petty” (σμικρότερα) but no less 
“useful” (χρήσιμα) matters of moral advice, (c) by means of a system of reminders 
                                                            
262 Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics, 259. 
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(ὑπομνήσεις), (d) the carrying-out of which we are to assist to our utmost, and (e) relies 
centrally upon a social functionality. By participating in it and striving to bring to 
consciousness – our own consciousness and that of others – we activate the principles of 
fine living and thereby benefit ourselves, each other, and the state. 
The frequent juxtaposition between reminding oneself and reminding others, 
incidentally, suggests how the assertion in the Theaetetus that thought is nothing else but 
the interior conversation of the soul with itself (Tht. 189e) might be put into practice. In 
addition, the memorial culture of the Laws – along with its crucially social component of 
individuals reminding one another – makes for an instructive contrast with the account of 
writing as a failed potion for memory at the end of the Phaedrus. Finally, we should see 
this “memorial culture” or “reasonable culture” of Magnesia as complementary to the 
“intimate relation between reason as expressed in good law and the reason of the 
individual citizen” emphasized by Bobonich.263 Both of these phenomena make a 
contribution to the “full” εὐνομία that is in excess of lawfulness tout court and that reigns 
in Magnesia. However, the memorial culture I have described, unlike the strictly 
individual condition described by Bobonich, is a thoroughly social condition: citizens are 
to remind themselves and each other. To this extent, therefore, one need not see the 
memorial culture, and by extension the system model in general, as resting on 
Bobonich’s thesis, but instead one could see these things as alternative to Bobonich’s 
thesis. While the functionality of memorial culture would certainly be bolstered by an 
increased optimism in the capacities of individual non-philosophers such as Bobonich 
describes, it could also offer a useful way of compensating for the very deficiencies, 
                                                            
263 Ibid., 216. 
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woefully unrevised, Bobonich assigns to Plato in the context of dialogues like the 
Republic and Phaedo. Additionally, this social quality of memorial culture harmonizes 
with another aspect of the Laws argued by Bobonich – namely, his claim that the Laws 
“does not partition the soul into agent-like parts” and is “unitary” rather than bipartite or 
tripartite.264 
 
5.3. Specifically social strategies 
 In this section, I mean to examine two strategies of cultural management which 
are almost always used in combination with one another – namely, “social persuasion” 
and “social enforcement.” First, I will explain what each of them entails. Second, I will 
make some comments about their ubiquitous combination. Third, I will go through two 
examples. 
 
5.3.1. Social persuasion 
 Social persuasion refers to the codified assignment of state-conferred reputational 
predicates, benefits, or penalties in response to certain kinds of action or inaction.265 
There are two immediate advantages to social persuasion as a strategy of cultural 
management. First, it exploits the pro-social desire for positive reputational distinction 
and aversion to negative reputational distinction as an incentive to bring about whatever 
pattern of action or inaction is desiderated by the legislator. Second, by accurately 
                                                            
264 Ibid., 259.  
265 These fall under what Laks calls “procedures de légitimation” – i.e., “forms de discours non 
argumentatives.” Laks, Médiation et Coercition, 48. Likewise, Ober draws attention to the importance of a 
“pragmatic, discursive, speech-act oriented analysis” of Athenian political discourse.Ober, The Athenian 
Revolution, 10. 
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labeling individuals with the reputations they deserve, social persuasion promotes 
“reputational justice” – I use the phrase in a fashion analogous to Miranda Fricker’s 
“epistemic justice.”266 This ensures that the good have maximal influence and the bad 
minimal influence. For instance, whoever reports to the state the unjust appropriation of 
wealth by another (913c-d) is to acquire “a reputation for virtue [δόξαν ἀρετῆς],” while 
whoever fails to do so is to acquire one “for vice [κακίας]” (914a5-6). 
 
5.3.2. Social enforcement 
 Social enforcement refers to the enforcement of law by whoever becomes aware 
of or witnesses its violation. For instance, whoever becomes aware of the discovery by 
another of buried treasure must inform the appropriate authorities (914a-d). Social 
enforcement may be either mandatory or optional. For instance, it is mandatory for 
whoever becomes aware of the discovery of treasure to inform the appropriate authorities 
(914a-d), but it is optional for whoever wishes to inflict punishment on the reproductively 
obstinate on certain occasions (783e-784d: see extended discussion below). It may take 
the form of telling the appropriate authorities or the form of a violent punishment 
administered on the spot. For instance, in the case of buried treasure, social enforcement 
takes the form of informing the authorities (914a-d), but in the case of the reproductively 
obstinate, it takes the form of a violent beating on the spot (783e-784d). Social 
                                                            
266 Fricker, “Rational Authority and Social Power: Towards a Truly Social Epistemology.” 
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enforcement is, in general, a familiar aspect of Athenian law and an important part of the 
Athenian political self-concept.267 See, for instance, the testimony of Demosthenes: 
"What is the strength of the laws? If one of you is injured and cries out, will the 
laws run up and help you? No: for they are simply written letters and would not 
be able to do this. What then is their power? It lies in your establishing them 
securely and giving them authority to help whoever needs them."268 
There are three immediate advantages to social enforcement. First, it mobilizes all 
bystanders or residents as potential deputies to enforce the law, thereby maximizing the 
extent of the laws’ enforcement. Second, in certain cases punishment delivered on the 
spot may be an edifying spectacle for other bystanders, thereby promoting lawful 
behavior among these witnesses. It makes visible the fact that something wrong has 
occurred and that it must be set right. Third, enforcing the law habituates the enforcer 
himself to be more lawful. 
 
5.3.3. Social persuasion and social enforcement 
Almost always, social persuasion and social enforcement appear in combination. 
For example, the penalty for a bystander who does not intervene in a situation requiring 
his intervention may be to suffer some derogation of reputation or honor. The 
combination of social persuasion and social enforcement has two benefits. First, it 
provides a schematized model of honorable conduct for the gentleman (ἐλεύθερος) 
applicable to a variety of circumstances. Second, it forces the hand of the susceptible or 
otherwise cognitively deficient by supplying an additional motive to do the right thing, 
                                                            
267 It also constitutes an important part of the theatrical-democratic legacy of Athenian political life, “the 
vigorous civic practice of being a theatês whereby men experientially encountered their democratic 
citizenship” – a component so convincingly articulated by Monoson though not, unfortunately, attributed in 
deserving measure to Plato’s Laws.Monoson, Plato’s Democratic Entanglements, 207. 
268 Demosthenes 21.224, as quoted in Balot, Greek Political Thought, 53. 
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thereby preventing them from being habituated toward wrong-doing themselves. In sum, 
social persuasion and social enforcement function in combination in a manner 
reminiscent of negative feedback: publicly committing some wrong immediately calls 
forth a host of bystanders prepared to set a good example in comparison with the 
offender’s bad one. Furthermore, anyone so susceptible as not to intervene in the required 
way is immediately labeled as reputationally inferior, and thus their ability to influence 
others is curtailed. Let us now examine two examples. 
 First, for reasons that need not concern us, Plato adjudges persistent bachelorhood 
a moral fault (774a-c). Accordingly, the bachelor must remain “unhonored” (ἄτιμος) with 
regard to all honors (τιμῆς…πάσης) customarily bestowed by the younger upon the older 
(774b5-b6). All young people are instructed not to “take the slightest notice of him” 
(774b6). This is a case of what I have called above “social persuasion.” To the extent he 
cares about his own τιμή, then, he is motivated to take necessary steps so as to prevent 
such derogation. However, in addition, should he persist in his uncivil habits, his 
potentially noxious influence is cut off. By specifically labeling him as ἄτιμος and 
instructing the younger not to pay him any respect, the city neutralizes him as an avenue 
of influence upon the younger. 
Finally, if he attempts to chastise anyone, everyone else must assist and protect 
the victim. Now, this is a case of what I have called above “social enforcement.” 
Everyone must intervene in these cases lest the socially unhelpful spectacle of a bachelor 
chastising someone and exercising apparent authority present itself. But if some 
bystander fails to provide the required assistance, then that bystander must be declared by 
law a cowardly and wretched citizen (δειλός τε ἅμα καὶ κακὸς) (774c1-c2). Here we see a 
174 
 
combination of social persuasion and social enforcement. On the one hand, the 
potentially harmful spectacle of the hubristic bachelor, etc., is replaced by the potentially 
beneficial counter-spectacle of the bachelor rebuked, etc. Thus, the chain of bad effects is 
arrested. On the other hand, should bystanders fail to intervene, they in turn will be 
labeled cowardly and wretched: in this way, once again, the chain of bad effects is 
arrested or minimized. 
Second, for reasons that again need not detain us, Plato finds the failure of bride 
and groom to produce children in a timely fashion – or at the very least, their failure to 
take seriously the production of children – a moral fault (783e-784d). Plato decrees that 
the reproductively obstinate are to have their names posted up in public (784c7-d1). This 
is clearly a form of social persuasion because it negatively impacts the reputation of those 
whose names have been posted up. Additionally, those so named are deprived of the 
honor of attending weddings, birth celebrations, and similar events (784d2-d3). This is a 
particularly appropriate form of social persuasion: they are not to be honored, and above 
all they are not be honored at those occasions most pertinent to their deficient behavior. 
Now, if the male nevertheless attends one of these events, whoever wishes (ὁ βουληθεὶς) 
should punish and beat him with impunity (784d2-d4). This is clearly a form of social 
enforcement – one geared, in addition, to producing the salutary spectacle of the 
reproductively obstinate punished in a forum most suitable to the nature of their vice. Of 
course, Plato would rather the childless not attend such gatherings in order to check their 
bad influence there. However, if they persist in attending, he is perfectly willing to turn 
the situation to the advantage of those present as well as the city itself. In sum, as we 
have seen, the toolkit of social persuasion and social enforcement allows Plato to 
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intervene directly, effectively, and relevantly in the reputation-formation of the citizenry, 
both because this is an incredibly important domain to manage in its own right and 
because it can be leveraged for the sake of enforcing various other laws. 
Finally, note that the application of these status predicates only makes sense 
against the background of an affective attachment to honor and aversion to dishonor – 
i.e., a sense of shame. Thus, contra Bobonich, it is not the case that shame “will thus 
have a limited role in Magnesia.” Bobonich argues this assertion on the grounds that “it 
cannot serve as the primary motivation for virtuous action in adults” and that it often 
comes into play as a last-ditch source of motivation to do the right thing.269 However, this 
account elides the importance in general of such last-ditch sources of motivation and 
Plato’s reliance upon social networks of bystanders and fellow citizens to bring about a 
state of εὐνομία. Shame, a necessarily social emotion, is a vital ingredient in these 
networks. 
 
5.4. Region-targeted strategies 
 Lastly, let us consider region-targeted strategies of cultural management. I call 
region-targeted strategies of cultural management those which are somehow intended to 
apply to specific arenas or domains of culture. These arenas or so domains may be 
singled out either in view of their special intractability or their special importance for 
culture in general. I will discuss three examples of region-target strategies: (i) a regulated 
fan-culture, (ii) the integration of women, and (iii) the ban on private religion. 
                                                            
269 Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics, 350. 
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In general, we may say that Plato aims to abolish all pockets of cultural autonomy 
lest they give rise to tendencies of culture that threaten the excellence and stability of the 
state. In so doing, Plato is carrying forward a general Greek intolerance for pluralism and 
having a “private life” to an excessive degree.270 Indeed, to the extent he does make 
provision for special “pockets” of culture and small groups (such as communal meals for 
men and women), he tends to appropriate their own special dynamics or arranges them 
such as to be conducive to the larger aims of the state. This, as Bobonich has noted, is a 
striking departure from the Republic, which attempted “to foster unity and other-
regarding concern by abolishing or ignoring social and political groups that fell below the 
level of the city as a whole or one of the three social classes as a whole.”271 Bobonich 
stresses, by contrast, that “in Magnesia, it is precisely such small groups that provide a 
main locus for the development and expression of other-regarding concern.”272 This 
tendency is illustrative of what Bobonich sees as Plato’s concern with how and to what 
extent good institutions can be made to work in the real-world circumstances of the 4th 
Century Greek world,273 a concern which Glenn Morrow in turn explicitly connects with 
the agency of the demiurge in the Timaeus.274 The systematic approach, as I have sought 
to carry it out, agrees with both of these points with a special emphasis on the chaos and 
danger of the social field as a form of materiality that must be appropriately utilized for 
                                                            
270 Balot, Greek Political Thought, 5, 12, 15. Balot draws the consequence of an intolerance for pluralism 
from his thesis that “ancient politics was a proper “virtue politics.”” Ibid., 12. The concept of a “private 
life” among the Athenians is somewhat vexed. On the one hand, as Balot notes, the "idea of private 
freedom was a commonplace of democratic political thinking,” and the “tolerance that characterized private 
life was based on egalitarian respect for all citizens,” but on the other hand, the freedoms enjoyed by 
Athenians were not absolute rights, but rather privileges bestowed by the community. Ibid., 59–60. 
271 Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics, 432. 
272 Ibid. 
273 Ibid., 384–85. 
274 Morrow, “The Demiurge in Politics,” 7, 8, 10, 15. 
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the sake of the good order of the city. I have sought to make this special emphasis more 
explicit under the heading of Plato’s supposed creative demiurgy: not only is it the case 
that Plato is “resigned” to make things work as best he can given the flawed, defective 
material available, but in addition it is the case that Plato is specially alert to the unique 
advantages of such material, flawed or defective as it may be. 
 
5.4.1. Fan culture 
Plato includes an unusual qualification in the election of the chief organizer of the 
choruses (765a-b). All “who are keen on such things [ὅσοι μὲν φιλοφρόνως ἐσχήκασι 
περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα]” must assemble and participate in the nomination-round for suitable 
candidates (765a5-6). If there is someone “keen on such things” who does not attend, 
then he must pay a penalty (765a6-7), but others who do not wish to attend are not forced 
to do so (765a7-8). So, on the one hand, those who do not wish to participate on the basis 
of a lack of interest in such things generally are not forced to do so, but on the other hand, 
it is mandatory for anyone who is interested in such things generally to participate. In 
other words, it is impossible to enjoy and care about art in an apolitical way apart from 
the deliberative processes of the state. The putative population of citizens who care about 
art but who would be otherwise unwilling to participate in the formal election procedures 
for cultural offices are forced to participate. With regard to these nomination procedures, 
participants are instructed only to judge candidates on the basis of their experience 
(ἐμπειρία) (765a8-b2). In this way, Plato forestalls the development of an autonomous 
culture of art-related expertise by forcefully including all known enthusiasts in processes 
of state culture within which their influence can controlled and directed. 
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5.4.2. Communal meals 
 Next, let us consider the integration of women into public life – specifically, 
communal meals. After discussing the institution of communal meals among the men of 
Magnesia, the Athenian declares that this custom “points to another measure” (780c).275 
This measure, the Athenian claims, (a) would be as successful as communal meals for 
men, (b) is currently practiced nowhere, (c) is such that its absence renders much 
legislative work fruitless, (d) is exceedingly difficult to discuss, and (e) would be difficult 
to bring about in reality as well (780c-d). With regard to (c) – namely, the apparent 
centrality of this putative custom – the Athenian gives the following general theoretical 
statement. The state secures good results for itself to the extent it participates in law 
(νόμος) and order (τάξις) (780d4-6). However, the good effects of certain well-ordered 
fields (πολλὰ τῶν εὖ τεταγμένων) will be ruined if “things are controlled either 
incompetently or not at all in others [τῶν δὲ ἀτάκτων ἢ τῶν κακῶς ταχθέντων]” (780d6-
8). Thus, if certain areas are left unregulated, they may give rise to effects down the line 
which cancel out good effects produced elsewhere. Women, the Athenian continues, 
supply a conspicuous example of this phenomenon. For instance, since the Dorians have 
left the life of women largely unregulated, they have not instituted communal meals 
among women. As a result of this neglect, they have lost control over many things it 
would be of great benefit to them to control (780e-781a). Indeed, the danger is 
exaggerated in the case of leaving women unregulated: “a woman’s natural potential for 
                                                            
275 Cf. David, “The Spartan Syssitia and Plato’s Laws.” 
179 
 
virtue is inferior to a man’s, so she’s proportionately a greater danger, perhaps even twice 
as great” (781b1-4). 
Moreover, it will be unusually difficult to bring women under the sway of 
legislation: they are the half of the human race “inclined to be secretive and crafty 
[λαθραιότερον μᾶλλον καὶ ἐπικλοπώτερον ἔφυ]” (781a2-a4), and they are habituated to a 
“life of obscurity and retirement” (781c6-d1). Thus, the domain of culture associated with 
women will prove particularly difficult to reform or control inasmuch as women 
themselves are particularly intractable and loath to submit themselves to supervision of 
control. Nevertheless, they must be brought “into the open” (εἰς φῶς) and compelled 
(προσβιάζεσθαι) to take their food and drink in a communal setting openly and visibly 
(φανερὰν θεωρεῖσθαι) (781a1, c7, c3-4). By forcing women to break their seclusion and 
take their meals in public with one another, Plato also opens them up to neighborly 
surveillance and habituation and puts an end to that the neglect of female culture which in 
his view threatened the state. Plato offers a striking complement to the assertion of 
Hannah Arendt that political courage begins with leaving the household;276 neither is 
politics as such complete, it seems, so long as anyone remains in the household.  
 
5.4.3. Religious culture 
Finally, let us consider the ban on private religion. It is illegal for anyone in 
Magnesia to possess a private shrine in his or her home, and anyone wishing to offer a 
sacrifice or perform some other religious observance must do so exclusively in the public 
temples (909d-e). Plato explains this rule as follows: (i) properly founding a temple or 
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shrine is such that not just anyone can do it, and those who attempt this often do it for 
blasphemous reasons (i.e., to get some material benefit), and (ii) religious activity must 
take place under public surveillance because those worshipping privately are more likely 
to engage in blasphemous behavior (909e-910b). In sum, religious culture provides yet 
another example of a form of previously autonomous cultural development enfolded into 
the state’s control and guidance. However, even as Plato seeks to root out private forms 
of religion for the sake of political values, he echoes the already politicized status of 
religion in Greek life. As Ryan Balot notes, “the political was always intertwined with 
religious custom, belief, and practice.”277 
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6. A DESCRIPTION OF THE NOCTURNAL COUNCIL 
 The systematic approach 
The goal of the two preceding studies (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5) has been to identify and analyze the ways in which Magnesia “governs itself” 
without having recourse to the totalizing surveillance, intelligence, and authority of a 
cadre. First, I examined the various electoral processes in operation in the Laws, seeking 
to understand the processes specific to various offices, the formal devices they employed, 
and the electoral culture in general in which they took place. Second, I investigated the 
extent to which Plato takes “culture” in the broad sense — i.e., the ways in which large 
groups of people influence and are influenced by one another in accordance with patterns 
of interaction which they themselves dictate — as an object of political-philosophical 
attention. Specifically, I pointed to Plato’s deep concern in the Laws with self-propelling 
cycles of cultural influence possessing the potential to harm, destabilize, or destroy the 
city, as well as Plato’s attempt to mitigate, curtail, or recuperate these tendencies as part 
of the self-regulation of the city. 
This goal is in line with the systematic approach in general – i.e., the claim that 
what makes the Laws valuable and distinct from the Republic and what explains all 
aspects of the dialogue is that the government of the society of the Laws enacts a system 
model.278 To recapitulate, I claim that the nature of the radical shift in political 
philosophy between the Republic and the Laws is best captured by a distinction I make 
between “cadre” and “system.” As I deploy these notions, a cadre is a small group of 
                                                            
278 In Chapter 1, I gloss the systematic approach as an answer to what I call the fundamental question of 
scholarship concerning the Laws – viz., why does the Laws exist? 
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specially qualified individuals, while a system is a large population whose members or 
constituents affect, and interact with, another in characteristic ways. Each of these 
concepts gives rise to a corresponding model of government. Under the cadre model of 
government, all power emanates from a small cadre of perfect or nearly perfect 
individuals whose existence it is essential to reproduce from generation to generation. By 
contrast, under the system model of government power resides in the complex patterns of 
interaction instituted among and embodied by individuals. These patterns include fixed 
and orderly electoral procedures, the rule of law, and extra-legal social and cultural 
norms. 
 
The nocturnal council 
The topic of this chapter differs in nature from both that of the previous two 
investigations Rather than analyzing a large yet thematically-linked swathe of diverse 
material from the Laws, I will discuss just one institution in particular – namely, the 
nocturnal council. In addition, I am interested in the concrete reality of this institution in 
its entirety rather than in a single, thematically determined aspect of it. Finally, what 
recommends this topic as relevant to the systematic approach is not so much an apparent 
affinity with it as an apparent antagonism. The nocturnal council receives a full 
description only very late in the narrative of the Laws; many commentators have found 
these circumstances troubling, especially given the content that follows. The nocturnal 
council apparently includes both the wisest old men and the most promising young men 
of the city, with the latter selected and elevated by the former. Like the philosopher-kings 
of the Republic, they pursue a curriculum of advanced subjects and engage in similar 
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intellectual activities. The council is described as the “head” of the state (962b-c), an 
“anchor of the whole state” (961c), an “organ of protection” (962c), and a “safety-
device” of the laws and constitution (960e). Should it prove possible to form such a 
council, Plato insists the state “must be entrusted to it” (969b). Morrow comments, 
“There is no parallel to this Council in the government of any historical Greek city that 
we know of.”279 
The suspicious meeting-time of the nocturnal council, its vague legal powers, and 
its late place in the narrative combine to endow the nocturnal council with a sinister 
reputation. Furthermore, its existence has been taken by some to make a mockery of the 
preceding lengthy description of a moderately democratic apparatus of government 
occupying Books IV through XII of the Laws. The vagueness, too, of the powers 
attributed the nocturnal council in comparison with the quite specific details provided in 
the case of other offices, along with the impression of superfluousness (given the 
previous setup of magistracies and offices) some have taken from it, have also seemed 
ominous.280 Some have even gone so far, in light of this apparent incompatibility, to 
declare the nocturnal council a later insertion by Philippus of Opus – an interpretation 
described by Morrow as “not impossible, but it should be accepted only as a last 
resort.”281 Others, while accepting the genuineness of Book XII,282 have nevertheless 
                                                            
279 Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City, 509, 514. 
280 E.g., see Guthrie: “To modern readers the functions and powers of the Nocturnal Council have seemed 
to be left rather vague. Its member as such have no direct hand in the business of government. All 
magistracies and offices for that purpose have already been provided for, and their various modes of 
election prescribed, in the earlier books, with far greater attention to detail than has emerged from the 
present short account.” Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 374. 
281 Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City, 500. Philippus of Opus is the acknowledged first editor of Plato’s Laws. 
Olympiodorus claims – probably falsely, according to Morrow – that Philippus also “corrected” parts of the 
Laws. Many scholars have sought to advance hypotheses intended to explain the condition of the Laws by 
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considered that “its inclusion necessitates the denial, or at least the reconstruction, of 
much that has gone before.”283 In any case, given the strong resemblance to the Republic, 
it may even make a mockery of the very idea of the novelty and identity of the Laws in 
comparison with the earlier work. Plato even describes the members of the nocturnal 
council as “guardians” (φύλακες), using the famous term from the Republic, as if he had 
made a kind of Freudian slip.284 
Referring to the rule of law – and its apparent suspension for the sake of the 
philosophical members of the nocturnal council – Müller describes the Laws as “Zwitter” 
or a hermaphrodite.285 Barker declares “the law-state is really destroyed.”286 Likewise, 
Malcolm Schofield attempts to disaggregate the “two projects” of the Laws into an 
attempt to approximate the second-best city to the kallipolis along with one to institute a 
political system 'more common' than that of an ideal community.”287 Certainly, it is clear 
that the institution of the nocturnal council, at least at first glance, poses a significant 
challenge for the systematic approach. After all, does the nocturnal council not, in the 
final analysis, constitute a kind of “cadre” situated at the heart of the Laws?  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
means of various actions undertaken by Philippus. For instance, Ivor Bruns claimed Philippus combined 
the Laws with another idealistic account by Plato, thus accounting for the apparent inconsistency between 
I,II, and parts of XII versus the other parts of the laws. Likewise, Theodor Bergk sees the Laws as a 
combination of different uncompleted texts to which Philippus had access – namely, parts of the second-
best and third-best constitutions. See Ibid., 515–17. 
282 After the highly successful attempt of Theodor Gomperz to destroy arguments of the sort advanced by 
Bruns or Bergk through an illustration of the abundant cross-references between the various parts of the 
Laws. Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City, 517. 
283 Ibid., 500. 
284 Indeed, Guthrie declares that the members of the nocturnal council are “analogous to the Guardians or 
philosopher-kings of the Republic,” pointing out that Plato “slips easily back into the terminology of Rep. 
and calls them so (964c7 and e2, 965c10, 966b5, 968d1, 969c2).” Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 
369. 
285 Müller quoted in Morrow, “The Demiurge in Politics,” 6. 
286 Quoted in Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 374. 
287 Schofield, “The Laws’ two projects.” 
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Structure of the following argument 
First, I will provide a complete description of every aspect of the nocturnal 
council. Second, I will argue that the nocturnal council does not pose a threat to the 
systematic approach as I have outlined it.  Previously, I declared that to examine some 
complex entity from a systematic perspective is to identify and analyze the ways in which 
it “governs itself” without having recourse to the totalizing surveillance, intelligence, and 
authority of a cadre. I will take the last three criteria as my negative standard of argument 
vis-à-vis the nocturnal council.288 In addition, I will interpret the three criteria as a 
conjunction which, I will argue, the nocturnal council does not, in fact, satisfy. 
Specifically, the nocturnal council lacks the authority of a cadre.  
I will also treat en passant a number of side-arguments and minor points 
regarding the nocturnal council. Ultimately, I will claim, not only is the nocturnal council 
not incompatible with the system model of government, but indeed it performs a vital 
function within it and is wholly continuous in spirit with the political philosophy 
animating the rest of the Laws. 
The description of the nocturnal council is divided into ten sections. First, I will 
say a little about the place in the text of passages dealing with the nocturnal council along 
with the essential conjectures to which details regarding the placement of these passages 
might give rise. Second, I will discuss the “three beginnings” one could conceivably 
assign the description of the nocturnal council; these three passages approach the spirit of 
the nocturnal council in related, if different, ways. Next, I will discuss the technical 
                                                            
288 Cf. Dies and Gernet, who gloss the nocturnal council as the “organe suprême de surveillance et de 
gouvernement.” Diès and Gernet, “Introduction,” vi. 
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details of membership in the council, the mentorship of junior members by senior 
members, and the meeting-time of the council. From here, I will examine Plato’s most 
extended account of the rationale of the council from the point of view of the security of 
the state along with the implications this has for the mode of philosophical competence 
necessary for its members and the functionality of the council itself within the state. 
Finally, this will lead directly into an overview of the council’s activities, style of 
operation, and principal legal powers. 
 
6.1. The place in the text 
Almost the entirety of the information we have concerning the nocturnal council 
comes from two sections in Book XII of the Laws, both near the very end of the work: 
one from 951d-952b (the “short passage”) and one from 962c-969c (the “long passage”). 
There are also two mentions of the “nocturnal council” in Book X in the context of 
policies regarding atheists. Many have found the description of the nocturnal council in 
Book XII of the Laws to be inconsistent, either in letter or in spirit, with the government 
apparatus of Magnesia sketched in Books IV through XII. This has given rise to a certain 
dilemma in the reception history. Either one rejects the authenticity of the passages 
dealing with the nocturnal council and attributes them instead to Plato’s editor, Philippus 
of Opus, or one accepts their authenticity but imputes thereby to Plato a charge of 
inconsistency or a slipperiness in presentation.289 
 
6.2. Three beginnings 
                                                            
289 See, e.g., Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City, 500., for a representative list of these attempts. 
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Let us now turn to what I have been calling the three “beginnings” of the 
nocturnal council found in Book XII. Each of these beginnings constitutes a sort of 
introduction, whether direct or indirect, to the nocturnal council. In addition, each helps 
to evoke the spirit of the council that is subsequently elaborated and articulate the 
thematic complex associated with it. Thus, it is necessary for these reasons to examine 
each of the beginnings in turn. First, I will discuss the office of the scrutineers and the 
discourse associated with them; second, I will discuss the institution of the θεωροί or 
observers; and third, I will treat the series of speeches centered on the notions of finality 
and security. 
 
6.2.1. The scrutineers 
The discussion of the scrutineers in 945b-948b in Book XII is directly relevant to 
the nocturnal council because the scrutineers are, as we will subsequently learn, members 
of this council ex officio. Furthermore, the discussion of the scrutineers is thematically 
relevant to the nocturnal council inasmuch as the scrutineers are (i) entrusted with special 
authority and (ii) recognized by the state at large (iii) for the sake of the corrective 
influence they exercise over society (iv) which requires special abilities on their part and 
(v) is of the utmost importance for the preservation of the state. 
These so-called “scrutineers” are in charge of the “scrutiny” (εὔθυνα) of officials. 
The scrutiny is an investigation which takes place when officials leave office and is 
intended to ensure office-holders were not guilty of any improprieties during their tenure 
of office. The problem scrutineers exist to solve or mitigate stems from what is 
problematic about the office-form itself — namely, the possibility that some officer 
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might say or do something “crooked” (σκολιὸν) because he has been “bent” (καμφθεὶς) 
by pressure or is lacking in his own power, his own δύναμις, in comparison with the 
dignity of the office he occupies (945b-c). Note that εὔθυνα literally means 
“straightening” and that “bent” and “crooked” are part of a tedious series of puns. 
The job of the scrutineers, accordingly, is to make inquiries and avail themselves 
of all decent methods of testing in order to discover any possible evidence of misconduct. 
Afterward, they are to post written notices publicizing their findings and assess 
appropriate penalties (946c-e). As such, the scrutineers are called upon to exercise a 
peculiar form of authority — they make up, as Plato puts it, a kind of “authority over the 
authorities (τῶν ἀρχόντων ἄρχοντα) (945b-c). The notion of a group of super-officers 
exercising a form of authority over all other officers is inherently reminiscent of a cadre. 
That the scrutineers act as an authority over the authorities is necessary in view of 
the special vulnerability of the state to “dissolution,” or λύσις, the unravelling of the spirit 
of community that holds the state together as a state. If the scrutineers fail to do their job 
properly, then the “sense of justice” (δίκη) which unites all the different officials is 
dissolved (λυθείσης) and “all the officials go their different ways and refuse to pull 
together any longer.” From a single state they create many states, in this way destroying 
the original state. 
The ability of the scrutineers to perform the service required of them for the unity 
and preservation of the state is a function, Plato repeatedly asserts, of the superiority of 
their virtue to that of those they scrutinize (945c-e). This special — even exemplary — 
status of the scrutineers is recognized by the state in numerous ways. During the initial 
stage of procedure for electing the scrutineers, each individual is instructed to nominate 
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that individual he believes “perfect in every way.” (945e-c) After the winners of the 
election have been crowned with olive, awarded the highest distinction of the state, τὰ 
ἀριστεῖα, and made high priests, it is to be publicly proclaimed that “the state of the 
Magnesians…presents to the Sun-god her three best men; and these, her choicest 
fruits…she consecrates…as a joint gift to Apollo and the Sun.” (945e-946c) 
 
6.2.2. The observers 
The discussion of the observers (θεωροί) in Book XII (951a-d, 952b-d) is directly 
relevant to the nocturnal council because some of these observers ultimately serve on the 
nocturnal council and all of them must report their observations to the nocturnal council. 
In addition, the discussion of the observers leads directly the short passage in 951d-952b. 
It is thematically relevant to the nocturnal council inasmuch as the observers (i) are 
super-capable individuals (ii) expected to exercise a corrective influence on society (iii) 
for the sake of its ultimate preservation (iv) on the basis of certain intellectual-empirical 
duties they perform (v) connected with a special mode of intellectual competence. 
In the middle of a discussion concerning different kinds of visitors both to and 
from Magnesia, the Athenian mentions a new category of outgoing visitors from 
Magnesia, who embark upon a special kind of study, one characterized as such both by 
the nature of its subject-matter and the conditions under which it must be undertaken. 
They pursue as the object of their observation (θεωρία) and investigation (ζήτησις) the 
customs, laws, and affairs of other nations — their πράγματα or νόμιμα (951a-c, 952b-d). 
They pursue this object by visiting other nations and engaging in conversation on a 
variety of subjects: among them are the composition of laws, education, and training 
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(952b-d).290 In particular, they are to seek after the “tracks” of certain “divine 
individuals” whose edifying company is highly prized and who are born “just as often in 
badly-ruled states as in the well-ruled.” (951a-c) 
Those who wish to embark upon these studies may do so provided they secure 
permission. However, anyone who wishes to become an observer must be over fifty, of 
sterling reputation, and not be perceived as vulnerable to corruption (951a-c, 951c-d). 
These observers are tasked with obtaining a certain body of knowledge deemed essential 
to the state. It is necessary for any state which wishes to become “sufficiently civilized 
and perfect [τέλεος]” not to remain unsociable (ἀνομίλητος) with other states and thereby 
“inexperienced” (ἄπειρος) with regard to the goods and evils of mankind (951a-c). This 
gathered experience allows the state to “thoroughly protect” (διαφυλάττειν) its own laws 
by grasping their rationale on the level of knowledge (γνώμῃ) as opposed to the force of 
habit (ἔθεσιν). Guthrie, among others, emphasizes that whereas true belief is typically 
enough for the population at large, the nocturnal council clearly possesses more than true 
belief.291 
This special mode of intellectual competence, in turn, permits the state to 
strengthen and preserve its finely established customs (νόμιμα) and correct or perfect its 
deficient ones. In fact, when the observer has completed his period of foreign 
observation, he is to appear before a special “council that contemplates legislation” (τὸν 
τῶν περὶ νόμους ἐποπτευόντων) and inform them whether he has encountered anyone 
                                                            
290 Intriguingly, Morrow suggests that the visits of the θεωροί may be an “echo of Plato’s visit to the 
Pythagoreans in Italy and to other lands during his years of travel after the death of Socrates.” Ibid., 505. 
Monoson, like others, assimilates the Athenian Visitor to the type of the theôros. Monoson, Plato’s 
Democratic Entanglements, 234. 
291 Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 370. 
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“able to give him some information about any problems of legislation or teaching or 
education” or if himself has made realizations along these lines in the course of his 
travels (952b-d). The council is of course the nocturnal council. It also has the power to 
award “high distinctions” (τὰ ἀριστεῖα) to those among the observers who have become 
even more virtuous while abroad. 
Finally, note that the word translated as “contemplates” – i.e., the verb ἐποπτεύω 
– is a very rare and interesting word whose use by Plato should command our attention. 
Specifically, it can mean to overlook or oversee, but in particular, it can also mean to be 
admitted to the highest grade of the mysteries. At this level of initiation, one does not 
have to wear a veil and could freely look upon the rituals that transpired. Plato often uses 
ἐποπτεύω and similar language or images from the mysteries as metaphors to convey the 
idea of some supreme intellectual realization or epiphany – e.g., in the Symposium, the 
Phaedrus, or the Republic. Thus, it is natural to expect this council possesses some 
special intellectual competence regarding the working of law that is unavailable to others. 
 
6.2.3. The logic of finality 
Let us now turn to the last of the three “beginnings” — what I will call the logic 
of finality. The discussion of the logic of finality is directly relevant to the nocturnal 
council inasmuch as it leads into the long passage and presents the principal rationale of 
the council. Among themes associated with the nocturnal council, it foregrounds the 
notions of (i) the preservation of the laws, (ii) special intellectual duties, and (iii) a 
special mode of intellectual competence. 
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After looking back over the long project of outfitting the new state with 
appropriate legislation, the Athenian comments that this legislative work is nearly at an 
“end,” a τέλος. However, he continues, merely for one to create something is not to fulfill 
the extent of one’s duties of authorship in regard to that thing. Unless one can provide 
one’s creation with “security” (σωτηρία) so that it will continue to exist after the moment 
of creation, the creation is in a sense “incomplete” (ἀτελές) (960b-c). Thus, before the 
Athenian, Kleinias, and Megillus can call their formulation of a set of laws for the 
Magnesians complete, they must find a way to provide these laws with σωτηρία and 
ensure their security and stability. 
Specifically, they must implant within the laws “a natural resistance to being 
reversed” (ἀμετάστροφον…κατὰ φύσιν δύναμιν) (960d-e). This “safety-device for our 
political system and legal code” is nothing other than the nocturnal council. Plato claims 
that if it were installed “as a kind of anchor for the whole state,” it will provide the state 
with σωτηρία. The council, furthermore, will accomplish this in the same way the “soul 
and head” (ψυχὴ καὶ κεφαλή) – or more specifically, the intellect (νοῦς) and senses 
(αἰσθήσεις) – of each living thing help to preserve the continued existence of that thing. 
To explain this, Plato points to the way a captain and his sailors rely on the observations 
for the latter and the expertise of the former. In every kind of activity, the essential thing 
is to recognize the relevant aim (σκοπός) and take contextually appropriate action toward 
that aim. 
 Accordingly, if the process of giving Magnesia a constitution is to be complete, 
there must exist something which “understands in itself” the “target” (σκοπός) at which 
the statesman would aim along with the ways in which this target can be realized and the 
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forms of discourse helpful to this project (962b-c). A state which lacks such an element 
within is mindless (ἄνους) and senseless (ἀναίσθητος) and will no doubt embark upon a 
random series of reforms which are not conducive to the ultimate aims of the state. 
 
6.3. Membership of the nocturnal council  
The topic of membership in the nocturnal council is covered twice in Book XII of 
the Laws, once in the short passage and once in the long passage. In certain details, they 
differ. I will review each of them individually. Both passages insist that the council be 
made up of a mix of the young and the old (951d-952b, 961a-c); these are sometimes 
called respectively junior and senior guardians. Both kinds of guardians are necessary to 
the functioning of the nocturnal council, but the senior guardians are more important. In 
this section I will only discuss the membership of the senior guardians, but the next 
section is devoted to the mentorship process by which junior guardians are admitted. 
In the short passage, the nocturnal council is stated to include (a) priests who have 
won “high distinctions” (τὰ ἀριστεῖα), (b) the ten oldest nomophylakes, and (c) all 
ministers of education past and present. Let us treat each of these groups in turn. First, 
priests who have won “high distinctions” is periphrasis for the scrutineers since they are 
the only priests who have been awarded high distinctions.292 The scrutineers are elected 
officials, and we have already reviewed their duties. Second, the nomophylakes are 
elected officials in charge of most aspects of enforcing the law and protecting the basic 
organization of society (754d-755b). Finally, the minister of education is an elected 
                                                            
292 Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City, 503. 
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official is in charge of “the entire education of boys and girls;” his office is described as 
“by far the most importance of all the supreme offices in the state.” 
In the long passage, the nocturnal council is stated to include (a) all who have 
been awarded highest honors, (b) the ten oldest nomophylakes, and (c) the official 
observers (θεωροί) to other lands who have passed the scrutiny of the nocturnal council 
upon their return (961a-c). There are three differences between the two statements on 
membership: (i) the first statement only includes priests who have been awarded high 
honors; (ii) the first statement says nothing about observers; and (iii) the minister of 
education has disappeared. If we accept an emendation of the text proposed by Theodor 
Bergk, according to which the word “priests” should be removed from the first 
formulation, then the first and third problems disappear. The group of those awarded high 
distinctions, after all, includes only – as far as we know – the scrutineers and certain 
observers. 
There is little to be done in the case of the second difference – i.e., the 
disappearance of the ministers of education. Perhaps Plato’s persistent laudation of this 
office and his description of the minister as the “best all-round citizen in the state” imply 
he, too, has been awarded high distinctions. In any case, if we bring the two formulations 
together, we will find that the nocturnal includes all past and present ministers of 
education, the scrutineers, and the ten oldest nomophylakes. Additionally, certain 
eminent citizens who have successfully undergone a period of foreign observation may 
have been asked to join. 
 
6.4. Mentorship of the junior guardians 
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We learn in the short passage that the nocturnal council is to be “mixed” 
(μεμειγμένος) and include both young men and old men. In the previous section, we 
examined the membership of the senior guardians, and in this one we will examine that of 
the junior guardians. Each of the senior guardians is instructed to bring to meetings a 
young man of his choice between thirty and forty years of age. At the meetings, the junior 
guardians are expected to “study with all possible zeal” the topics chosen by the senior 
guardians (951d-952b). Note that the verb for “bring” (προσλαμβάνων) is often used to 
denote choosing someone as an assistant or partner. 
The selection-process is described slightly different in the short passage and in the 
long passage. In the long passage, the Athenian insists that a prospective junior guardian 
be chosen by a senior guardian only if the young man seems worthy in both nature and 
upbringing (961a-c). He is then introduced to the other guardians, and if he seems worthy 
to them, accepted as a member. However, if the rest  of the council elects not to 
accept him, then the whole consideration-process must be kept a secret from everyone, 
especially from the rejected candidate himself (961a-c). In the short passage, by contrast, 
each junior guardian is merely described as having been “chosen” (ἀρέσκοντα) or 
“summoned” (παρακεκλημένων) by a senior guardian (951d-952b). 
The similarity with the kallipolis of the Republic, in which a group of potential 
future guardians are progressively elevated purely at the discretion of those above, is 
clear.293 Likewise, the Republic’s emphasis on identifying those with a certain desired 
class of “natures” for future training is also present here. The junior guardians are 
                                                            
293 Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 375. 
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described in a later passage as having been chosen as the “the best in natural gifts” (τοὺς 
εὐφυεστάτους) (964d-965a). 
If a young guardian proves unworthy (ἀνάξιος) after his selection, then the whole 
council is instructed to censure the member who nominated him. Those young guardians 
who win a good reputation, by contrast, are to be guarded (φυλάττειν), watched over 
(ἀποβλέποντας), and fostered (τηροῦντας) with particular care by the whole state. 
Finally, they are to receive special honors so long as they behave well, but if they should 
not, then they are to be specially dishonored (951d-952b). This also seems similar to the 
case in the Republic: as one ascends the echelon of forms of testing in the kallipolis, one 
secures a greater share of honors and is exposed to new forms of training and testing. 
 
6.5. Meeting time of the nocturnal council 
There are two sources of evidence regarding the meeting-time of the “nocturnal 
council.” First, it is very often referred to as, well, the “nocturnal council” (νυκτερινὸς 
σύλλογος) (908a, 909a, 968a-c). It’s also referred to, at one point, as “the council that 
must convene in the night (νύκτωρ)” (962c). Second, there are two longer specifications 
of the meeting-time of the council, one in the short passage and on the long passage. 
In the short passage, the Athenian says that the council must meet “every day by 
strict rule” from “just before dawn” until “the sun is well up in the sky” (951d-952b). 
Now, “just before dawn” is my translation of ἀπ’ ὄρθρου — the noun ὄρθρος means 
either dawn or just before dawn. If we assume that the references to the council as 
nocturnal are even partially accurate, then ὄρθρος in this case must mean “just before 
dawn” rather than just “dawn.” In any case, given the terminus ad quem above, it is clear 
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the “nocturnal council” begins its meetings while it is dark, but ends them while it is 
light. 
The long passage, again, stresses “dawn” rather than “night” as the time during 
which the nocturnal council meets. It is described as ὄρθριον, an adjective meaning “at 
dawn.” In addition, there is a rationale given for this meeting time: this is when there will 
be the most “leisure” (σχολή) for the members of the nocturnal council from their private 
and public responsibilities. 
 
6.6 Rationale of the nocturnal council 
In this section, I will describe the “rationale” of the nocturnal council. By the 
“rationale” I mean the complex ways in which the nocturnal council is professed by Plato 
to benefit or participate in the life of the city. In contrast to the following sections, in 
which I will discuss the more concrete aspects of the council – its activities, powers, and 
style of operation – this section pertains to the utility of the nocturnal council considered 
on a more abstract level. Furthermore, I am concerned to summarize this abstract utility 
as Plato conceives and describes it. The description of the rationale is best organized 
according to three themes: (i) the nocturnal council as anchor of the state, (ii) the 
nocturnal council as exercising ἀκρίβεια, especially with regard to the end of the city as a 
whole, and (iii) the nocturnal council as the “head” of the state. These themes are familiar 
from the logic of finality, described above. 
 
6.6.1. Anchor of the state 
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According to what I have described above as the logic of finality, the authorial 
duties incumbent upon the author of a thing are incomplete until the author has provided 
that thing with security (σωτηρία) (960b-c). Thus, in the case of the “laws” which have 
been elaborated at such length (or the “constitution and the laws,” as Plato sometimes 
puts it), it is necessary to provide them with security. This instrument of security is, of 
course, nothing other than the nocturnal council. 
The security it is intended to provide is first conceived as a kind of stability or 
unchangeability. The Athenian declares it is necessary to somehow implant with them a 
“resistance to being reversed [ἀμετάστροφον…δύναμιν]” (960d5-6). Further ways of 
characterizing the kind of security with which it is necessary to endow the laws suggest it 
is meant to be foundational or orienting in respect to the activities of the state. First, the 
Athenian likens providing σωτηρία to the constitution and laws to laying a firm 
foundation (961). Second, he describes the council, which is to fulfill this function, as “a 
kind of anchor for the whole state [οἷον ἄγκυραν πάσης τῆς πόλεως]” (961c4-5). 
An examination of the case of animals provides with further clues respecting how 
the nocturnal council as the instrument of security is intended to discharge its 
responsibilities. In the case of animals, the saving or preservative element (σωτήρ) in 
each is its soul and head. More specifically, it is the intelligence and senses (961d). The 
more excellent an animal’s intelligence and senses, the more likely it is to continue to 
exist in the face of external threats. In sum, it is the “combination of reason with the 
highest senses [νοῦς μετὰ τῶν καλλίστων αἰσθήσεων κραθεί]” (961d9-10) which can 
most appropriately be labeled the security (σωτρηρία) of each thing. In support of the 
claim (that the mixture of intellect and senses is the security of a thing), the Athenian 
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gives the example of a captain and sailors working together to pilot a ship. The group 
mixes their sense-perceptions (τὰς αἰσθήσεις) with the captain’s insight (τῷ κυβερνητικ͂ω 
νῷ), and in this way “they keep themselves and the whole ship safe [σῴζουσιν αὑτούς τε 
καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ναῦν]” (961e3-5). Additional examples from medicine and generalship 
show that the combination of intellect and senses is effective because it enables 
appropriate action to be taken in each context toward the appropriate aim (σκοπός) for 
that context (961e-962a). 
The properly preservative knowledge, then, of a thing is the knowledge of the 
target or aim, the σκοπός, of that thing. In other words, to properly preserve something 
means to possess special intellectual access to the σκοπός of that thing in order to assess 
or deliberate toward its satisfaction.294 Whatever or whoever we install for the 
preservation of the state must possess this knowledge (962a-b). Since the nocturnal 
council is intended to be such an “organ of protection [φυλακτήριον]” (962c7), it must 
possess a single target and direct all its activities in conformity with it rather than 
dividing its attentions between a host of different aims (962d). Of course, this modus 
operandi is in direct contrast with that of most states: these places witness a constant 
stream of legislative fluctuation unorganized by reference to any supreme end (962d-e). 
In sum, the nocturnal council, as the instrument of security for the laws and 
constitution, is intended to exercise a stabilizing influence upon the various institutions of 
the state by ensuring that they are in conformity with a single supreme end in exactly the 
manner the combination of intellect and senses performs a similar role in other pursuits. 
Note that the mode of stabilization here enjoined is with regard to σκοπός; thus, it is 
                                                            
294 Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City, 501. 
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perfectly possible – and indeed likely –that Plato intends the nocturnal council to propose 
reforms or changes in law or custom.295 The nocturnal council exists to stabilize the 
government by means of keeping it oriented towards its fundamental σκοπός, not by 
means preserving every little detail of the constitution willy-nilly or as it one day 
stood.296 Of course, the same intellectual faculty is required for the proposal of intelligent 
reforms as is for the discernment of unintelligent deviations. Thus, the nocturnal council 
is perfectly suited to both of these related roles. 297 Morrow glosses the functionality of 
the nocturnal council in relation to the founding legislation of Magnesia by pointing out 
that, “Every society in which the sovereignty of law is affirmed has to provide some 
method for interpreting and expanding its inherited rules.”298 It is illuminating, however, 
to consider such a role for the nocturnal council in relation to what is specifically 
described as a lack by Kahn in the Statesman: “There seems to be no space between the 
utopian rule of an expert and blind obedience to whatever laws are in force – no room in 
this dialogue (as there will be in the Laws) for a legal procedure of legal reform.”299 
 
6.6.2. Mode of competence 
                                                            
295 On this topic, see Brower’s helpful article. Browers, “Piecemeal Reform in Plato’s Laws.” 
296 Cf. “Permanent safeguarding is attained not by rendering the law code itself permanent and immutable, 
but by insuring that there is an institutional framework in the city that allows for learning new high-level 
truths and for taking account of circumstances.” Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and 
Politics, 400. Likewise, Guthrie points out, on the one hand, the assertion in 772a-d that the whole law-
system is to be immutable, and on the other hand, the passages in Book VI respecting gaps in legislation, 
suggesting Morrow’s way of making sense of the respective passages to be best. Guthrie, A History of 
Greek Philosophy, 368–69. 
297 Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City, 501. 
298 Ibid., 513–14. 
299 Kahn, Plato and the Post-Socratic Dialogue, 230. 
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The second theme pertinent to the rationale of the nocturnal council has to do with 
this end-directed guidance to be exercised by the nocturnal council. The Athenian points 
out that the necessity of ensuring that the various institutions of the state are directed to a 
single supreme end was first emphasized in Book I (963a; 630a-e). Specifically, the 
legislator was to aim at virtue (963a), or rather, virtue as a whole in contradistinction to 
merely some part of virtue or some particular virtue (630d-e). Furthermore, virtue itself 
was held to be fourfold (τέτταρα) (963a6), consisting of practical wisdom, moderation, 
justice, and courage (631c-d). Among these, reason (νοῦς, here synonymous with 
φρόνησις) was itself declared the end of the other virtues (963a). 
In the case of other rational pursuits like navigation, medicine, generalship, to 
which the office of the nocturnal council has been likened, it is in particular the reason 
employed by the captain, doctor, or general (νοῦν…κυβερνητικὸν...καὶ ἰατρικὸν καὶ 
στρατηγικὸν) which aims at some single context-appropriate end (963a11-b2). Currently, 
we are discussing the reason employed by the statesman (τὸν...πολιτικὸν) (963b2). If the 
analogy between rational pursuits is to hold, then we should expect of the reason 
employed by the statesman all we expect of the reason employed by the captain, doctor, 
and general, mutatis mutandis. Crucially, this means that we should expect of the 
respective agents not only (i) the ability to identify or indicate (εἰπεῖν) the end in 
question, but also (ii) the ability to offer a precise description or detailed delineation of it 
(σαφῶς...φράζειν, διαρθροῦντες, διωριζόμην) (963b3-963c1). 
Under (ii) note the presence of vocabulary (διαρθροῦντες, διωριζόμην) which 
implies making distinctions within the general concept of the end. In the case of the end 
of the statesman – i.e., virtue – possessing this ability means possessing the ability to 
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specify and distinguish the four kinds of virtue from one another, as well as the ability to 
explain why the four kinds of virtue are unified under the single word “virtue” (963-
964b). The Athenian goes on to describe the special mode of competence we are to 
expect of those associated with the nocturnal council and characteristic in general of 
exegetes, teachers, and lawgivers, or “the guardians of the others:” (i) they are to be 
appropriate interlocutors for those in need of “enlightenment and instruction,” and (ii) 
they must be able to teach (διδάσκτοντα) and explain in detail (πάντως δηλοῦντα) the 
effect (δύναμιν) of virtue and vice. Thus, these “guardians” are to be capable both in 
theory and practice (λόγῳ ἔργῳ τε ἱκανοὶ) and sufficiently knowledgeable regarding 
virtue (ἀρετῆς πέρι γιγνώσκοντες ἱκανῶς) (964c6-7). The state which lacks such a group 
must be regarded as “unguarded” (ἀφύλακτον) – i.e., it lacks the end-directed guidance 
essential to σωτηρία – and therefore succumbs to the same pattern of chaotic innovation 
and eventual collapse that besets other contemporary states (964c7-d1).300  In sum, the 
special protective device essential to the stability and σωτηρία of Magnesia will 
specifically require those who are extraordinary discerning with regard to virtue both in 
its theory and practice (ἀκριβεστέρους τῶν πολλῶν περὶ ἀρετῆς ἔργῳ καὶ λόγῳ) (964d4-
5).301 
 
6.6.3. The corporate metaphor 
                                                            
300 Morrow, too, emphasizes and discusses the special intellectual access the members of the nocturnal 
council are expected to have in relation the law and the function of this cognitive access for the salvation of 
the laws. Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City, 501. 
301 According to Guthrie, whereas the members of the council possess knowledge, true belief suffices for 
those outside it. While it is true that the council has a comparatively superior cognitive grasp of the truth, it 
may be selling short the population at large to limit them to true belief.  Guthrie, A History of Greek 
Philosophy, 370. 
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 The purpose of the nocturnal council is to endow the state with security 
(σωτηρία). The security-providing element in general (σωτήρ) may be likened to soul and 
head, or more particularly, the intellect and senses (961d). For example, in the case of a 
ship the captain and his crew work to preserve the ship: the captain contributes the part of 
intellect, while captain and crew alike play the part of senses. More specifically, the 
combination of intellect and senses functions to ensure that the proper target (σκοπός) 
governs the relevant practice, enterprise, or craft (961e-962a). Indeed, in general no 
practitioner – e.g., a doctor or general – can be said to possess rational knowledge (νοῦς) 
so long as that practitioner is ignorant of the relevant σκοπός. Thus, in the case of the city 
what we need for its preservation (σωτηρία) is something or someone which understands 
the σκοπός or end of the city. No one who is ignorant of this can even be called a ruler 
(ἄρχων) (962a-b). 
So, we must endow the city with something (τι) which understands the σκοπός of 
the city which would be selected for it by a true statesman (πολιτικός). Morrow 
emphasizes this key intellectual capacity, likening it to those possessed by the 
philosopher-kings of the Republic. He claims, thus, that “these closing pages are as 
integral a part of the Laws as are Books VI and VII of the Republic.” The nocturnal 
council is truly the head of the state in the sense of an "intelligence which apprehends the 
reason in the law and the source of this reason in the ordered cosmos.”302 In addition, we 
should expect this entity, whatever it may be, to possess the subordinate capacities of 
understanding what means are best for realizing this aim and who or what among men 
and laws can offer valuable advice for achieving it (962b-c). In this way, the Athenian 
                                                            
302 Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City, 501–3. 
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asserts, a state so endowed will not be “irrational” (ἄνους) or “senseless” (ἀναίσθητος); 
i.e., it will possess the safety-providing element that ensures everything the state does 
conduces toward the essential aim of the state rather than constituting an essentially 
random and unorganized pattern of activity (962b-c). 
 In the specific case of the nocturnal council, it will resemble the general form of 
the safety-providing element – i.e., the combination of intellect and senses – in the 
following way. The junior guardians – chosen because they are the “best in natural gifts 
[τοὺς εὐφυεστάτους]” and “possess a sharpness in their whole soul [ὀξύτητας ἐν πάσῃ τῇ 
ψυχῇ ἔχοντας]” (964e3-4) – correspond to the senses. They will look around the whole 
state, store up impressions in their memories, and act as reporters for the rest of the 
council (964e-a). Meanwhile, the senior guardians can be compared to the intellect given 
the great wisdom (τῷ διαφερόνως φρονεῖν) they display with regard to vital matters of 
the state (964a). Their role is to deliberate (βουλεύεσθαι), making full use of the 
“assistance and advice of their juniors” (964a). In this way, the nocturnal council will 
“truly save” (σῴζειν...ὄντως) the state (964a) by acting as its soul and head. 
 
6.7. Activities of the nocturnal council 
Next, I will proceed to discuss the activities, operation, and powers of the 
nocturnal council. By “activities” I mean the concrete forms of business and action taken 
by the council; how they spend their time qua council. By “operation” I mean the general 
style of how the council goes about whatever it does. Finally, by “powers” I mean the 
legal rights or duties of the nocturnal council, what they have the power to accomplish 
qua council. Plato describes three main activities of the nocturnal council: (i) an 
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academic program consisting of research, education, and discussion; (ii) the policing and 
therapy of atheists in the new state; and (iii) the dispatching and reception of observers 
sent to foreign states. Morrow argues that we should note the close resemblance between 
the Academy and the Council: (1) in subject-matter of studies, (2) in the goal of saving 
the city, and (3) in their reception of wise visitors.303 
 
6.7.1. Discussions, education, and research 
 The nocturnal council engages in a range of recognizably academic activities 
including (a) discussion of political and social matters, (b) research both internal and 
external, and the (c) pursuit of a theological and philosophical curriculum. Let us treat 
each in turn. 
The Athenian describes the meeting of the nocturnal council as a συνουσία 
(951e5), a Socratically charged word reminiscent of dialectical exchange, and as 
featuring “discussions [τοὺς λόγους]” (951e5-a1). In addition, the members of the council 
are instructed to discuss certain topics “they may discover from external sources [ἄλλοθι 
πυνθάνωνταί]” (952a2) and to concern themselves with “studies [μαθημάτων]” that 
benefit their “research [σκέψει]” (952a3). Thus, they are devoted both to discussion and 
research in equal measure. 
 As for the content of this discussion and research, the Athenian explicitly 
mentions “laws [περὶ νόμων]” and “their own state [τῆς τε οἰκείας πόλεως πέρι]” 
                                                            
303 Ibid., 509–10. Regarding (2), Morrow claims that the Academy was Plato’s vehicle for legislative 
reform. See Morrow, “The Demiurge in Politics,” 9. See also, in regard to the Academy directly advising 
the founders of Magnesia, Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 373. Additional information about the 
involvement of the Academy in founding new cities can be found in Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work, 
464. Cherniss, also, emphasizes the exploratory and discursive aspect of the Academy in opposition to a 
supposed strict fidelity to the Theory of Forms. Cherniss, Harold, The Riddle of the Early Academy. 
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(952a1). However, it is reasonable to assume the subject-matter of the discussions and 
research also includes the topics described in connection with the observer program and 
the curriculum of theology and philosophy (both shortly to be described). In addition, it is 
also natural to associate this subject-matter of discussion and research with the mode of 
competence assigned the nocturnal council in virtue of its role as the preservative element 
of the state – viz., (i) an understanding of what constitutes the σκοπός of the state, (ii) a 
grasp of the concrete means for realizing that σκοπός, and (iii) a facility in recognizing 
appropriate sources of advice (συμβουλία) among laws and individuals (962b5-9). 
Finally, the Athenian describes the senior guardians of the nocturnal council as 
deliberating (βουλεύεσθαι) with the assistance and advice of the junior guardians based 
on their experience (965a1-3). This accords with other descriptions of the subject-matter 
of their discussion and research, but it also suggests these discussions and research are 
particularly oriented toward the necessary decisions and problems of the present. 
 In addition to mere discussion and dialectical inquiry into social and political 
matters, the nocturnal council also undertakes positive research into the ways of life and 
governance at work in other states by dispatching official observers of the customs 
(νόμιμα) of other nations (952b5-7). Such observers are instructed to visit other lands, 
observing and conversing with their inhabitants. If they discover anyone capable of 
“giving some information [τινα φήμην]” (952b7) on the composition of laws, education, 
or upbringing, or if they themselves have made discoveries of their own, they are to share 
(κοινωνεῖν) these matters with the rest of the nocturnal council (952b-d). Indeed, Guthrie 
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describes the activity of the council as “research rather than a degree course.”304 Taylor 
declares in regard to the council, “One of its chief functions is to foster sound scientific 
research (952a).”305 
In view of the obviously dialectical character of both the intra-council discussions 
and the trans-Magnesia voyages, it is surprising that Morrow claims to find none of “that 
dialectical and philosophical inquiry into first principles on which Plato in the Republic 
had laid such stress.”306 In addition, he wonders “how any citizen who had been subjected 
for thirty years or more to the strictly supervised regimen we have described could retain 
the critical power and the freedom of mind required for such study.”307 However, unlike 
the Republic, which in effect bans as dangerous the open traffic of intellectual inquiry, 
the Laws allows it in a controlled set of circumstances intended to reap the positive 
effects without courting the negative. Taylor, by contrast, points to precisely such 
passages in Book XII by way of response to the claim that astronomy replaces dialectic in 
the Laws.308 
 Finally, let us consider the advanced philosophical curriculum associated with the 
nocturnal council. It has already been resolved that members of the nocturnal council – if 
                                                            
304 Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 375. 
305 Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work, 464. 
306 Morrow, “Plato’s Conception of Persuasion,” 248. Samaras, similarly, claims to find a shift from the 
Republic to the Laws of metaphysics to history and associates this shift in study with a democratic tilt. I 
disagree with this in a couple of ways. First, “history” does not adequately describe the object of the 
nocturnal council’s researches even if there is a kind of renewed emphasis on such matters. Plato seems just 
as interested in synchronic happenings elsewhere as diachronic series in the same place. In addition, he 
does not seem to care about historicity as such; rather, what is important are the didactic truths and lessons 
of human behavior. Second, there’s no denigration of metaphysics as such in the Laws: see Books X and 
XII; so rather than a shift from one to the other it makes more sense to talk of the joining of one by the 
other. Third, it makes more sense to see Plato’s embrace of democracy as demiurgic rather than historical; 
Plato is interested in democratic forms to the extent they are necessary for the working-over of certain 
kinds of material. Samaras, Plato on Democracy, 260. 
307 Morrow, “Plato’s Conception of Persuasion,” 248. 
308 Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work, 497. 
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they are indeed to put into practice the superior knowledge of statecraft necessary to 
preserve the state – must exercise superior ἀκρίβεια in regard to distinguishing and 
comparing the different species of virtue. To do this, they must receive a more advanced 
education, one that will allow them “not merely to see the many individual instances of a 
thing, but also to win through to a knowledge of the single central concept, and when he’s 
understood that, put the various details in their proper place in the overall picture.” (965b) 
Thus, what is required of the members of the nocturnal council, and thus what 
presumably plays an important role in their special activities, is not so much distinct from 
the social and political content described above as it is its “philosophical” organization in 
the form of a kind of grand knowledge pertaining to virtue; they must possess “an exact 
idea of the common element in all the four virtues.” (965c-e)309 
Likewise, in the case of “goodness and beauty,” the guardians should understand 
what it is that unifies instances or types of beauty and goodness within their respective 
classes (966a). Since the role of the guardians is to keep the state “on track,” so to speak, 
with regard to its essential σκοπός, it is vital they acquire the necessary mode of 
intellectual competence which scales up and down in this way and can explain these 
passages in a fluent and cogent way to others. This desiderated mode of competence is to 
apply to “all serious questions [πάντων τῶν σπουδαίων]” (966b4-6). 
 Among these σπουδαία of which it is necessary for the members of the nocturnal 
council to acquire a superior intellectual grasp (beyond what the law ordains) are 
theology and other fundamental philosophical topics (966c-968a). Thus, the Athenian 
                                                            
309 See above footnote on Samaras’s claim that the Laws embodies a shift from metaphysics to history. 
Schofield connects the “methodology of philosophical dialectic” described here to Phdr. 265c-266c and 
Soph. 253d. Schofield and Griffith, Plato: Laws, 465. 
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declares that every intended guardian must “work hard [διαπονήσαηται] to master every 
theological proof there is” and that “we must never choose as a Guardian of the Laws 
anyone who is not preternaturally gifted or has not worked hard [διαπεπονηκότα] at 
theology” (966c-d). 
Regarding the course of higher studies pursued by the guardians, Morrow 
comments that it “for the most part…parallels that laid down for the guardians in Rep. 
VII,” but the “astronomy, the theology, and the doctrine of the soul are additions.”310 In 
sum, we should include among the likely activities of the nocturnal council these 
practices of intense intellectual labor (Plato’s preferred word in this connection is the 
verb διαπονεῖν) in service of the most distinguished topics in a fashion consistent with the 
ἀκρίβεια characteristic of the council.311 
 
6.7.2. Reform of atheists 
Plato’s highly fascinating policy regarding atheists is detailed at length in Book 
X. The senior members of the nocturnal council play an essential role in this policy. In 
essence, Plato thinks that no one would ever voluntarily commit unholy deeds and or 
speak impious words did they not profess some sort of atheism (885b). Thus, by 
controlling the distribution of atheist beliefs among the population of Magnesia, he aims 
to minimize certain sorts of crimes. Specifically, he divides atheists into three categories: 
(i) those who do not believe the gods exist, (ii) those who believe that gods exist, but also 
that they are indifferent to human beings, and (iii) those who believe that gods exist and 
                                                            
310 Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City, 506. 
311 Cf. Monoson, Plato’s Democratic Entanglements, 228. 
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are not indifferent to human beings, but also that they can be “influenced by sacrifices 
and supplications” (885a-e).312 Atheists are to be converted from their atheism by three 
progressively more intense means of persuasion: (i) the visible evidence of the sun and 
stars (855c ff.), (ii) written theological discourses forming the preamble to laws on 
impious behavior (e.g., 887b-c, 890e-891a, 899d, and 907c-d), and (iii) the argument and 
conversation of members of the nocturnal council. Let us focus on the third. 
 Anyone who is convicted in the relevant court of “impiety of word or deed” – or 
any official who does not prosecute cases of impiety which have come to their attention – 
will be imprisoned in one of two special prisons according to the severity of the offense.  
(907e-908a) The three forms of atheism mentioned earlier are further subdivided into six 
forms according to whether each form of atheist, in addition to his intellectual belief, also 
harbors “an uncontrollable urge to experience pleasure and avoid pain” or “has a 
naturally just character” (908b-c). The latter, according to Plato, will not commit any 
crimes, but he will “talk with a complete lack of inhibition about gods and sacrifices and 
oaths, and by poking fun at other people will probably, if he continues unpunished, make 
converts to his own views” (908c). The former, by contrast, will dissimulate his atheism 
as such; instead, “he’s the sort of fellow who’ll make a diviner and go in for all sorts of 
legerdemain,” and he may become a “dictator or a demagogue or a general, or a plotter in 
secret rites” (908d-e). Plato views members of the second group, who require permanent 
segregation and isolation from the population at large (909a-c), as far more dangerous 
                                                            
312 For atheism in general in the Greek context, see Tate, “Greek for’Atheism’”; Tate, “More Greek for 
‘Atheism.’” 
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than those of the first who, he claims, only need “admonition combined with 
incarceration [νουθετήσεως ἅμα καὶ δεσμῶν]” (908e1-e3).  
 The members of the nocturnal council assist in a key way in the treatment of this 
second group – i.e., atheists with a naturally just character. These atheists are remanded 
into the custody of a “reform center” (σωφρονιστήριον) where “no citizen must come 
into contact with them” with the important exception of the councilmembers (908e-909a). 
The members of the nocturnal council visit those in custody and associate (ὁμιλοῦντες) 
with them for the purpose of admonition (ἐπὶ νουθετήσει) and the salvation of their souls 
(τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς σωτηρίᾳ) (909a2-a5). It is clear from context that the intervention of the 
guardians is such as to provide an intellectually more flexible and sophisticated refutation 
of atheism than what is contained in the preamble. The members of the nocturnal council 
are exactly qualified to provide this in virtue of the superior ἀκρίβεια and education in 
theology they possess. 
 
6.7.3. Repatriation of observers  
 In addition to more traditional observers (e.g., Magnesian emissaries to sacred 
festivals), the Athenian also decrees it necessary (χρεών) to dispatch to certain other sorts 
of observers (θεωροὺς) who wish to observe (θεωρῆσαι) in a more systematic way (κατά 
τινα πλείω σχολήν) the affairs of other peoples (τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων πράγματα) 
(951a3-7). Morrow suggests that these visits may contain an “echo of Plato's visit to the 
Pythagoreans in Italy and to other lands during his years of travel after the death of 
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Socrates.”313 The nomophylakes are to grant permission only to those observers who 
seem invulnerable to corruption while abroad (951a3-7, 951c1). The rationale given for 
the dispatching of these foreign observers accords perfectly with that of the nocturnal 
council itself: (i) if the city remains inexperienced (ἄπειρος) with regard to the evils and 
goods of men (ἀνθρώπων κακῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν) because it keeps to itself (ἀνομίλητος), 
then it can never become completely civilized and perfect (ἥμερος ἱκανῶς…καὶ τέλεος) 
(951a7-b2, and see 951c-2-3); (ii) to protect the laws (τοὺς νόμους διαφυλάττειν), it is 
necessary to comprehend them from a position of knowledge (τοῦ γνώμῃ λαβεῖν αὐτοὺς) 
(951b3-4); and (iii) it will assist in securing (βεβαιούμενον) the customs that have been 
finely established and correcting (ἐπανορθούμενον) those that are deficient (951c1-c3). 
 What is the character of this period of foreign observation? The Athenian uses the 
word “leisure” (σχολή) characteristic of sustained intellectual or academic study (951a7), 
as well as the term for inquiry or investigation (ζήτησις) (951b8, 951c3, 961a5). Finally, 
the word θεωρία, in addition to its normal meaning of the dispatching of observers 
(θεωροί), is also connotative of intellectual contemplation and study.314 The material 
emphasized for foreign observation also closely accords with what is discussed by the 
nocturnal council: (i) the affairs of other peoples (τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων) (951a5-6); 
(ii) the evils and goods of societies (ἀνθρώπων κακῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν); (iii) the customs of 
other nations (τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις νόμιμα) (952b6); or (iv) anything special 
                                                            
313 Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City, 505. Cf. Monoson, Plato’s Democratic Entanglements, 234. 
314 Monoson discusses the “concentrated and patterned use of the vocabulary of theorizing” in the Laws. 
However, this discussion is a component of an overall thesis in regard to the Laws and “theory and 
theatricality” with which I disagree. Monoson, Plato’s Democratic Entanglements, 208, 228, 229, 232. 
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(καίριον) on the subject of the preservation of the laws (πρὸς τὴν νομοφυλακίαν) (961a5-
6) 
 Much of this investigation, the Athenian suggests, is to take place in a special way 
reminiscent of typical Socratic practice, actual Academic research activities, and the very 
dialogue currently being held between Kleinias, Megillus, and the Athenian.315 In 
essence, there are asserted to exist at any given time (ἀεὶ) certain divine men 
(ἄνθρωποι…θεῖοί), who are never numerous, but who are nevertheless born (φυόμενοι) 
just as often in cities with ἐυνομία as those without (951b4-b7). To “associate” 
(συγγίγνεσθαι: a Socratic word) with these men is eminently worthwhile and rewarding 
(951b5-6), and it is necessary for the resident of the state with ἐυνομία to track down 
these individuals in order to converse with them and benefit from their wisdom (951b7-
8). The foreign observer is to share with the whole council (κοινούτω τῷ συλλόγῳ 
ἅπαντι) if he has come across any of these divine individuals capable of imparting some 
information (τινα φήμην) regarding the composition of various laws (τινῶν περὶ θέσεως 
νόμων), education (παιδείας), or upbringing (τροφῆς), or if he himself has achieved 
insight into such things (νενοηκὼς ἄττα) (952b5-9). 
 The nocturnal council supervises the repatriation of these foreign observers in 
three ways. First, they are in charge of processing and discussing the significance of any 
information (φήμη) on the composition of any laws, education, or upbringing, or 
anything (τί) special (καίριον) on the preservation of the laws (πρὸς τὴν νομοφυλακίαν) 
the observers have to report (952b7-9, 961a4-6). Second, the foreign observer is to 
                                                            
315 Indeed, the “other helpers” cited are, according to Morrow, as cited by Guthrie, Plato’s academy. See 
Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 373. See also Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work, 464. 
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undergo a kind of moral evaluation upon his return. If he appears to have returned neither 
better nor worse, he is to be praised on account of his bountiful eagerness (τῆς σφόδρα 
προθυμίας) (951c1-2). If he appears to have improved in the meantime, he is to be loaded 
with honors while alive and after his death (951c2-4). Finally, if he appears to have 
returned corrupted, he must not associate with other citizens for the remainder of his life 
lest he corrupt them, but simply live in obedience to the laws (951c5-c7). Third, the 
nocturnal council is to accept into itself as permanent members those foreign observers 
who have been thoroughly scrutinized (διαβασανισθέντας) upon their return by the other 
members of the nocturnal council (961a6-8). In addition, it is reasonable to assume that 
the nocturnal council – or at least its membership – is involved in the “exchange of 
information [τούτων τισὶν τὸ μὲν διδάξας, τὸ δὲ μαθὼν]” (935d5-6) called for in the event 
of the arrival in Magnesia of a foreign observer from another city similar to those 
dispatched by Magnesia (953c-d). 
 
6.8. The operation of the nocturnal council 
 Let us now discuss the operation of the nocturnal council. By “operation” I mean 
something perhaps more akin to its “style of operation” – i.e., what common marks does 
it bring to bear in everything it does, in all of its activities. To some extent, enumerating 
these characteristics risks duplicating descriptive work above; thus, I may only gesture at 
them. The two major characteristics of the style of operation of the nocturnal council are 
(a) its intellectual or academic character and (b) the teamwork between junior and senior 
guardians. 
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 Under the heading of the intellectual or academic character of the nocturnal 
council, we may note (i) its research into, and discussion of, matters of law, custom, and 
other features of the life of the polis, (ii) the empirical, contingent component of this 
research, (iii) academicity as such (i.e., a set of patterns, habits, and practices), (iv) and 
the emphasis placed upon speaking on important matters with ἀκρίβεια. 
With regard to (i), the nocturnal council is often characterized as vehicle for 
research, discussion, and inquiry: it is a gathering (σύλλογος) or meeting (συνουσία) 
devoted to discussions (λόγοι) and inquiry (σκέψις), one that seeks out teachings 
(μαθήματα) and anyone who has made certain realizations (νενοηκώς) and attempts to 
discover (πυνθάνεσθαι) whatever it can in the interesting of rendering clearer 
(εὐαγέστερον γίγνεσθαι) what is obscure and opaque (σκοτωδέρα καὶ ἀσαφῆ) (951d-
952b, 952b-d, 961a-c). In content, it pursues – what is variously described as – laws, the 
affairs proper to the city, customs, legislation, education, upbringing, or whatever 
pertains to the preservation of the law (951d-952b, 952b-d, 961a-c). 
With regard to (ii), there is an important empirical or contingent component to the 
research described above. For instance, foreign observers are specifically dispatched to 
other states so that Magnesia may not remain “inexperienced” (ἀνομίλητος) with regard 
to the good and evil elements of other peoples (ἀνθρώπων κακῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν) (951a7-
b4). Likewise, teachings from “external sources” (ἄλλοθι) and the information (φήμη) 
someone from abroad may offer are prioritized (951e5-952a2, 952b5-9). Finally, the 
category of the specially appropriate (καίριον) is emphasized among the field of what is 
encountered abroad (961a4-6), as are laws and other individuals as sources of advice 
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(συμβουλία) distinct from that philosophical knowledge of the aim (σκοπός) of 
legislation per se (962b7-9). 
With regard to (iii), note that the nocturnal council holds its gatherings every day 
at the same time on the basis of strict rules (951b6-7), is devoted to sharing and 
propagating items of knowledge within itself (952b7-9), partakes of a special degree of 
leisure (σχολή) (961b6-8), possesses the power of asking to join their body those who 
meet certain criteria (961a6-8), and facilitates a general transfer of knowledge and 
experience from the old to the young through a process of mentorship (951e3-5, 952a6-
b5, 961a8-b6) 
Finally, with regard to (iv), the Athenian explicitly stipulates that the members of 
the nocturnal council must exhibit ἀκρίβεια with regard to virtue (965c9-d1, d4-6). To 
possess ἀκρίβεια in regard to something, as the text frequently explains, means to possess 
the ability to see and explain to others how the instances of sub-forms of that thing differ 
and relate to another (963c-d, 964b-d, 965a-c). We should thus certainly expect this 
ability – to scale upward and downward in an intelligent and fluent way between ideals 
and practice – to characterize the general operation of the nocturnal council and all its 
members too. 
Finally, let us turn toward the second characteristic of the style of operation of the 
nocturnal council – viz., the form of teamwork or cooperation obtaining between junior 
and senior guardians. First, the council is described as “mixed” (μεμειγμένος) with regard 
to the young and the old (951d5-6): the use of this word recalls the description of the 
institution of the Spartan Gerousia in Book II by Lycurgus. The latter is said to have 
“blended [μείγνυσιν]” the prudent influence of age [τὴν κατὰ γῆρας σώφρονα δύναμιν]” 
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with the “obstinacy and vigor of the Spartans [τ͂η κατὰ γένος αὐθάδει ῥώμῃ]” (691e3-
692a1) at work in the persons of their two kings by forcing them to share their authority 
with the body of 28 elders (691e-692a). Here, however, it is ultimately not so much the 
prudent influence of age which makes a necessary contribution to the activity of kingship 
as the energies and special potentialities of youth which make a necessary contribution to 
the activity of the council. The junior guardians are instructed to study (μανθάνειν) with 
all possible zeal (πάσῃ σπουδῇ) those topics which the old have chosen (ἐγκρίνωσιν) 
(952a6-7). 
Much more substantive information regarding the productive interaction of the 
junior and senior guardians can be found in the Athenian’s justification of the claim that 
the nocturnal council functions as the head and senses of the state (964d-965a). If the 
“state itself corresponds to the trunk,” then the junior guardians, who were chosen on 
account of their “natural gifts” and the sharpness they possess in their whole soul 
(ὀξύτητας ἐν πάσῃ τῇ ψυχῇ ἔχοντας), (i) survey the whole state (περὶ ὅλην κύκλῳ τὴν 
πόλιν ὁρᾶν) and (ii) “store up in their memory all the sensations they receive while on 
guard [φρουροῦντας δὲ παραδιδόναι μὲν τὰς αἰσθήσεις ταῖς μνήμαις]” (964e1-5). The 
senior guardians, by contrast, who imitate the intellect (νῷ) on account of their superior 
wisdom in relevant matters (τῷ πολλὰ καὶ ἄξια λόγου διαφερόντως φρονεῖν), deliberate 
(βουλεύεσθαι) (964e5-965a2). The two groups collaborate in the following way: the 
junior guardians “act as reporters [ἐξαγγέλους γίγνεσθαι]” for the senior guardians 
concerning “everything that takes place in the state,” and the senior guardians make use 
of the junior as assistants (ὑπηρέταις) for their advice (μετὰ συμβουλίας) (964e5-965a3). 
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Thus, the junior guardians act as an essential conduit that relays and interprets the 
particular and concrete realities of the state to the senior guardians so that the latter may 
deliberate and consider them in connection with the most real and fundamental aims of 
the state as a whole. Note that the division of labor between the junior and senior 
guardians cannot be reduced to the distinction between data and theory. The junior 
guardians are made use of for the purpose of advice (συμβουλία): they cannot offer this 
συμβουλία unless they have at least some intellectual grasp of the general aims of the 
state. Likewise, the senior guardians do not simply passively accept as current whatever 
the junior guardians tell them: they are specifically described as possessing a reasonable 
ability to discern who (τίς…ἀνθρώπων) is capable of giving them good advice and who is 
not (καλῶς ἢ μὴ συμβουλεύει), as well as a general means-end knowledge of attaining 
the fundamental goal of the state (962b7-9). This partial failure of the metaphor is, in 
fact, not even novel: e.g., the same unequal, but not absolute distribution of prudential 
and sensory capacity obtained with respect to the captain and his crew (961e). 
 
6.9. Attributed powers 
We have so far discussed the activities and style of operation of the nocturnal 
council. Now, let us go over the “powers” attributed to this body, distinguishing between 
“specific powers” and “vague powers.” By “specific powers” I mean specific abilities 
explicitly attributed to the nocturnal council. By “vague powers” I mean powers which it 
is reasonable to suspect the nocturnal council must possess given overall or emphatic 
claims about its nature or purpose.  First, I’ll discuss the former, and then I’ll discuss the 
latter. 
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Amazingly, there are only two specific powers attributed to the nocturnal council 
(other than those associated with its own membership): (i) the supervision and therapy of 
certain forms of atheist, as described above; and (ii) the repatriation and processing of 
foreign observers who have returned from abroad.316 Since these two things have been 
amply described under 6.7 above, I will not rehash them here. I’ll discuss whether or not 
these two specific powers make the nocturnal council like the philosopher-kings of the 
Republic in the next Part. Finally, let us note that the very paucity of specific powers 
attributed the nocturnal council has led some to take the “vague powers” shortly to be 
described all the more seriously. 
 
6.10. Vague powers 
Now that we have described the explicitly attributed legal powers of the nocturnal 
council, let us proceed to examine an important series of claims and proposals to be 
found on the last few pages of the text. These passages attribute “vague” rather than 
“specific” powers to the nocturnal council. I will focus on three statements in particular, 
what I call the “title claim,” the “legal protector” claim, and the “grant” claim. 
Unfortunately, many have found in these vague powers given the nocturnal council a 
kind of carte blanche, not heeding the warning of Glenn Morrow in regard to the “grant” 
that it “is a kind of peroration, and one should recognize that a peroration does not always 
contain the most precise statement of a speaker's or writer's thought.”317 Likewise, 
                                                            
316 Morrow notes as well that the nocturnal council has only these two explicit responsibilities. Morrow, 
Plato’s Cretan City, 510. Likewise, Schöpsdau emphasizes that the council as such exercises “keine 
Regierungs- oder Kontrollfunktion im Staat.” Schöpsdau, Nomoi, Buch I-III, 125. 
317 Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City, 512. 
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Morrow reasonably asserts (though it requires argument) that the essential language of 
the handover is “obviously too vague to support an inference as to its legal powers; it is 
an expression only of Plato's belief in the crucial importance of his council.”318 
Let us consider the “title claim” first. After enumerating a familiar set of 
philosophical insights and intellectual skills including the ability to give “reasoned 
explanations” of “consistent rules of moral action” when required (967d-e), the Athenian 
declares that no one incapable of mastering these things — in addition to the ordinary 
virtues — “will ever be good enough to govern an entire state, but only to assist 
government carried on by others [ἄρχων μὲν οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο ἱκανὸς ὅλης πόλεως, 
ὑπηρέτης δ' ἂν ἄλλοις  ἄρχουσιν]” (968a-c). Thus, Plato appears to make a kind of 
knowledge the normative condition of exercising power in the familiar way of the 
Republic. Since the insights and skills in question are exactly those supposed to be 
possessed by the members of the nocturnal council, the clear implication of this passage 
is that whereas the members of the nocturnal council ought to be designated or authorized 
the “real rulers” of the entire state, the other officers are merely their “assistants.” 
The “legal protector” passage occurs almost immediately after the “title claim” 
and appears to follow in virtue of it. Specifically, the Athenian proposes that the 
nocturnal council be made the “legal protector [φυλακὴν…κατὰ νόμον] of the safety of 
the state [χάριν σωτηρίας].” (968a-c) Primed as we are by the title claim above, it is easy 
to read this passage as an additional grant of authority to the nocturnal council. In view of 
their superior knowledge entitling them to rule, it seems only fitting they should be 
awarded a vague, yet impressive sounding title like “legal protector.” 
                                                            
318 Morrow, “The Demiurge in Politics,” 19, n. 23. 
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Finally, there is the “grant.” The Athenian declared that “if this divine council [ὁ 
θεῖος…σύλλογος] of ours can be formed, then the state must be entrusted to it 
[παραδοτέον τούτῳ τὴν πόλιν].” (969b) The word Saunders translates “entrusted” 
(παραδοτέον) could also be translated “given over” or “handed over.” Plato could not 
seem to be any clearer: what could it mean to “give over” the state to the council except 
to authorize the council as the supreme element? 
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7. THE NOCTURNAL COUNCIL AND THE SYSTEMATIC 
APPROACH 
In Chapter 6, I undertook a neutral overview of all elements of the nocturnal 
council including its context, membership, rationale, activities, and style of operation. 
Now, in Chapter 7 I will present a positive argument in full that the existence of the 
nocturnal council is not incompatible with the systematic approach I claim is the one 
most germane to the Laws. Recall that the systematic approach is founded on identifying 
and analyzing the ways in which a society “governs itself” without having recourse to the 
totalizing surveillance, intelligence, and authority of a cadre. For the purpose of the 
argument in question, I will interpret the last three criteria as a conjunction. This 
conjunction of elements is not satisfied by the nocturnal council because the council does 
not possess the authority of a cadre. Finally, in the course of presenting this argument I 
hope to clarify the nature of the nocturnal council in its specificity. 
The remainder of Chapter 7 is divided into eight sections. First, I will discuss some 
relevant material bearing upon the sense in which the nocturnal council ought to be 
considered continuous with the rest of the Laws. Next, in sections 7.2 through 7.8 I will 
discuss material relevant to the conjunctive case including the predominantly elected 
membership of the nocturnal council (7.2), the non-threatening nature of the mentorship 
of junior members by senior members (7.3), the attributed powers of the council (7.4), the 
sense in which the nocturnal council is a nocturnal council (7.5, 7.6), the sense in which 
its members are called guardians and the council itself a safety-device, an instrument of 
security, and an anchor (7.7), and finally the “vague powers” assigned the council (7.8).  
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7.1. The question of continuity 
 The continuity I have in mind here is neither textual continuity, which is a matter 
of cross-references, logical transitions, and perhaps even the organizational structure of a 
dialogue, nor continuity on the level of what is described, which concerns whether the 
parts of the government described in the earlier passages are compatible with those 
described in the later passages, but rather continuity on the level of an explicit theme — 
i.e., how does the text itself address and comment on the question of its own 
continuity?319 It is important to examine passages that thematize the relation of the 
description of the nocturnal council to the previous description of other parts of the 
government because these passages affect our interpretation of the nocturnal council in an 
obvious way. Specifically, there are two important extended statements in Book XII that 
address the continuity of the nocturnal council with the rest of the government apparatus. 
First, there is what I called in 6.2.3 the “logic of finality.” Second, there is a passage— 
near the very end of Book XII — what I will call the “addition speech.” 
The logic of finality concerns the conditions under which one’s activity can be said 
to be at an end (τέλος) or under which one’s creation can be said to be complete (τέλεος). 
One’s duties of authorship toward something are exhausted only when one has provided 
it with complete and perpetual security (σωτηρία) (960b-c). In the present case, this 
means that the work of legislating a constitution for the prospective Magnesian colony 
                                                            
319 In light of the successful demolition of Bruns or Bergk-style arguments by the work of Gomperz, the 
apparent incompatibility remains to be explained not by textual, but by interpretative, means. Thus, it is 
question of descriptive and thematic continuity rather than textual continuity. In this section, I treat the 
question of thematic continuity. The question of descriptive continuity is an object of Chapter 7 in general. 
Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City, 517. 
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cannot properly be said to have come to an end until there has been implanted within it “a 
natural resistance to being reversed” — a power or δύναμις that, as it turns out, the 
nocturnal council is intended to exert. (960d-e) Considered from this point of view, the 
nocturnal council is not only continuous with the rest of the laws, but indeed it is, in a 
sense, implied by them as their completion or fulfillment. The same reasons which 
obligated one to construct such a set of laws now also obligate one to provide it with an 
entity like the nocturnal council. As Kleinias puts it, it would be “laughable” for someone 
to “labor in vain” at something by failing to “construct it on a firm foundation” (960d-e). 
Next, near the very end of the dialogue, the Athenian says to Kleinias and Megillus 
that it is time to consider whether it is necessary (χρεὼν), in addition (πρὸς) to the body 
of laws already enunciated, to append or add (προσφέρειν) the institution of the nocturnal 
council. What is of immediate interest here is the sense in which the nocturnal council is 
considered something distinct from the other laws, something that can or cannot be 
appended or added to them. This in turn implies a sort of independence or self-
consistency of these laws from the institution of the nocturnal council.320 
This impression is furthered by the exchange that follows: Kleinias responds to the 
Athenian that they must indeed attempt to append it “even if we are only able to bring it 
off to a small extent” (968a-c). This response on the part of Kleinias does two things: (i) 
it affirms the normative desirability of instituting the nocturnal council as an appendix to 
the existing laws; but it also (ii) recognizes as a limiting condition of this desirability the 
possibility that we may be only able to achieve the institution to a partial extent (κατὰ 
                                                            
320 Cf. in Samaras’s phrase, the council is not political, but “meta-political.” Samaras, Plato on Democracy, 
299. 
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βραχὺ). Likewise, a little later, the Athenian begins a statement, “And should this divine 
council of ours come about…” (968e-969c). The use of the conjunction “if” (ἐάν), the 
subjunctive case of “come about” (γένηται), as well as the adjective “divine” (θεῖος) 
foreground the difficulty and perhaps only partial possibility of the nocturnal council. 
However, to call it divine (θεῖος), is at the same time in no way to detract from the 
normative desirability of this institution. Indeed, the remainder of the text abounds with 
the mutual assurances of the interlocutors to engage in the attempt with eagerness, 
resolution, and a cooperative spirit (968a-969c). 
In sum, considering the logic of finality together with the addition speeches 
illuminates the complex continuity of the nocturnal council with the rest of the 
Magnesian government and gives rise to an error theory respecting the impression many 
have taken away from the Laws of the nocturnal council as  a hasty yet overambitious 
appendage to the Magnesian government. For, in a sense the laws of Magnesia are 
complete, self-consistent, and independent by themselves without the institution of the 
nocturnal council. In a sense, they don’t “need” the nocturnal council, and this is good 
because, as we learn, it may be impossible anyway to institute such a council to the full 
extent. However, in another sense, one that speaks to the fundamental limitations Plato 
assigned the mere law-form, they do require the nocturnal council, which is perforce 
consistent with them, if they are to continue to exist in security and stability in a 
tumultuous world. Thus, the nocturnal council, even if not necessarily necessary, is 
nevertheless possibly possible, and, to the extent possible, necessary. 
 It is in this way, and it is within this structure, that we can answer those critics 
who use the apparent inconsistency of the Laws as a premise to argue either for the 
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authorship of the latter part by Philippus of Opus or for the claim that Plato did not 
impart the requisite unity to his final text.321 Likewise, we are in a position to situate the 
apparent vagueness of the nocturnal council’s powers to those modern readers who find it 
puzzling, especially in the face of the already elaborated structure of magistrates and 
officers whose duties, etc., have already been described.322 However, it still remains to be 
shown that this unity in political-philosophical conception, whatever its character, is best 
described as systematic in contrast with the cadre of philosopher-kings of the Republic. In 
addition, to the extent that, like Müller, we see the previous body of laws in the Laws and 
the nocturnal council as representing different principles of government, we must insist 
that their combination, a Zwitter or no, was certainly not unintentional or undesigned, but 
rather that the essential continuity and integrity of this Zwitter-dialogue is thematized and 
emphasized by Plato.323 
 
7.2. The nocturnal council as indirectly elected 
I argue that the institution of the nocturnal council does not constitute a counter-
example to the systematic approach — i.e., that it does not possess the surveillance, 
intelligence, and authority of a cadre. In particular, I argue it does not possess the 
authority of a cadre. There are two ways in which the nocturnal council could be said to 
lack the authority of a cadre. First, the conditions of membership in the council are 
“open” in such a way that the citizen body of Magnesians themselves essentially 
                                                            
321 See Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City, 500. 
322 For a conventional statement of this impression, see Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 374. 
323 Morrow, “The Demiurge in Politics,” 6. Cf. likewise Schofield’s attempt to distinguish between the two 
projects of the Laws: Schofield, “The Laws’ two projects.” 
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determines who sits on it. Second, the council itself does not possess the governmental 
powers associated with a cadre. This section along with 7.3 are devoted to arguing the 
nocturnal council lacks the authority of a cadre in the first sense, while 7.4 and 7.8 are 
devoted to arguing it lacks the authority in the second sense. 
Membership in the nocturnal council comprises both junior and senior guardians. It 
is unclear if junior members even participate in the limited forms of concrete power 
assigned to the council, but regardless, I will discuss their case in 7.3. Among senior 
guardians there are, if you recall, the ten oldest nomophylakes, past and present ministers 
of education, the scrutineers, and certain observers (θεωροί) or possibly others who have 
been awarded high distinctions (ἀριστεῖα) by the state. 
The nomophylakes are elected into their position, and there is no reason to suppose 
anything suspect about the election process (752d-753d). Similarly, the restriction to the 
ten oldest of them is not particularly troubling. Now, the election process for the minister 
of education might be viewed as a little more suspect; after all, only officials of the state 
are allowed to vote during this process, and only nomophylakes are eligible candidates 
(765d-766c). Yet, these voting officials themselves were, at the end of the day, elected, as 
were all the candidate nomophylakes. While it might not be ideally democratic from our 
point of view, it is nonetheless a far cry from the direct appointment from above that 
holds in the Republic. Finally, the scrutineers are also elected. Like that of the 
nomophylakes, there is nothing especially problematic about this process. Thus, the 
“open” nature of the offices whose occupants are members ex officio of the nocturnal 
council carries over to the council itself. Its membership is not imposed from above, but 
is in large part determined by the inhabitants of Magnesia. 
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True, if one thinks of the nocturnal council as comprising an especially powerful 
body within the state, then their status as indirectly elected might give one pause if one 
thinks such elections already favored those of a certain class or those who fit a certain 
profile. The nocturnal council, then, would only be confirming this original bias built into 
elections such as they are. Yet such a procedure – admitting the bias – would be entirely 
within the spirit of Platonic political philosophy. As Morrow puts it, “The demos is to be 
sovereign in certain matters, but it is not to rule.” In other words, the status of the 
nocturnal council as indirectly elected does not alter in any way the previously existing 
paradigm of fundamental popular sovereignty in a system that nonetheless heavily favors 
as “chief officers of the state” those who are “persons of maturity and experience” and 
who possibly possess “some measure of the higher education that Plato later 
describes.”324 
Additionally, the process by which certain observers (θεωροί) are asked to join the 
council might give us pause. After all, doesn’t this clause essentially allow the council an 
unlimited right to determine its own membership in the style of a cadre? In response, it is 
important to distinguish in Plato’s constitution between the formal possibility of abuse 
and the material possibility of abuse. In essence, formal possibilities of abuse are 
irrelevant. There are many of them in the Magnesian constitution. They do not matter 
because the pro-actively vicious mentality necessary to exploit formal possibilities of 
abuse is already viewed by Plato as a problem so serious as to render nugatory in 
comparison the reality of this abuse. Plato certainly does not think, as Kant does, that a 
                                                            
324 Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City, 230. Likewise, Schofield describes the elections of Magnesia as “designed 
to give more authority to those of greater wisdom and virtue.” Schofield, “The Laws’ two projects.” 
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“nation of devils” can enjoy political society together, because Plato believes, as he often 
emphasizes, that the law-form by itself is insufficient, and that “lawfulness” (εὐνομία) 
requires both a good set of laws and a body of citizens with a certain disposition toward 
those laws. If state officials are out to exploit loopholes in order to game the constitution, 
then the state has bigger problems than these loopholes to worry about. 
The right of the nocturnal council to admit observers who meet its approval is a 
formal, not a material, possibility of abuse. The decision to become an observer is not 
represented as common, and this errand may take as long as ten years. Likewise, the same 
argument would apply to the “ἀριστεῖα loophole” if we think the nocturnal council can 
bestow ἀριστεία on whomever it wants for any reason. In reality, there is simply no 
indication in the text that this award is bestowed on anyone other than the scrutineers and 
approved observers. 
 
7.3. Mentorship of the junior guardians 
As we have seen, the nocturnal council includes a mixture of junior and senior 
guardians. Each senior guardian nominates a young man between the age of thirty and 
forty who must pass the scrutiny of the other guardians. If those accepted as junior 
guardians continue to behave virtuously, then they are rewarded with honors by the state. 
The junior guardians assist the nocturnal council in its researches, study its curriculum, 
and collect certain kinds of information in their memory useful to the deliberation of the 
council. 
Although the presence of the junior guardians is certainly important to the 
functioning of the nocturnal council, there is no indication that they take part in the 
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exercise of the legal powers of the council. Thus, from a certain point of view there is no 
reason to fault the selection-process of the junior guardians in itself: if they are not 
delivered into a position of immediate authority, then the method of their delivery is 
irrelevant. However, we may nevertheless be troubled by the seeming resemblance 
between the “cursus honorum” traveled by promising young men in the Republic and the 
one traveled by the same group in the Laws. 
In the Republic, children younger than twenty study calculation, geometry, and 
other forms of education preliminary to dialectic (503e-504a). This education is of a 
“playful” character because play best reveals, Plato thinks, the natures of children, and 
the education-process in the Republic consists, in large measure, of identifying, 
promoting, and cultivating those with the philosophic nature suitable for rule (525b-c). At 
the age of twenty, a subset of these children are chosen on the basis of the testing, given 
various honors, and subjected to a new program of education intended to unify the 
previous subjects. The ability to unify such diverse subjects is regarded as a test for those 
who are “naturally dialectical” (537-d). At the age of thirty, a smaller subset of the group 
is selected and honored on the basis of the tests they have undergone in “labors, studies, 
and fears” (537c-d). From the age of thirty to thirty-give this group is in turn subjected to 
a rigorous course in dialectic and argument; they are tested by the “power of dialectic.” 
From thirty-five to fifty, this group occupies “office suitable for young people” where 
they are also tested (539e). Finally, if at the age of fifty they have passed all tests and 
attained to a kind of philosophical epiphany in addition, they are admitted to the ruling 
circle. There they will spend most of their time philosophizing, but also exercising 
political power and educating (540a-c). 
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Like in the Republic, the trifecta of progressive testing, honors, and selection from 
above of suitable “natures” figures in the elevation of the young guardians. What’s more, 
the last three stages in the Republic have a clear analogue in the Laws. The five-year 
course in rigorous dialectic from the age of thirty to thirty-five in the Republic clearly 
corresponds to the period spent by the junior guardians on the nocturnal council between 
the ages of thirty and forty; afterwards, the ex-junior guardians are free to pursue political 
office, just as the select young men in the Republic hold minor offices;325 and finally, 
after they have turned fifty they may join the nocturnal council, again just like the 
guardians in the Republic. 
Yet there is a major difference between the tracks of power in the Republic and 
the Laws. Specifically, whereas in the Republic the last stage, like every stage, takes 
place at the discretion of the small group with supreme power, in the Laws there is no 
guarantee whatsoever that yesterday’s junior guardians will be tomorrow’s senior 
guardians. As we saw in the previous section, the vast majority of the members of the 
nocturnal council occupy their position in the council in virtue of the office they were 
elected into.326 
Of course, one could make two objections to this point. First, one could claim that 
perhaps the scrutineers on the council could abuse their power to secure the admission of 
the former junior guardians.327 I will treat the possibility of the abuse of the scrutiny in a 
subsequent section. Second, one might object that the honors given the junior guardians 
                                                            
325 Strictly speaking, the junior guardians of the Laws have no prescribed path whatsoever. However, it is 
quite reasonable, as Morrow recognizes, to expect that they will spend the period of their fifth decade in 
public office. See Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City, 508. Likewise, Morrow, “The Demiurge in Politics,” 19. 
326 Morrow: “The Nocturnal Council cannot of itself assure their later election to office.” Morrow, Plato’s 
Cretan City, 508. 
327 Morrow also recognizes this possibility. Ibid. 
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might later afford them an advantage in the elections indirectly determining the 
membership of senior guardians. 
Here we should recognize that, in all likelihood, just as Plato wants them to have an 
advantage in these elections, so he also wants them to later end up as senior members of 
the nocturnal council.328 Indeed, the nocturnal council’s role as a “leadership program” 
which identifies those with philosophic natures and provides them additional training 
intended to develop this nature is perhaps one of its most important functions. Again, we 
should recognize that nothing in such a procedure is inconsistent with the general 
Platonic line respecting democratic sovereignty while also restricting in practice officer-
membership to those who satisfy a certain standard or belong to a certain class. 
Yet unlike the Republic those with philosophic natures must nevertheless secure the 
consent of the citizen-body before exercising any sort of power, even the limited power 
inherent in the nocturnal council. In this sense, the assumed ascent of the junior guardians 
into power partakes of a more general pattern in the Laws of voluntary subjection to the 
rational persuasion of reason — a form of authority that is and is not. What is surprising 
in Plato is not that those in power should be reasonably elite, but that they should possess 
that power only with the consent of those less elite. Likewise, there is nothing illicit about 
the reputational advantages afforded the junior guardians because they non-coercively 
indicate relevant facets of the candidacy of this group to a suitably cultivated and 
educated body of electors interested in voting with this information. This is consistent 
with Plato’s program and the actual reality of elections for the Greeks. 
                                                            
328 Schofield rightly points out that Plato’s elections are “designed to give more authority to those of greater 
wisdom and virtue.” Schofield, “The Laws’ two projects.” 
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7.4. Attributed powers of the nocturnal council 
In this section I will examine the attributed powers of the nocturnal council. By 
“attributed powers” I refer to the concrete and specific duties or privileges explicitly 
assigned the council, and I exclude from consideration, at least for the present, the “vague 
powers” assigned the council — e.g, the Athenian’s recommendation that the council be 
“constituted the legal protector of the safety of the state” (968a-c). Among attributed 
powers, let us also distinguish between directly attributed powers and indirectly attributed 
powers. Directly attributed powers are those attributed to members of the nocturnal 
council in virtue of their status as members; indirectly attributed powers are attributed to 
members of the nocturnal council in virtue of other offices they hold. 
The only directly attributed powers to members of the nocturnal council are 
supervising the repatriation of observers (θεωροί) and the reform of atheists.329 While 
these are important and difficult tasks wholly in the spirit of the nocturnal council, they 
do not rise to the level of the concrete power possessed by the ruling cadre in the 
Republic. Indeed, there may be reason even to qualify these powers. Morrow, in fact, 
argues that the council “has no power to impose penalties; the case of the foreign 
traveller whom it thinks to have been corrupted by his experiences abroad is to come 
before the courts for judgment by the regular process (952c).”330 Thus, at least as regard 
explicitly attributed powers, we must agree with Morrow that the “existence of this 
council can hardly be regarded as interfering with the stated duties and functions of the 
                                                            
329 Cf. Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City, 510. 
330 Morrow, “The Demiurge in Politics,” 18. 
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other officers, since no legal authority is conferred upon it in Plato's legislation.”331 What 
power the nocturnal council possesses is “moral, not legal.”332  
Let us now consider the indirectly attributed powers. First, note that by definition 
these powers are not possessed in virtue of membership in the nocturnal council, but 
rather in virtue of other offices. Since in this case all of the offices are filled by election, 
there is nothing problematic about officials elected to exercise certain forms of power 
exercising those forms of power. However, there are still two problems one might raise. 
First, one might point to the scrutiny in particular. Could the scrutineers, who sit on 
the nocturnal council, abuse their power in ways that benefit or are bidden by the council 
in order to secretly orchestrate who occupies which positions? This seems very unlikely. 
In the section of the text detailing the duties of the scrutineers, Plato includes explicit 
provisions both for (i) scrutinized officials who want to protest the result of their scrutiny 
and (ii) trying and punishing scrutineers who have become corrupt. Indeed, the latter 
charge may be prosecuted by anyone who wishes to it (947e-948b). 
Second, one might worry about the mutual influence or consensus which might 
emerge among these officials of the council as a result of their frequent and extensive 
discussions and association. In other words, the nocturnal council itself would spearhead 
an elite-formation with effects for Magnesia as a whole.  In this case, Plato would see 
such mutual influence or consensus not as problematic, but as a desirable consequence 
conducive to the unity and excellence of the state. It is frequently emphasized belief of 
his that the state should have a single aim in line with which it is necessary to bring all 
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the different aspects of society and government. Assisting in the articulation, defense, and 
realization of this unified aim of society is exactly the point of the nocturnal council. In 
addition, it is perfectly consistent with the political philosophy of Plato’s Laws that the 
actual rulers be superior to those they rule in “maturity and experience” so long as they 
rule on the basis of the consent of the latter group.333 
 
7.5. Why the nocturnal council is not nocturnal 
 The phrase “nocturnal council” implies to many that the body in question meets 
deep or late into the night. However, as I will show, there is significant reason to doubt 
this. It is significant whether or not the nocturnal council is truly nocturnal because this 
aspect helps to characterize it as an institution. For many, to be nocturnal carries 
connotations of the illicit or clandestine; after all, why else meet during the night unless 
to avoid daytime scrutiny? The nocturnal council, then, would be an organ invisible to the 
rest of the Magnesian government because, presumably, its proper work would seem 
incompatible and at odds with the “daylight image” of the Magnesian regime, and the 
members of the nocturnal council would be dealers in arcana imperii. 
 As explained in 6.5, there are two sources of evidence regarding the meeting-time 
of the nocturnal council. First, there are characteristic descriptive phrases such as “the 
council meeting by night [τὸν τῶν νύκτωρ συλλεγομένων σύλλογον]” (908a4-5), 
“members of the nocturnal council [οἱ τοῦ νυκτερινοῦ συλλόγου κοινωνοῦντες]” (909a3-
4), “the council that gathers at night [τὸν σύλλογον ὃν…νύκτωρ…συνιέναι]” (962c9-10), 
                                                            
333 Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City, 230. 
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and “the nocturnal council of officers [τὸν τῶν ἀρχόντων νυκτερινὸν σύλλογον]” 
(968a7). 
Second, there are two longer specifications of the circumstances in meeting, one 
from the short passage (951a-952d) and one from the long passage (960b-969c). 
However, whereas the descriptions of the council in passing give a strong nocturnal 
impression, the two direct specifications rather suggest that the council meets at or 
around dawn. For instance, in 951d-952b the Athenian gives the duration of the council’s 
meeting as from “just before dawn” until “the sun is well up in the sky.”334 Likewise, in 
the long passage the council is said to convene “at dawn [ὄρθριον]” (961b6). 
Since the point of the specifications is to describe the actual circumstances of the 
council, whereas that of the mentions is merely to pick out the nocturnal council, it stands 
to reason we should prefer the former over the latter as a source of evidence for the 
intended meeting-time of the nocturnal council. Nevertheless, it would certainly be odd if 
the mentions were inaccurate with regard to what they successfully picked out. 
Previously, I argued that we should understand the duration of the nocturnal council as 
beginning at night just before dawn and ending well into the morning (951d-952b: “the 
sun is well up in the sky”). Thus, the duration of the meeting of the nocturnal council 
includes a night component and a day component; it literally encompasses the sunrise. It 
is not inaccurate, therefore, to refer to it as the “nocturnal council” since this phrase 
captures a characteristic or signature detail useful in picking out the council even if, at the 
same time, the phrase does not completely specify the actual meeting-time. Similarly, 
                                                            
334 Schöpsdau accurately describes its meeting-period as “vom Morgengrauen bis zum Sonnenaufgang.” 
Schöpsdau, Nomoi, Buch I-III, 118. 
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Morrow argues that the dawn marks the starting-time, rather than the whole duration, of 
the meeting of the council.335 In addition, Guthrie agrees with this interpretation.336  
Therefore, we see that the tempting link between what is nocturnal and what is 
illicit or clandestine is blocked by a more careful consideration of the actual meeting-time 
of the nocturnal council. It does not meet at night, but rather partly during the night and 
partly during the night over a period of transition encompassing the sunrise. In addition, 
there is a perfectly respectable rationale for this mode of proceeding. The council meets 
“around dawn” (ὄρθριον) because this is precisely when (ἡνίκ') there is a special degree 
of leisure (μάλιστ’...τις σχολὴ) for everyone (παντί) from all other activities both private 
and public (τῶν ἄλλων πράξεων ἰδίων τε καὶ κοινῶν) (961b6-8). For a body 
predominately comprised of members ex officio, it is important to find a convenient 
meeting-time that does not conflict with the heavy political responsibilities already 
incumbent upon its membership (in addition to their private economic responsibilities).337 
Thus, the council receives its name “not from any sinister or clandestine function that it is 
destined to perform, but from the fact that it meets in the early morning, between dawn 
and sunrise, when the officials are most likely to be free from other duties.”338 In 
addition, as Morrow points out, meeting at this time would not be especially onerous or 
inconvenient: the Greeks were in general early risers in comparison with us.339 However, 
it is not a matter of mere convenience: by choosing such an unconventional meeting-time, 
                                                            
335 Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City, 503. 
336 Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 370. 
337 Samaras emphasizes that the members of the council, as philosophically inclined as they may be, are not 
professional philosophers, but ordinary members of the community who need time during the day. 
Samaras, Plato on Democracy, 297. 
297 
338 Morrow, “The Demiurge in Politics,” 16–17. 
339 Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City, 503. 
238 
 
the council secures for itself that σχολή – a kind of temporary freedom from non-
intellectual concerns – so essential to its very intellectual and academic vocation 
characterized by discussion, research, and pedagogy. Moreover, it requires the most 
(μάλιστα) such σχολή in comparison with other pursuits. The clear implication, therefore, 
is that meetings of the nocturnal council – far from being scheduled with a view toward 
facilitating something sketchy, clandestine, or illicit – are in fact scheduled with a view 
toward their conspicuous importance and the special demands (e.g., academic openness) 
they entail.340 
 The decidedly non-secret, public, and overt nature of meetings of the nocturnal 
council accords with its preferred modalities of discussion and research (see 6.7) and its 
overall character (see 6.8). There are, however, three facets of the activity of the 
nocturnal council which do require secrecy of a sort, but these all carry their own 
rationale which is there is no reason to export in a more general sense. First, if an external 
observer returns having been “corrupted” while abroad, then he must not associate 
(συγγίνεσθαι) with anyone and live as a private citizen (ἰδιότης) (952c5-d4). This 
instance of secrecy is not troubling for two reasons: (1) it pertains, strictly speaking, not 
to the members of the nocturnal council, but to a the members of a certain class almost 
admitted to membership; and (2) the clear function of these restrictions is to prevent or 
minimize the influence of this latter group on the Magnesian population at large, but if 
anything we would expect the opposite to obtain in the case of the members of the 
nocturnal council. 
                                                            
340 Guthrie, likewise, agrees the name of the nocturnal council is not as sinister as it may at first appear. 
Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 370. 
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 Second, there is the matter of the atheism policy. A certain class of atheists is only 
allowed to converse with the members of the nocturnal council (908e-909a). Again, this 
instance of secrecy is not troubling: there are clear reasons why these atheists must be 
prevented from influencing others with their dangerous beliefs (see, e.g., 908c). Third, 
there is the matter of the failed nomination of junior guardians. The Athenian declares 
that in the event of a proposed junior guardian seeming unworthy to the other members of 
being included, the consideration process (τὴν…κρίσιν) must be kept secret (ἀπόρρητον) 
from everyone, especially the rejected candidate (961b4-6). Here, again, there are clear 
reasons for the particular secrecy unconnected to the operation of the nocturnal council in 
general. In the case of young men who do not meet the standards of being a junior 
guardian, the last thing the council would want to do is give the general impression that 
they are “similar” to those who do (and are thus worthy of emulation, etc., as the latter 
are). In sum, in the case of all forms of secrecy pertaining to the nocturnal council, there 
are patently particular reasons for this secrecy which do not admit of a general 
application. 
 Thus, as we have we seen, it is misleading to activate the nocturnal symbolism of 
the “nocturnal council” in a way that implies illicitness, covertness, arcana imperii, etc. 
First, the council itself is not, strictly speaking, a nocturnal one, but rather more dawn-
oriented. Second, the specific associations of nocturnal are manifestly inappropriate to 
the rationale surrounding the meeting-time of the council and the typical activities and 
character of the same. It is not the black night with which we should most of all associate 
the council, but rather the dawn – i.e., the ascent of the sun into the sky. It is surely not 
incidental that the sun is associated with reason itself in Book X of the Laws; moreover, 
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watching the “ascent” of the sun, its being put-into-place, could be seen as analogous to 
the key intellectual function of the nocturnal council as understanding the rationale of 
laws and institutions in a superior way allowing them, if necessary, to set them right or 
draft different versions. 
 
7.6. Why the nocturnal council is not a council 
 The second half of the phrase “nocturnal council” – i.e., council (σύλλογος) – 
appears to suggest the notion of a legally empowered body with authoritative power over 
some domain or in relation to other legal bodies. However, it should be noted that there 
are two words in Greek which may be translated “council” – namely, (1) σύλλογος and 
(2) βουλή. The word σύλλογος comes from the verb συλλέγειν, which means “to bring 
together, collect, gather.”341 Thus, σύλλογος refers first and foremost to any gathering or 
meeting of individuals. Such a body may or may not be legally empowered; the word 
itself forecloses neither possibility.342 The word βουλή, on the other hand, refers to a 
“council of elders” or “senate” such as the Council of 500 instituted by Kleisthenes or the 
Areopagus – i.e., legally empowered bodies with specifically delimited roles in the 
Athenian political process. It is notable, therefore, that the nocturnal council is described 
as a σύλλογος rather than as a βουλή. Calling the nocturnal council a σύλλογος 
emphasizes the physical fact and event of their meetings and gatherings as well as the 
academic and intellectual pursuits – which proceed through eminently social and shared 
means – enabled by them.  
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241 
 
In any case, it is clearly impermissible to infer that the nocturnal council is a 
legally empowered council on the basis of its very name. Of course, that the nocturnal 
council is not described as a βουλή in no way implies it is not a deliberative 
(βουλευτικός) organ. The function of the senior guardians is specifically described as to 
“deliberate [βουλεύτεσθαι]” (964a2) in light of the information brought them by the 
junior guardians. However, the deliberative output of the nocturnal council is not 
endowed with coercive force in virtue of the status of the council, or at least, the 
description of the council as a σύλλογος gives us no reason to suppose this. 
 
7.7. The title of guardian and related expressions 
The members of the nocturnal council are frequently referred to as “guardians” 
(φύλακες). Since this is the same title held by the members of the ruling cadre of the 
Republic, it seems natural to expect the powers and role of these two groups to be similar. 
In addition, the very idea of a “guardian” — the etymology is the same in both Greek and 
English — appears to suggest that this group is in some way the repository of ultimate 
power in the state. Moreover, a host of related expressions — the nocturnal council is 
called the “safeguard” (φυλακτήριον), “anchor” (ἄγκυρα), and “safety-device” (σωτήρια) 
of the state or laws — may contribute to the same impression. A careful analysis of the 
context of these expressions is sufficient, I claim, to dissipate this impression. 
Let us consider first the simple title of “guardian” (φύλαξ) often applied to 
members of the nocturnal council. In the middle of a discussion concerning the utility of 
the ability to speak with exactness (ἀκρίβεια) on the subject of virtue along with as the 
connection of that ability with having knowledge of virtue, the Athenian contrives a 
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hypothetical scenario in which “expounders, teachers, and lawgivers” — whom he 
explicitly describes as “the guardians of the rest of the community” (τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς 
φύλακας) — are called upon to minister to a criminal in need of “enlightenment and 
instruction, or perhaps correction and punishment” (964b-d). We should expect each of 
these individuals to be able to “teach” (διδάσκοντα) and “explain in detail” (πάντως 
δηλοῦντα) what is the effect of vice and virtue (964b-d) in a way that is superior to the 
ability of others to do these things 
This is an important passage for understanding what Plato means by “guardian.” By 
applying the term “guardian” to a new group in virtue of certain activities he goes on to 
attribute to them, Plato illuminates that in virtue of which he applied the term to the 
members of the nocturnal council in the first place. Specifically, the new group of 
exegetes, teachers, and lawgivers are qualified as guardians precisely because of their 
superior ability to teach and give complete explanations regarding virtue to those who 
have gone astray and must be set right by means of the persuasive and educative force of 
these explanations. 
Two more scenarios closer to the duties of the actual guardians confirm this view of 
guardianship. The arrival of a poet or a soi-disant “educationalist” (παιδευτής) who “puts 
up a better show” than “the winner of the palm for every kind of virtue” are also cases 
where the intervention of guardians is necessary. Here, again, the problem is to blunt the 
effect of dangerous agents capable of leading citizens astray, and to do this precisely by 
means of complete and detailed explanations, speeches with ἀκρίβεια. The Athenian 
concludes that any city without “efficient and articulate guardians with an adequate 
understanding of virtue” is simply “unguarded” (ἀφύλακτον) and thus vulnerable to 
243 
 
dissolution. In sum, calling the members of the nocturnal council “guardians” is not to 
invest them with any particular power, but to recognize their possession of a certain set of 
intellectual-discursive skills along with the crucial role those skills play in the continued 
and stable existence of the state.343 Thus, the members of the nocturnal council are a 
paradigm example of how – according to Kraut – Plato recognizes the reality of 
“differential understanding” among the population of Magnesia and seeks to develop a 
political philosophy and successful model of polis-governance in light of that reality.344 It 
is also especially puzzling why Morrow would choose to downplay the possession by the 
councilmembers of these very skills, pointing to the supposed absence of “dialectical and 
philosophical inquiry into first principles” as well as the “critical power and the freedom 
of mind required for such study.”345 
From this standpoint, it is also easy to see that to call the nocturnal council an 
“organ of protection” (φυλακτήριον) is to make a similarly innocuous point (962c). The 
immediate context of the use of φυλακτήριον is the desire that there exist some institution 
in the state which understands in itself the target (σκοπός) of statesmanship, how to 
achieve this target, and what sources provide helpful advice in this pursuit (962b-c). To 
call this institution an “organ of protection” (φυλακτήριον), then, is again merely to 
emphasize a certain kind of intellectual grasp of statesmanship along with the ability to 
operationalize that grasp in a concrete way against the background of the urgency in 
general that this knowledge be attained and disseminated. We should also note that the 
                                                            
343 Thus, Guthrie goes too far when he sees the revival of guardian-terminology as indicative of the status 
of the members of the nocturnal council as philosopher-kings. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 369. 
344 “One of Plato's great contributions to political philosophy lies precisely here, in his recognition of the 
importance of this unequal relationship among human beings.” Schofield, “Ordinary virtue from from the 
Phaedo to the Laws.” 
345 Morrow, “Plato’s Conception of Persuasion,” 248. Contrast Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work, 497. 
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mode of preservation Plato here enjoins is not strict fidelity in all outer forms but rather, 
as Bobonich puts it, “insuring that there is an institutional framework in the city that 
allows for learning new high-level truths and for taking account of circumstances.”346 
Likewise, to refer to the council as an “anchor for the whole state” is not to endow 
it with sovereignty over the state, but rather to recognize that the state must beware 
embracing an inconsistent pattern of random and contingent reforms and that the 
influence of the council is helpful in the struggle against tempting deviations (962b-c).347 
Finally, and similarly, to describe the nocturnal council as the “safety-device (σωτηρία) 
for our political system and legal code” is to recognize the causal role the council plays in 
preserving (σῴζειν) the political system and laws, the πολιτεία and νομοί, not to 
somehow install it as the supreme element within those things. In any case, there is no 
evidence the nocturnal council has legislative power as such. Rather, “If the Nocturnal 
Council proposed a revision, its recommendations would presumably require the assent 
of the people, for this is elsewhere said to be required for any revision of the laws 
(772cd).”348 
 
7.8. Vague Powers 
                                                            
346 Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics, 400. 
347 Does the council have the ability to suggest reforms of it own, or does it merely shoot down those of 
others in a responsible way? The question of the scope for reform in the Laws is somewhat vexed. On the 
one hand, there are passages seemingly denying all reform whatsoever except under impossible conditions. 
On the other hand, there are other passages which suggest the nocturnal council is to provide positive input 
in regard to possible reforms or at least the filling-in of the legal infrastructure already laid down. See 
Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 368–69. 
348 Morrow, “The Demiurge in Politics,” 19. Contrast such a possibility of appropriately informed political 
reform with what obtains in the Statesman, a dialogue in which there is “no room…for a procedure of legal 
reform.” Kahn, Plato and the Post-Socratic Dialogue, 230. But see also the discussion in Guthrie, A 
History of Greek Philosophy, 368–69. 
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At long last, let us turn to the so-called “vague powers” of the nocturnal council 
— i.e., the potentially sweeping powers granted near the very end of the Laws in a highly 
rhetorical set of passages. First, I will treat the title claim, then the legal protectorate, and 
finally the grant. However, before doing these things I will summarize the essence of the 
role of the nocturnal council as I see it; I will make my specific arguments respecting 
these three passages in reference to, and the context of, this summary. 
 
7.8.1. The authority of the nocturnal council 
The single most salient fact about the nocturnal council is its overwhelmingly 
academic character — i.e, its devotion not only to endless research and discussion of 
laws, customs, virtue and vice, and human affairs in general, but in addition its pursuit of 
a set of higher philosophical, scientific, and theological topics. These studies afford them 
clear knowledge of the aim (σκοπός) of a good society, the ability to recognize the most 
suitable means of achieving that aim, and the ability to discern in their deliberations what 
is of value in the codified laws or spoken speeches of others. 
This knowledge and its constitutive abilities are to ensure the stability of the state 
by means of preventing bad or random reforms; they are to direct and guide the activity 
of the state in the same way that the intelligence and senses of a living thing direct and 
guide its activity for the sake of preserving it. Yet, as Morrow points out, even as the 
Council “is clearly intended to exert influence, both in criticizing and making 
amendments and supplements to the laws, and in evaluating the person who are to 
exercise authority,” there is “no procedure” in a legal sense mentioned or outlined 
“whereby the Nocturnal Council is to make its insight and intelligence effective in the 
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affairs of the state.”349 In the face of this “puzzle,” many have sought to ascribe vast, 
implicit powers to the nocturnal council, seizing on the some of the passages I will 
shortly discuss to find evidence of these vast, implicit powers.350 However, not only are 
these interpretations wrong, I will argue, but in addition they are unnecessary. 
Thus, the principal question, as I see it, is the form this guidance takes. I would 
argue that it does not take the form of an irresistible structure of command so much as 
that of the persuasive influence of reason disseminated and elaborated by means of 
discourse in a masterful way within a culture predisposed to value, cultivate, and follow it 
whenever possible.351 The circulation of the population on and off the nocturnal council, 
as well as the circulation of the current members in their other political capacities, would 
help to disseminate its influence.352 This comports with what Kraut has described as 
Plato’s intelligent recognition and utilization of “differential understanding” among 
members of the population.353 Morrow, too, hews to this option in broad lines, calling for 
                                                            
349 Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City, 510. Likewise, Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 374. According to 
Samaras, "the distribution of power falls into two parts...the 'formal' administrative system" and the 
Nocturnal Council. Samaras, Plato on Democracy, 234–35. 
350 Likewise, the “absence of legal powers commensurate with the functions which the Council is designed 
to accomplish is indeed puzzling and is the basis of the criticism frequently made that it is a useless 
appendage to Plato’s construction.” Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City, 510. So conceived, the nocturnal council 
would contribute to “deliberative democracy.” Schofield, Plato, 55–56. 
351 Thus, it is by no means true that, as Barker claimed, with the appearance of the nocturnal council “the 
law-state really is destroyed.” Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 374. Schöpsdau refers to the 
nocturnal council as a “’meta-staatliches’ Organ.” Schöpsdau, Nomoi, 125.  
352Cf. Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics, 391–93. Likewise, Guthrie points to 
the “carefully planned membership” of the nocturnal council and the resultant “close link” to the 
deliberations of the state in general. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 374. The explicit 
responsibilities of the nomophylakes, in particular—their legislative discretion regarding the revision, 
completing, and detailed application of the laws – as well as render them perfectly situated to disseminate 
the influence of the council. Schöpsdau qualifies the power of the nocturnal council as “indirekt durch die 
ihr in Personalunion angehörenden Beamten.” Schöpsdau, Nomoi, Buch I-III, 114–15, 118. Schofield 
draws attention to the “Athenian” rather than “Socratic” paternalism at work in the Laws. This paternalism 
operates through open institutions, autonomy, etc. (rather than via educating an elite), and so characterized, 
the nocturnal council could propagate it through its indirectly elected membership. 
353 Kraut, “Ordinary virtue from the Phaedo to the Laws.” 
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the “little reflection” on the basis of which we might imagine the “many ways whereby 
the Council could influence public policy in an interpretative and advisory capacity.”354 
For instance, the nocturnal council might “perform a necessary function in the interstices 
and looser joints of the legal structure, not contradicting but supplementing the rule of 
law.”355 We should remember Plato’s well-known skepticism about the reliability and 
comprehensiveness of the law as such; the members of the nocturnal council, who are (i) 
apprised of the real aim of the laws and (ii) familiar with the on-the-ground conditions of 
society, customs, and population of Magnesia, are perfectly situated to issue tailor-made 
extensions and reforms of the law in a way reminiscent of the “demiurge.”356 Kraut 
suggests that the residual role played by the “philosophically trained governors” who 
staff the nocturnal council is connected with Plato’s repeated recognition of the 
insufficiency of the law.357 Likewise, Bobonich repeatedly emphasizes the “open texture” 
of Plato’s legislation, while Saunders refers to the “documentary fallacy” of letting go 
unrecognized the necessary detailing and tailoring which Plato everywhere signposts.358 
Kahn, finally, emphasizes the innovation of the Laws in comparison to the Statesman 
with respect to the possibility of responsible reform, but as Kahn points out, both the 
ability to suggest intelligent legal reforms and the ability to rule by outright decree appear 
to be part of the same cognitive endowment.359 
                                                            
354 Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City, 510–11. 
355 Morrow, “The Demiurge in Politics,” 19. 
356 Morrow even calls the council “the logical and impressive climax of Plato's demiurgy.” Morrow, Plato’s 
Cretan City, 20. 
357 Kraut, “Ordinary virtue from the Phaedo to the Laws.” 
358 Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics, 406–8. 
359 Kahn, Plato and the Post-Socratic Dialogue, 229–30. 
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In this way, it would assist in making the law “a living reality, not a dead 
formula.”360 This includes not only the educational molding of many of the future leaders 
via the mentorship of the junior guardians, but also the operation of the scrutiny. In 
addition, just as we should expect the scrutineers to bring their nocturnal experience to 
bear on their daytime activities, so we should expect the same of the other officers. Thus, 
in view of these channels of influence and the reasonable expectation they acquit 
themselves in a way consistent with their activities and duties, it does not seem there is 
anything to fear in the Laws as Zwitter.361 
Let me cite two aspects of the nocturnal council in favor of this view. First, Plato 
repeatedly cites the ability of the guardians to speak with exactness (ἀκρίβεια) about what 
makes virtue virtue and other subjects both as a sign they have the requisite sort of 
education and knowledge and as the faculty in virtue of which they are to actually 
perform the function expected of them. Second, all of the principal activities assigned 
them — (i) the repatriation of foreign observers, (ii) the reform of atheists, and (iii) the 
deliberation with respect to laws and customs — are essentially conducted entirely 
through the modality of vigorous discussion. Those observers, in particular, who were 
recruited to join the council, essentially travel to different states in order to have 
discussions there. In addition, this view comports with the sense in which, as I argued 
above, members of the nocturnal council are labeled “guardians.” 
In sum, it seems tempting to describe the quality of authority of the nocturnal 
council in the Laws as “a kind of hegemony.” The notion of hegemony invoked here is 
                                                            
360 Morrow, “The Demiurge in Politics,” 16. 
361 Ibid., 6. Cf. also the attempt of Schofield to disaggregate the Laws by distinguishing between two 
different projects. Schofield, “The Laws’ two projects.” 
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not the ancient one of a supreme element within a larger set of entities, such as the 
position of Athens within the network of Greek states, but rather that developed by the 
Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci. According to Gramsci, hegemony (“egemonia 
culturale”) denotes the general representation through social or cultural means of the 
interests or values of the ruling class as the interests or values of all classes. However, 
even this would be inaccurate: the mission of the members of the nocturnal council is not 
to substitute their own interests for the interests of the state as a whole, but rather, by 
consistently discerning, articulating, and arguing for the interest of the state as a whole, to 
provide this interest with a level of influence sufficient to heal the otherwise inevitable 
fracturing of interests among officials in power. This quality of the intellectual authority 
of the nocturnal council would exactly correspond to the desiderated condition among the 
citizens, so often elaborated and emphasized in the Laws, of a “voluntary slavery to the 
laws.” Indeed, this quality of the intellectual authority of the nocturnal council is 
precisely supported by the argument of Bobonich, that the transition from the Republic to 
the Laws marks an “increased optimism” on Plato’s part in the powers of non-
philosophers.362 Thus, it falls under what Bobonich describes as the “significant 
implications for his political theory” of Plato’s revolution in perspective.363 For the 
members of the nocturnal council to exert their special authority, the other citizens must 
be responsive to the compelling arguments they are prepared to retail to them.364 
Likewise, if they are to be elevated into such a position by means of indirect election, 
                                                            
362 Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics. 
363 Ibid., 374. 
364 Thus, “In Magnesia, there will be an intimate relation between reason as expressed in good law and the 
reason of the individual citizen. The education of Magnesia's citizens provides them with rational grounds 
for accepting their political and legal system as well as for their basic ethical and theological beliefs.” Ibid., 
216. 
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there must be appropriate confidence on Plato’s part in the capacities of the citizen 
electors. 
 Compare, by contrast, the puzzling insistence of Morrow (in an early work) on the 
“tragedy of Plato’s intellectual predicament” according to which the necessity that 
adherence to the laws proceed through “conviction” and not “habit alone” must go 
unachieved since Plato “has deprived himself of the sole means of correction, viz., the 
free play of individual criticism.”365 The nocturnal council, however, is precisely the 
institution intended to elevate the adherence by the population to the laws from habit to 
rational conviction, and they are to do this, at least in part, by means of the free play of 
individual criticism. 
In sum, if the authority of the nocturnal council is “moral, not legal,” such a 
qualification is made by no means to denigrate that authority. As Morrow puts it, “its 
moral influence would certainly be very great.”366 Indeed, we should recognize the 
immenseness and efficacy of the moral – if not legal – authority of the nocturnal council 
even if, at the same time, it is necessary to distinguish and not confuse the two modes of 
authority. The nocturnal council possesses no – or very slight – attributed powers, and 
they “are subject to the checks that Plato’s law provides to prevent malfeasance in 
office.”367 Moreover, conceiving the authority of the nocturnal council in this way allows 
us to sidestep the difficulties that arise from Plato’s apparently “vague” presentation of 
the powers of the council in comparison with the detailed duties of the previously 
                                                            
365 Morrow, “Plato’s Conception of Persuasion,” 249–50. 
366 Morrow, “The Demiurge in Politics,” 18. 
367 Ibid. Morrow is referring to the scrutiny. In addition, note that Plato is well aware of the possibility of 
scrutineers abusing their position vis-à-vis the scrutiny, and he thus explicitly includes provisions intended 
to prevent this. In sum, the members of the nocturnal council are responsible to the law in every possible 
way. 
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described magistrates:368 it is because the former do not make up a set like the latter, but 
rather coexist on top of them. 
 
7.8.2. The title claim 
 The “title claim” refers to the Athenian’s claim that no one who does not 
authoritatively possess, in addition to having the merely “ordinary virtues,” a certain 
canon of philosophical insights and associated intellectual abilities “will ever be good 
enough to govern an entire state, but only to assist government carried on by others 
[ἄρχων μὲν οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο ἱκανὸς ὅλης πόλεως, ὑπηρέτης δ' ἂν ἄλλοις  ἄρχουσιν]” 
(968a1-a4). In particular, the Athenian has in mind (i) the doctrine that the soul is “far 
older than any created thing,” “immortal,” and “controls the entire world of matter,” (ii) 
the doctrine that reason is the “supreme power among the heavenly bodies,” and (iii) 
“essential preliminary studies” (iv) to be surveyed “with a philosopher’s eye” as to “what 
they have in common,” (v) used “to framed consistent rules of moral action,” and (vi) to 
provide “reasoned explanation” when possible (967d-e). The resumé of these items of 
knowledge and skills, as well as the immediately ensuing context (i.e., the proposal to 
make the nocturnal council the legal protector), leaves no doubt that the Athenian has the 
nocturnal council in mind. 
The passage is problematic for any interpretation of the Laws which supposes, as 
mine does, that the nocturnal council is not the mere replacement of the cabal of 
philosopher-kings of the Republic tacked on to the largely dissimilar apparatus of the 
Magnesian government near the end of the text. For it clearly describes only those who 
                                                            
368 E.g., Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 374. 
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possess the knowledge and intellectual skills associated with the nocturnal council as the 
capable (ἱκανοί) rulers (ἄρχοντες) with regard to the whole state (ὅλη πόλις); everyone 
else is, regardless of whatever ordinary virtues they possess, a mere assistant to the other 
(i.e., “real”) rulers (ὑπηρέτης ἄλλοις ἄρχουσιν). Not only does this appear at odds with 
the structure of offices (perhaps now demoted to a kind of assistantship) as previously 
laid out, but in addition the criterion of the more select group – special knowledge – is 
highly reminiscent of precisely the criteria put in place for the philosopher-kings of the 
Republic. There are, however, three reasons to reject such an interpretation of the title 
claim. 
First, it is necessary to recognize that to be a “ruler” (ἄρχων) can mean one of two 
things: (i) a concrete title of power,369 or (ii) a success-predicate bestowed in virtue of the 
special quality with which one would exercise one’s power or the special knowledge one 
would bring to bear proper to its exercise.370 
It is precisely the latter which is argued by the Eleatic Visitor in the Statesman 
(Stm. 259a-b). If some individual is capable of competently advising another individual in 
                                                            
369 Similarly, Samaras points out that even if Forms exist in the Laws, they don’t give rise to the same 
metaphysical right of rule as in the Republic. Samaras, Plato on Democracy, 271. 
370 It is, needless to say, in this sense that I will argue the point. Schofield describes a second way in which 
“philosopher kings” linger in the Laws – namely, they or something like them are represented as 
instrumental in the founding, but not necessarily, or at least not necessarily in the same breath, as the 
maintenance of the city (see Book IV). Schofield, Saving the City, 45–49. However, a detail noticed by 
Schofield allows both problems (the persistence as well as the curiously partial scope of such philosophic 
kingly power) to be solved. Ibid., 45. Whereas the Republic stresses the monad of the philosopher who is a 
king, or vice-versa, the Laws Book IV describes the dyad of the legislator and the virtuous tyrant. The 
legislator in question is not a tyrant or figure possessed with absolute power; rather, the legislator has 
monarchical power only at a remove through the distinct medium of the tyrant. But this it is this legislator 
insight necessary for the founding of the state which is also necessary for its maintenance, not the tyrant’s 
assistance. Thus, the legislator is the same figure as the member of the nocturnal council, but neither is the 
philosopher-king per se. Thus, (i) the dyad rather than monad, (ii) apparent bizarreness of “philosopher-
kings” necessary for the founding in Book IV, but not the maintenance, of the state, and (iii) special titular 
assertion in Book XII all hang together and cohere. 
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the matter of the second’s medical practice, then the first deserves the same “professional 
title [τοὔνομα τῆς τέχνης]” (Stm. 259a1-a4) customarily bestowed upon the second. In the 
same way, if someone is capable of giving competent advice to the king of a country or 
possesses the knowledge proper to kingship, it is proper to designate this advice-giver as 
“kingly” or an “expert in kingship” (βασιλικός) regardless of their official status as an 
actual king or a private citizen (Stm. 259a-b). 
Such a position tracks Plato’s general attitude toward the use of names – viz., that 
names, regardless of the external and contingent patterns of their conferral, most properly 
designate those entities or individuals that satisfy the ideal descriptions associated with 
the names. To take another example from the Statesman, Plato argues that constitutions 
(πολιτείαι) which do not place those with expert knowledge in control are “not really 
constitutions at all” (293d-e). 
In sum, there are ample textual parallels for Plato’s favoring the use of a title to 
apply to those who ought to hold it in virtue of the knowledge they possess rather than in 
virtue of their concrete exercise of the same. Moreover, it is precisely in the context of 
the possession of special forms of knowledge that Plato appears to restrict the title of 
ἄρχων to the members of the nocturnal council. What it is crucial to realize, however, is 
that Plato is commenting not at all on the literal distribution of power in Magnesia, but on 
the satisfaction by the members of the council of the normative condition of all rule.371 
The latter is, needless to say, a familiar Platonic topos. In this case, however, unlike the 
Republic, the distinction between ruler and assistant in the Platonic sense cuts across the 
                                                            
371 Cf. Samaras regarding the formal distribution of power as against the Nocturnal Council. Samaras, Plato 
on Democracy, 234–35. 
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concrete, real-life distribution of offices (ἀρχαί). Plato is not peremptorily upending the 
system of Magnesian government elaborated at such length in order to replace it with 
these “rulers.” He is merely characterizing in a forceful and significant way the special 
knowledge they possess and the special influence they are expected to exert not at all in a 
manner inconsistent with the already existing apparatus  of the Magnesian government, 
but rather, in a manner in complete consonance and conjunction with it. Indeed, they are 
to assert this influence, as Morrow puts it, in an “interpretative and advisory capacity.”372 
 Second, let us turn to the object over which the members of the nocturnal council 
are declared ἄρχοντες: namely, the “entire state [ὅλης πόλεως]” (968a3). It is notable 
indeed that the state in its entirety, as opposed to any specific part, is singled out as the 
object of governance. Thus, it is perfectly compatible with the concrete grants of power 
made to other officers in the Magnesian government for the members of the supreme 
council to preside in some way over the whole. For instance, one might reign as an ἄρχων 
in some matter of the city in one’s own right, while also deferring in the manner of a 
ὑπηρέτης to those deemed the ἄρχοντες of the city as a whole. Actually, given the 
considerable overlap between the nocturnal council and the rest of the government, it 
may be more accurate to say that the concrete grants of power to members of the 
nocturnal council qua normal officers of government are perfectly compatible with the 
charge of governing the whole qua members of the nocturnal council. 
 Of course, this so-called compatibility may be called into question if we construe 
the relation between parts and whole as one of subordination. If being an ἄρχων of the 
city as a whole means being a supreme commander of the city, then the title claim will 
                                                            
372 Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City, 510–11. 
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indeed appear to liken the nocturnal council to the philosopher-kings of the Republic. 
However, given the complete vagueness from a concrete perspective of what being an 
ἄρχων of the city as a whole is supposed to mean, as well as the far from threatening 
character of the activities and concrete powers of the nocturnal council as constituted, it 
is not plausible, I argue, to construe being an ἄρχων of the city as a whole as bestowing 
concrete superiority upon the members of the nocturnal council. Rather, the kind of 
“superiority” – or “holistic” focus, one might say – attributed to the nocturnal council is 
perfectly consonant with the emphasis on the critique, reform, and design of institutions 
in general that characterize the nocturnal council, the longer and more searching 
perspective on matters of the city it is expected to take, and the special intellectual talents 
and acquisitions it is expected to possess. 
That the members of the nocturnal council appear to be ἄρχοντες of the city as a 
whole, therefore, does not amount to a grant of concrete supremacy over all the other 
offices of the city, but rather an emphatic recognition of the extraordinary intellectual or 
philosophical perspective in relation to the city, over and above the normal call of duty, 
which the members of the nocturnal council are expected to cultivate and exercise, as 
well as of the crucial guidance such expertise ought to play in the life of the city over the 
long term.  
 Third, it is important to note that the members of the nocturnal council are not 
literally addressed by the title of ἄρχων. Rather, the statement is made that “no one who 
is unable to acquire these insights [ὁ δὲ μὴ ταῦθ' οἷός τ' ὢν…κεκτῆσθαι]” could be 
(γένοιτο) “good enough to govern [ἄρχων...ἱκανὸς] an entire state, but only to assist 
government carried on by others.” (968a1-a4) In other words, it is not possible (οὐκ ἄν 
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ποτε γένοιτο) for someone without a certain ability (ὁ...μὴ...οἷός) to attain a certain 
ability (ἄρχων...ἱκανὸς). The title claim is an assertion regarding capacities: without the 
capacity for certain insights there is no capacity to rule in a certain way. Since the 
members of the nocturnal council certainly have the capacity for the desiderated insights, 
they must also have the capacity to rule in a certain way. However, to assert they have the 
capacity to exercise a certain kind of rule is not to bestow the title upon them in a full and 
concrete way; it is merely to characterize the kind of intellectual-political scope they have 
at their disposal. This is not to say the capacity for a special kind of rule possessed by the 
members of the nocturnal council in virtue of their acumen and experience simply wilts 
on the vine; rather, it is essential to the very rationale of the council that its members 
exercise this capacity, but the correct way of understanding the form this exercise takes 
is, as I have repeatedly suggested, as concurrent with their other roles as part of the 
normal apparatus of the Magnesian government.373 
 So far, I have given three reasons why we should not interpret the title claim as a 
grant of concrete power which upends the already elaborated apparatus of the Magnesian 
government or a declaration in any way replacing that government with something 
similar to what is found in the Republic. Next, I would like to make four corollary points 
in connection with this interpretation of the title claim. 
First, it is necessary to consider together the ambiguity of the title of ἄρχων I have 
argued is apposite to the title claim with the status of the nocturnal council as indirectly 
                                                            
373 Morrow, too, emphasizes the distinctness of the roles the ex officio members of the nocturnal council are 
called upon to play even as they also exhibit a kind of complementarity: “ …its function is not adjudication, 
nor administration, nor deliberation and decision on matters of public policy, but education and inquiry; 
and the distinctness of this function remains, even though most of its members will themselves be 
administrators or judges, and even though the ultimate purpose of their studies is the wise conduct of public 
affairs.”Ibid., 511. 
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elected. In 7.2, I argued that the nocturnal council does not constitute a cadre due to its 
“open” conditions of membership. Most of its members sit on the council ex officio, and 
they are elected into, even if at several removes, these offices in a normal, unproblematic 
manner. The members of the nocturnal council, most of whom already preside as 
ἄρχοντες elected in the traditional manner, are then additionally granted the – I have 
argued – the philosophically significant title of ἄρχων that signals the special perspective 
and influence they are intended to possess and exercise.  
The members of the nocturnal council, then, are thus ἄρχοντες in both senses of 
the word; however, the first pertains to their concrete exercise of power, whereas the 
second pertains to their special capacities. The second does not overrule the first; indeed, 
it is precisely the ambiguity of the term ἄρχων that allows for their harmonious 
coincidence. The members of the nocturnal council are perfectly positioned to 
demonstrate the ἀρκίβεια characteristic of that institution in the course of fulfilling the 
normal duties associated with their offices and associating with the other officers.374 This 
supplementation and extension of the legal structure of Magnesia is possible for the 
members of the nocturnal council on the basis of their grasp of the aim of the law and 
their ability to bring about those aims, as best they can, by means of the social and 
cultural material at their disposal.375 In addition, from the perspective of the rule of law, 
the “interpretative and advisory” capacities possessed by the council are exactly what are 
                                                            
374 Thus, Guthrie cites the “carefully planned membership” of the council in relation to the state’s 
deliberations.  Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 374. 
375 Thus, Morrow: the nocturnal council is “the logical and impressive climax of Plato's demiurgy.” 
Morrow, “The Demiurge in Politics,” 20. 
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required for “Plato’s central purpose, the maintenance of the rule of law.”376 This 
extension of the rule of law by its skilled interpreters in a detailed and contextual way is 
consonant with the feature of the text Bobonich has described as the “open texture” of 
Plato’s legislation and in relation to which Trevor Saunders has elaborated the 
“documentary fallacy.”377 Likewise, it comports with the need Kraut sees for 
“philosophically trained governors” in light of the insufficiency of the legal-form.378 
Precisely because the members of the nocturnal council are already ἄρχοντες in a 
concrete way– and this is why most of them are even members of the council – it is not 
necessary to interpret the title claim as a concrete grant of power. Interpreting it, instead, 
as a success-predicate in virtue of the excellent advice regarding ruling the members of 
the nocturnal council are equipped to offer (Morrow: “in an interpretative and advisory 
capacity”)379 is perfectly compatible with their already-existing concrete responsibilities 
as members of the Magnesian government. By circulating, socializing, and co-
deliberating with other citizens in the course of their duties, the members of the nocturnal 
council will amplify the influence of the council and serve as soft ἄρχοντες throughout 
Magnesia.380 Likewise, it explains why Plato can permit himself, and why “modern 
                                                            
376 Ibid., 18. In addition, Barker is not just incorrect regarding the claim that nocturnal council destroys the 
rule of law, but rather essentially incorrect regarding the function of that council, which is, if anything, to 
preserve the rule of law. Barker quoted in Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 374. A good collection 
of “conspiracy theorists” regarding the operation of the nocturnal council in the Laws can be found in 
Samaras. Samaras, Plato on Democracy, 285 ff. 
377 Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics, 406–8. 
378 Kraut, “Ordinary virtue from the Phaedo to the Laws.” 
379 Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City, 510–11. 
380 Cf. Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics, 391–93. 
259 
 
readers” might get an unhelpful impression of, a certain vagueness in detailing the duties 
of the nocturnal council compared to his detailing of those of other magistracies.381 
In addition, there is nothing problematic or menacing in the coincidence of the 
special capacities associated with the second sense of ἄρχων with the concrete grant of 
power subordinate to the first sense of ἄρχων. Those elected as ἄρχοντες in this sense 
were elevated to office with the consent of the population as a whole as mediated by 
elections. It is expected that those with such capacities will make good candidates for 
election, but they still must be actually elected – in this way, preserving the sovereignty 
of the citizen-body.382 
Second, not only is the ambiguity of the title of ἄρχων perfectly compatible with 
the status of the members of the nocturnal council as indirectly elected via other offices, 
but in addition it is the coincidence of the two forms of being an ἄρχων in the bodies of 
the councilmembers that allows the proper exercise of the second form. Thus, the sense in 
which the members of the nocturnal council are ἄρχωντες is no way a dead letter, but is 
restituted on the basis of their already existing commitments of office. It is precisely in 
the course of their existing official responsibilities and in relation to their fellow officers 
that the members of the nocturnal council can exercise their superior grasp of the proper 
aims of legislation along with the akribetic faculties necessary to instantiate this grasp 
and offer successful explanations to others. To do these things is to be an ἄρχων in the 
                                                            
381 Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 374. 
382 Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City, 230. 
260 
 
second sense; and thus the sense of ἄρχειν as ruling in the sense of offering guidance it is 
incumbent on others to follow is salvaged.383  
 Third, we should note the resemblance between a situation in which members of 
the nocturnal council are ἄρχωντες in the second sense and the puppet example 
elaborated in Book I of the Laws (644d-645c). According to the latter, certain 
experiences in are likened to “opposing cords or strings that tug against each other” 
(644e1-2). In such cases, we must cleave to the “sacred and golden pull of reasoning” and 
“pull against the other strings” (644e4-645a1). However, because “reasoning is a fine 
thing…gentle rather than violent,” “its pull requires assistants [ὑπηρετῶν]” (645a5-a7). In 
the same way that the “golden pull” of reasoning requires “assistants” due to its 
essentially gentle (πρᾷος) rather than violent (βίαιος) nature, so the sound advice of the 
members of the nocturnal council solicits the adherence of “assistants” via the essentially 
gentle modality of discussion and explanation. However, this economy of rulers and 
assistants is essentially overlaid upon the already existing economy of offices, which it no 
way disturbs, but rather facilitates and optimizes. 
 Fourth, and finally, let us note that the double-structure of ruling which I have 
argued is implied by the title-claim befits the longstanding Platonic tendency to 
subordinate the formal characteristics of power-assignment in government to the wisdom 
or advice under whose guidance the state is actually governed. For instance, in the 
Menexenus Socrates claims that Athens has always, appearances and the names favored 
                                                            
383 Ibid., 511. Cf., also, Morrow’s “in an interpretative and advisory capacity.” Ibid., 510–11. Likewise, see 
Guthrie’s observation regarding the “carefully planned membership” of the council considered from the 
point of view of influencing the deliberations of the state in general. Guthrie, A History of Greek 
Philosophy, 374. 
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by others notwithstanding, possessed the same constitution – namely, aristocracy (Mx. 
238c). The formal characteristics of democracy exhibited by Athens – e.g., the use of 
elections to distribute power and offices and the lack of barriers to participation based on 
poverty or ancestry – are irrelevant since the Athenians are said, in any case, to distribute 
power to “those who are thought best by them at a given time” and whoever “is thought 
wise or good” (Mx. 238d). Whatever its manifest character, in reality the Athenian 
government is an “aristocracy” – albeit, an “aristocracy along with popular consent [μετ' 
εὐδοξίας πλήθους ἀριστοκρατία]” (Mx. 238c7-d2).384 Of course, by adducing this 
material, I certainly do not mean to assert any sincere claim to historicity in the case of 
Athens on the part of Plato, but only to show Plato’s acceptance of the logical possibility 
of the sort of situation I claim obtains in the case of Magnesia.385 
In other words, that Plato via the title claim gestures toward a sort of “aristocracy” 
of the nocturnal council need not be taken as inconsistent with the rest of the Magnesian 
government: to the extent that Magnesia is an aristocracy, it is one on the basis, and in the 
midst, of systematic ways of assigning power which are formally quite remote from the 
dictatorship of philosopher-kings. Likewise, in the Statesman Plato also subordinates all 
other characteristics of government – such as lawfulness, coerciveness, or the wealth of 
the rulers – to the single criterion of whether or not the rulers number among those “truly 
                                                            
384 Morrow, among others, has cited the appropriateness of this description for the society of the Laws. 
Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City. Likewise, Schofield asserts that the elections of Magnesia are “designed to 
give more authority to those of greater wisdom and virtue.” Schofield, “The Laws’ two projects.” Ditto 
Schöpsdau, Nomoi, Buch I-III, 123. 
385 According to Bearzot, Plato (like Isocrates) is invested in the idea of substituting his own idealized 
account of Athenian democracy for the historical reality. Paradoxically, Plato presents as “democrazia” a 
state “privo di contenuti democratici in senso classico.” Bearzot, Platone E I “Moderati” Ateniesi, 
XXXVII-- Fasc. 1:106. 
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possessing expert knowledge” (Stm. 293c-d). Only constitutions that satisfy this criterion 
may be adjudged “correct” – or even constitutions at all; to evaluate constitutions by 
other formal criteria is to miss what is essential about a constitution. In addition, the 
confusion of Kleinias and Megillus regarding what formal category best captures the 
constitutions of Sparta and Knossos (712c-713a) – a confusion subsequently ratified as 
appropriate and desirable by the Athenian – demonstrates the essential distinctness of the 
formal characteristics of government from the higher condition I have argued the title 
claim is intended to assert. Thus, again, from all sides we see that the fact that Plato 
wants the members of the nocturnal council to be ἄρχοντες need not entail any formal 
commitment on his part regarding the constitution of the Magnesian government, only 
that he wants this government to fall within the category of those governments that, 
regardless of their formal makeup, are guided by expertise such as that possessed by the 
members of the nocturnal council. That this particular government must, in addition, 
secure the consent of the governed is ultimately just as important as the previous fact, 
especially since it affects stability in key ways. However, the first characteristic in no 
way invalidates the second one, and in fact, conforms to what Morrow has called “Plato’s 
basic intentions” – i.e., to leave the sovereignty of the demos intact while ensuring those 
more worthy of office have advantages in securing and holding them. In addition, we can 
see that Zeller’s claim – which is popular enough386 – that the Laws eschews philosophic 
rule in favor of something like the rule of law falls short.387 On the one hand, the 
condition of rule in the Laws differs from that of the Republic inasmuch as it is law-based 
                                                            
386 Thus, similiter, Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 335. 
387 Quoted in Morrow. Morrow, “The Demiurge in Politics,” 6. 
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and does not grant any ruling clique the power to issue arbitrary and binding decrees to 
the rest of the populace. On the other hand, the condition of rule in the Laws differs from 
the rule of law tout court inasmuch as the nocturnal council exerts its law-correcting, 
law-perfecting influence – reminiscent of philosophic rule and proceeding from 
philosophic insight – in a “soft” way that requires the consent and persuasion of relevant 
parties. In addition, these authorities, who do possess a certain amount of power over the 
laws, are themselves elevated into office in accordance with law and popular consent as 
mediated by elections. Thus, Guthrie occupies the middle-ground when he describes the 
condition of the Laws as “the rule of law” in comparison to the “arbitrary rule of men” 
such that “everyone has a chance to administer but only a few may create or alter” the 
laws. This “few” is distinguished by its “exceptional ability,” “seniority,” and 
“philosophical training” – the last of which will help them to theorize and deliberate in 
accordance with the ultimate aim of all laws. 
Finally, we should not view Plato’s apparent preference for rulers in the sense of 
philosopher-kings as somehow invalidating of the larger project of the Laws. Certainly, 
Plato never modified this preference of his, all things being equal, for the rule of 
philosopher-kings over the rule of law; indeed, he thinks certain things are problematic in 
the nature of law itself. However, what is noteworthy about the Laws is that he attempts 
to make the rule of law work as best he can, and this includes even a certain set of 
capacities reminiscent of those of the philosopher-kings activated in service of the law.388 
However, he is not instituting them over the law. As Kahn puts it, “the Laws can express 
                                                            
388 Thus, Kraut analyzes the demand for “philosophically trained governors” in this light. Kraut, “Ordinary 
virtue from the Phaedo to the Laws.”  
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Plato's deep preference for the rule of philosophy only indirectly, as it were with 
nostalgia.”389 Rather, he is only making use of this “differential understanding” as it 
applies to the nocturnal council in soft yet intelligent ways that respect the sovereignty of 
the demos.390 
 
7.8.3. Legal protectorate 
 Let us now deal with the status of “legal protector of the safety of the state” 
(φυλακὴν...κατὰ νόμον χάριν σωτηρίας) attributed to the nocturnal council. Specifically, 
the Athenian declares, in the light of the immediately preceding title claim, 
“we now have to consider whether we are going to add yet another law to the code 
we’ve already expounded, to the effect that the Nocturnal Council of the 
Authorities, duly primed by the course of studies we’ve described, shall be 
constituted the legal protector of the safety of the state.” (968a-b) 
At first glance, it is natural to read this passage, like the title claim, as bestowing supreme 
power upon the nocturnal council, running roughshod in the process over the previously 
established Magnesian government. However, a more careful scrutiny of the passage and 
its context is sufficient to dispel this erroneous impression. First, let us reconsider the 
question of continuity, as there is important evidence in connection with the legal 
protector claim that bears upon it. Second, let us examine the status itself attributed to the 
nocturnal council in light of its precise formulation, the meaning of the relevant terms, 
and the context, both narrower and wider, of the claim. 
 Previously, in 7.1 above, I examined the issue of continuity as an explicit theme 
(as opposed to textual or other sorts of continuity) between the nocturnal council and the 
                                                            
389 Kahn, Plato and the Post-Socratic Dialogue, 232. 
390 Kraut, “Ordinary virtue from the Phaedo to the Laws.” 
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rest of the government, arguing that taking two passages together, the “logic of finality” 
as well as the “addition speech” (which overlaps with the legal protector claim), shows 
the complex continuity of the nocturnal council with the rest of the Magnesian 
government. In brief, the nocturnal council is a valuable and even necessary addition to 
the rest of the laws which serves as a deep complement to them even while, at the same 
time, it possible for the latter to exist without the former.391 
 In the case of the legal protector claim, we can see that the claim itself is 
described as something additional to “the code we’ve already expounded [ἤδη πρὸς τοῖς 
εἰρημένοις νόμοις ἅπασιν ὅσους διεληλύθαμεν]” (968a4-5) and as something which may 
be appended (προσοίσομεν) (968a6). Thus, the laws which have been “already 
expounded” must possess at least a modicum of independence. Subsequently, Kleinias 
asserts that regulation dealing with the nocturnal council should be appended “even if we 
are only able to bring it off to a small extent” (968b3-4). The legal protector claim, then, 
and by extension the nocturnal council in general, is represented as something which (i) 
which we may be able to bring about only to a small extent or not at all, but which (ii) we 
should certainly do so to the extent we are able. Before proceeding to analyze the legal 
protector claim itself, it is worthwhile to emphasize its connection with the apparent 
relative independence and complementary utility of the nocturnal council. We should thus 
expect the legal protector claim to embody something which benefits, without necessarily 
interfering with, the existing government. 
                                                            
391 Cf. “Far from being inconsistent with the rule of law, the Nocturnal Council seems to be essential for the 
maintenance of that principle.” Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City, 513. 
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 Now, let us turn to the legal protector claim itself: “that the Nocturnal Council of 
the Authorities [τὸν τῶν ἀρχόντων νυκτερινὸν σύλλογον]…shall be constituted the legal 
protector [φυλακὴν…κατὰ νόμον] of the safety of the state [χάριν σωτηρίας].” (968a6-7) 
In essence, the legal protector claim grants a certain status (“legal protector of the safety 
of the state”) to a certain entity (“the Nocturnal Council of the Authorities”). The latter is 
obviously the nocturnal council; however, it is described in a strange way: as the 
nocturnal council of officers or authorities (τῶν ἀρχόντων). This special phrase performs 
two functions: (i) it points out that the members of the nocturnal council satisfy the 
conditions of the title claim immediately above, and thus they count as “genuine” rulers 
(ἄρχοντες) of the whole state, and (ii) it draws attention to the existing powers of the 
members of the nocturnal council commensurate with their elected positions as diverse 
officers of the state.392 In addition, as part of the same sentence, the council is described 
in apposition as “duly primed by the course of studies we’ve described [παιδείας ὁπόσης 
διεληλύθαμεν κοινωνὸν γενόμενον]” (968b1). 
As for the status assigned to the nocturnal council, it consists of a role “protector” 
(φυλακή) which is further qualified as “legal” (κατὰ νόμον) and “of the safety of the 
state” (χάριν σωτηρίας). In the case of both of these modifying phrases, it is possible to 
construe them in relation not to “protector” (φυλακή), but in relation to the act of 
becoming or being constituted (ἐσόμενον) as such, but I do not think this grammatical 
decision has any substantive effect on the meaning of the sentence. Let us first treat the 
                                                            
392 As mentioned previously, the responsibilities of the elected nomophylakes (regarding the detailed 
extension, revision, and detailed application of the law) to some extent already allow them to execute legal 
protectorate-like acts. Thus, they’re not being granted anything additional. Schöpsdau, Heitsch, and Carl 
Wener, “Nomoi. Buch IV-VII.,” 114–15. 
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role of the council as a “protector” or φυλακή and then examine the significance of the 
two modifications.  
“Protector” (φυλακή) – from the verb φυλάσσω, meaning to “keep watch and ward, 
keep guard” – refers to a watching, guardian, keeping, or guardianship over something. 
Like the frequent description of the members of the nocturnal council as “guardians” 
(φύλακες) and the description of the council itself as a “safeguard” (φύλακτήριον), its 
description here as a “protector” (φυλακή) suggests at first glance that the nocturnal 
council has been endowed with ultimate power in the state in a fashion similar to the 
Republic. However, in the former case, after an examination of the way such terms are 
used in the context of Book XII, we concluded that they referred rather to (i) the superior 
ability of the councilmembers to teach and explain facets of virtue and in general apply 
persuasive and educative force when necessary and (ii) the possession by the council of 
certain intellectual-discursive skills along with their utility for the state as a whole. Here, 
too, we should in no way be troubled by the stipulation of the council as a φυλακή. 
Neither the official role nor the particular language used to pick it out present any new 
challenge to our understanding of the council. The nocturnal council is perfectly poised to 
perform this function as “guardian” of the state.393 Indeed, it can do so precisely in virtue 
of its superior insight into the law’s rationale. Meanwhile, there is no evidence it 
possesses legislative power in excess of this capacity, and as Morrow points out, if it 
                                                            
393 To this end, the nocturnal council perhaps functions in a manner reminiscent of what Ober calls the 
“dialogue between democratic practice and elite critical discourse” ultimately necessary to the former. 
Ober, The Athenian Revolution, 12. Ober thinks this interplay is necessary because the democratic “regime 
of truth” as such cannot itself imagine a form of truth founded outside itself. Ibid., 114, 149–51. Of course, 
Plato would certainly not countenance that part of the analogy. Rather, precisely because Magnesian 
political practice did want to be founded on something like absolute truth, the nocturnal council (that elite 
organ) functioned to assist it. 
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were to propose some specific revision of the constitution, “its recommendations would 
presumably require the assent of the people, for this is elsewhere said to be required for 
any revision of the laws (772cd).”394 
Indeed, this familiar interpretation of φυλακή is bolstered by the context which 
precedes and follows the legal protector claim. First, the legal protector claim is 
presented as following in light of the title claim, which explicitly links education 
(παιδεία) and power (ἀρχή). Second, the council itself is described in apposition as “duly 
primed by the course of studies [παιδείας] we’ve described.” (968b1) Thus, that the 
council has been made the φυλακή only denotes their superior state of knowledge, their 
intellectual-discursive skills, and the ultimate utility of these things from the standpoint 
of the safety of the state. Indeed, the modifying phrase “of the safety of the state [χάριν 
σωτηρίας]” (968a7) – literally, for the sake of security – ties the legal protector claim 
tighter to this complex of ideas. As in the case of atheists and others who have gone 
astray, the guardians of the nocturnal council use their expertise to set them straight, thus 
contributing to the stability of the state.395 
Finally, note that such a conception of nocturnal council as φυλακή is completely 
compatible with the concerns respecting the question of continuity. The nocturnal 
council, so conceived according to this interpretation of the legal protector claim as 
making the nocturnal council the designated source of advice and instruction, fulfills the 
                                                            
394 Morrow, “The Demiurge in Politics,” 19. 
395 Additionally, the members of the nocturnal council help to realize concretely the openness in some parts 
of the legislative texture of the Laws, what Laks calls their “scalar” character. The members of the council, 
to the extent they further the project of the Laws in both directions, toward the ideals for the sake of which 
legislation takes place and towards the material realities at hand, partake of “le travail de la médiation" 
which Laks claim characterizes the Laws as a whole. Likewise, Laks points out “la reserve qui la traverse 
quant à la promulgation des lois.” Ultimately, “la problématisation de la loi” constitutes “un de ses thèmes 
directeurs.” Laks, Médiation et Coercition, 21, 48–49, 71. 
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conditions of relative independence and complementary utility I argued were implied by 
the context of the claim.  
 We have left only to consider the significance of the second modifying phrase 
“legal [κατὰ νόμον]” (968a6). A somewhat more informative translation of κατὰ νόμον 
than “legal” might be “according to law” or “by law.” Clearly, there is a difference 
between the council serving as a protector and the council being designated the legal 
protector. The latter implies an “officialness” on the level of the law itself. The problem, 
in the present instance, is to discern what the act of “officializing” or “legalizing” the role 
of the council contributes. The best answer to this question places the legal protector 
claim against the background of the concerns mentioned in the passage I have called the 
“logic of finality” (960b-c). In that passage, the Athenian commented that their work of 
legislating (νομοθεσία) had nearly, but not quite, reached its “end” (τέλος). The creative 
duties incumbent upon a creator of something are incompletely fulfilled unless the creator 
can endow the creation with security (σωτηρία). Up until that point, the creation is 
“incomplete” (ἀτελές). 
 In the case of the Athenian, Kleinias, and Megillus, their creation is the laws 
(νομοί) of Magnesia. They must somehow give these laws “a natural resistance to being 
reversed” (ἀμετάστροφον…κατὰ φύσιν δύναμιν) (960d-e); they must contrive a “safety-
device for our political system and legal code.” In addition to the general point made in 
connection with the logic of finality, there is also the special insufficiency of the law-
form, an insufficiency which figures frequently in the Laws and in other dialogues. We 
should thus view the legal (κατὰ νόμον) status of the nocturnal council as protector 
(φυλακή) as the official capstone to the logic of finality, as well as an attempt to mitigate 
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the inherent insufficiencies of the law-form itself by means of a legal stipulation. The 
nocturnal council, by being legally recognized as an authority possessing the relevant 
wisdom and skills associated with the laws and the governance of the state as a whole, 
contributes to the stability of the otherwise inherently precarious body of laws and 
institutions of Magnesia. It represents the attempt to legally internalize or otherwise 
legalize the extra-legal, superior capacities of philosophers for the sake of the very 
stability of the laws themselves.396  
 
7.8.4. The grant 
 Let us finally consider the last of the “vague powers” assigned the nocturnal 
council – namely, what I have called the “grant” in 968e-969c. The nucleus of the grant is 
the Athenian’s suggestion to Kleinias and Megillus that “if this wonderful council [ὁ 
θεῖος…σύλλογος] of ours can be formed, then the state must be entrusted to it 
[παραδοτέον τούτῳ τὴν πόλιν].” (969b2-3) The Athenian adds, “practically no modern 
legislator will want to oppose us.” (969b3-b5) Provided that the council members are 
correctly selected, appropriately educated, lodged in the citadel of the state, and “made 
into guardians [φύλακες] whose powers of protection [πρὸς ἀρετὴν σωτηρίας] we have 
never seen excelled in our lives before” (969b8-c3), then the “combined metaphor of 
head and intellect [κεφαλῆς νοῦ τε κοινωνίας]” of the state will be translated from mere 
                                                            
396 Thus, contra Morrow, who asserts that Plato recognizes without remedying the problem of ensuring 
adherence to the laws on the basis of conviction rather than habit along with the problem of perfecting laws 
because he “has deprived himself of the sole means of correction, viz., the free play of individual 
criticism,” we see that via the nocturnal council Plato aims to remedy precisely these defects by means of 
precisely that instrument. Morrow, “Plato’s Conception of Persuasion,” 249–50. Thus, also Kraut, in re 
“philosophically trained governors.” Kraut, “Ordinary virtue from the Phaedo to the Laws.”  
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“idealistic dreaming [ὀνείρατος…τῷ λόγῳ]” into a genuine waking vision (ὄντως δὲ 
ἔσται σχεδὸν ὕπαρ) (969b5-7). 
 First, let us note that nothing in the grant passage exists to disrupt the impression 
we have received of the “relative independence” of the nocturnal council from the rest of 
the government. The nocturnal is not treated as a fait accompli: rather, the Athenian 
asserts that if (ἐάν γε) the nocturnal council can be formed (γένηται), then the state must 
be handed over to it. However, the state must be prepared to exist with or without the 
nocturnal council, and the council must be prepared to exist alongside such a state. 
Additionally, the result of the council being formed is likened to the actualization of the 
familiar corporate metaphor, itself perfectly compatible with the relative independence of 
the council from the state. 
 Second, with regard to that corporate metaphor, if the general context of the grant 
passage suggests that the actualization of the metaphor is the most apt description of the 
result of the grant, and thus of what the grant itself entails, then the sense we have gained 
so far of what it means for the nocturnal council to function as the head of the state assists 
in disarming the grant passage of its apparent threat. If to “hand over” the state to the 
council is merely to allow the council to function as the senses and intellect of the state, 
then there is nothing problematic about the grant. 
 Third, note the overriding concern with “stability” shown in the formation of the 
council. The members of the council are to be made into guardians “whose powers of 
protection [ἀρετὴν σωτηρίας] we have never seen excelled in our lives before.” (969c2-3) 
If part of the rationale of the grant is to take advantage for the state of the extraordinary 
ἀρετή σωτηρίας possessed by the members of the council, then “handing over” the state 
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to such a council hardly portends a radical change in the status quo: indeed, it constitutes 
the permanent sticking-into-place of the status quo. 
 Fourth, let us turn to the brief resumé of the actual conditions of guardianship. 
The Athenian pointedly mentions that the councilmembers must be “rigorously selected 
[ἀκριβῶς ἐκλεχθῶσι]” and “properly educated [παιδευθῶσί…προσηκόντως]” (969b8-c1). 
This suggests that the “handover” in no way violates the selection-procedure and 
education-procedure for councilmembers we have already canvassed at length. However, 
we have also argued that the selection-procedure is parasitic upon the (completely 
systematic) election-procedures for the normal parts of the Magnesian government. Thus, 
that Plato favors certain kinds of individuals in his election-procedures leaves popular 
sovereignty intact.397 
 Thus, as a matter of context – given the grant’s relation to (i) the relative 
independence of the council, (ii) the corporate metaphor, (iii) the thematization of 
stability, and (iv) the allusion to the completely non-problematic selection-procedure for 
the members of the nocturnal council – we need not be excessively worried as to its 
possibly overthrowing the traditional Magnesian government. Careful examination of the 
language of the grant itself – “if this wonderful council of ours can be formed, then the 
state must be entrusted to it” (969b2-3) – supports this view. Clearly, the action to be 
taken if the council can be formed – namely, that the state (πόλις) must be “handed over” 
(παραδοτέον) to it – is what it is crucial to analyze. What does it mean to “hand over” 
(παραδοτέον, from παραδίδωμι) the “state”? 
                                                            
397 Cf. Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City, 230. 
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 The best evidence comes from a passage in Book IV in which nearly the exact 
same phrase occurs (714b-715e). There, the Athenian retails to Kleinias and Megillus the 
popular theory that (i) law and justice are subordinate to the kind of regime in place 
(714b), (ii) that the ultimate goal of legislation is to safeguard the established regime 
against revolution (714b-c), and (iii) justice is in the final analysis merely whatever 
serves “the interests of the stronger” (714c). In sum, we are presented with a vision of 
pure power-politics which the Athenian suddenly compares to “one of those claims to 
authority [ἐκείνων τῶν ἀξιωμάτων ἀρχῆς πέρι],” (714d11-e1) one which “Pindar 
turned…into a law of nature” (715a1-2). He is referring to a list of seven potential “titles” 
(ἀξιώματα) drawn up in Book III on the basis of which the right to rule (το ἄρχειν) is 
distributed (690a-d): e.g., the rule of those of high birth over those of low birth, or the 
rule of the elder over the younger. In particular, one of titles asserted that “that the 
stronger should rule and the weaker should obey” (690b4-5). Poetry from Pindar is 
quoted in support of this claim. It is this claim (ἀχιώμα) that the Athenian asserts lies 
behind, in essence, the modern theory of law, justice, and the city he describes in Book 
IV. Having broached the topic of these ἀξιώματα anew, he asks Kleinias and Megillus, 
“to which side in the dispute [ποτέροις τισὶν] should we entrust [παραδοτέα] our state [ἡ 
πόλις]?” (715a4-5) The same phrase to be analyzed in 969b2-3 – namely, what it means 
for the state to be “handed over” – occurs in 715a4-5. Thus, it is natural to learn what we 
can concerning 715a4-5 the better to understand 969b2-3. In the case of former, the 
Athenian is asking according to what kind of grand pattern or criterion power ought to be 
distributed? In particular, does whatever faction or ruler in control dictate what is just and 
legal, or are the authorities themselves subordinate to law and justice? 
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 Unsurprisingly, the Athenian opts for the latter. Indeed, in the case of the former, 
there is no political system (πολιτεία), laws (νομοί), and or even citizens (πολῖται), 
properly speaking (715b2-b6). Rather, in the new state to be established, power will not 
be distributed on the basis of wealth, stature, or birth, but “the highest office in the 
service [τὴν τῶν θεῶν ὑπηρεσίαν…τὴν μεγίστην] of the gods must be allocated [δοτέον] 
to the man who is best at obeying the established laws [ὃς…τοῖς τεθεῖσι νόμοις 
εὐπειθέστατός] and wins that sort of victory in the state,” and  “who wins the second 
prize must be given second rank in that service, and so on, the remaining posts being 
allocated [ἀποδοτέον] in order on the same system.” (715c2-6) 
The vocabulary in this passage (δοτέον, ἀποδοτέον) is clearly of a piece with 
παραδοτέον in 969b2-3. Since both passages describe the new state of Magnesia, it 
makes sense to assimilate the transfer of power to the nocturnal guardians in the spirit of 
the kind of power-allocation described here. Likewise, the Athenian’s decision to refer to 
those usually called “rulers [ἄρχοντας]” as “servants of the laws [ὑπηρέταις τοῖς νόμοις]” 
in order to highlight the subordination of these officials to the real source of power 
encoded in the laws (715c-d) is in complete conformity with the proper understanding of 
the guardians as ἄρχοντες (see 7.7 above): they do not exercise power in their own right 
as supreme ἄρχοντες of the state, but rather vis-à-vis their superior, akribetic powers of 
elucidating the law, explaining and arguing their rationale, and fitting them to new 
circumstances. In other words, precisely because the guardians are “best at obeying” the 
established laws should power be “handed over” to them. This is to make once again 
Morrow’s point that the nocturnal council facilitates and enables rather than undermines 
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or cancels the rule of law.398 It is far from being the case, as Barker asserts, that “the law-
state is really destroyed.”399 Moreover, it does not hand over power to philosophers by 
fiat, but rather centrally emphasizes the normative guidance philosophy is to provide in 
the state.400 In addition, to the extent that the grant also describes the concrete powers the 
members of the nocturnal council possess in virtue of their other elected positions, it 
merely repeats the basic assumption that elite-dominance of elections is not incompatible 
with popular sovereignty.401 
Thus, with respect to the two possible situations the Athenian lays out in Book IV 
– (a) “the law is subject to some other authority and has none of its own” (715d3); and 
(b) “law is master of the government and the government is its slave” (715d4-5) – clearly 
the latter is meant to obtain. To hand over power to the guardians is not to enthrone them 
as an elite whose every diktat must be obeyed; rather, it is to recognize the urgency of 
their special philosophical talents in the service of obeying the law, which is the real 
supreme element in the state, even though it also an inherently fallible medium in need of 
human perfection for the sake of permanent enduring. It is not to destroy the condition of 
the rule of law, but to perfect it by means of human assistants.402 Likewise, it is not to 
reinstitute the rule of philosophers as such, but to approach this condition by means of an 
alternative constellation of intricate institutions.403  Populating these institutions in a 
                                                            
398 Ibid., 513. 
399 Quoted in Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 374. 
400 Cf. Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City, 512. 
401 Cf. Ibid., 230. 
402 Cf. Ibid., 513. 
403 Thus, au contraire Zeller, who all-too-schematically sets out the differences between the Republic and 
Laws thus: “The Republic makes philosophy the groundwork of rational political life and, presupposing 
philosophical rulers, plans the state purely from the Idea; the Laws seeks to show how far, and through 
what means, the state may be adequate to its task without this presupposition.” Quoted in Morrow, “The 
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useful way are the valuable bodies of those characterized by “differential 
understanding.”404 Philosophy is neither “absent” nor bearing the fasces in the Laws.405 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Demiurge in Politics,” 6. Guthrie holds to a similar – too schematic – distinction. Guthrie, A History of 
Greek Philosophy, 335. 
404 Kraut, “Ordinary virtue from the Phaedo to the Laws.” 
405 Morrow, too, emphasizes that philosophy “by no means absent from Plato’s state.” Morrow, “The 
Demiurge in Politics,” 17. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
 
 The present work represents an attempt to answer the question, “Why does the 
Laws exist?” In answering such a question, I did not propose to supply a set of work-
external, author-focused reasons for why Plato composed the work of the Laws. Rather, I 
proposed instead to give a work-internal, work-focused account of the immanent 
governing-principle or principles behind the text as a whole, i.e., the underlying spirit or 
organization which, in turn, solicits both readers and students of the Laws to recognize 
that there is something new or compelling at work within its pages. My goal, then, one 
could say, has been to justify the “aesthetic impetus” of the reading-experience of the 
Laws – i.e., I have sought to show that there is in fact a “there there” with respect to the 
feeling while reading the Laws that there is something here which is interesting, unique, 
and well-developed. The question, then, which I have approached, in whatever form it 
may be put, is perhaps rarely asked in favor of a countervailing tendency of scholarship: 
namely, to connect the Laws with, and explain it in terms of, other works of Plato, 
especially the Republic. Yet precisely to do this is to deny an independent existence to the 
Laws and to make it, for instance, a mere appendix to the Republic; similarly, it is to 
ignore the self-evident aesthetic impetus, part of the experience of reading or engaging 
with the Laws, that here is something interesting or compelling.406 
 The criterial conditions under which I labored, in other words, are to answer the 
above question – which I interpret in a work-focused, not in an author-focused way –  by 
supplying an account of the dialogue which (a) explains all its aspects while also (b) 
                                                            
406 Of course, paying appropriate homage to the aesthetic impetus of reading the Laws does not mean taking 
its content for granted. It could simply be a delusion impossible to substantiate. 
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distinguishing the Laws from the Republic in a way that does not devalue the former. I 
believe this question is an important one; indeed, its importance goes far beyond the 
“aesthetic impetus” of the reading-experience of the Laws. Properly speaking, all other 
questions of scholarship concerning the Laws are subordinated to, or qualified by, this 
one, the question of why the Laws exists, and so I have called this question the 
fundamental question of scholarship concerning the Laws. 
 My own answer to the question, the systematic approach, is that what makes the 
Laws distinctive is its embodiment of the system model of government – viz., allowing 
and empowering a large population of individuals who interact with one another in 
orderly ways to govern themselves, by means of formal electoral procedures, the rule of 
law, and social and cultural norms and behaviors. The concepts of cadre and system form 
a contrastive pair; whereas a cadre is a small group of extraordinary individuals, a system 
is a large group of more ordinary individuals. The cadre and system models represent 
different ways of assigning power: whereas the first restricts it to a small group whose 
existence must be recreated from generation to generation, the second allows it to repose 
in the complex patterns of interaction carried out by individuals in a system. In sum, I 
contend that the systematic approach is sufficient to comprehensively explain the various 
and strange aspects of the Republic, and that it does so in a non-prejudicial way in 
comparison with the Republic. 
 Furthermore, I also describe and distinguish from the systematic approach three 
other relevant answers to the fundamental question within the scholarly literature: the 
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democratic approach, the legal approach, and the demiurgic approach.407 These 
approaches take as their generative concepts democracy, law, and demiurgy. All of them 
contain important insights and could even be described as correct to an extent. However, 
each of them also has special problems, and additionally none of them can account for the 
Laws in its complete and full specificity. Accordingly, after arguing for the shortcomings 
of each alternative approach, I show how the systematic approach is capable of 
appropriating to itself the advantages of each while also solving its problems. This is 
reflected in the series of system-pertinent concepts I elaborate which are parallel to 
democracy, law, and (concessionary) demiurgy – namely, popular involvement, culture, 
and creative demiurgy. 
 The democratic approach to the Laws locates its distinctive element in the more 
democratic way of proceeding which characterizes this dialogue in comparison with the 
Republic. To a substantial extent, the democratic approach is correct: the society of the 
Laws is more democratic than that of the Republic. However, I have argued that there are 
two problems with it. First, there are many non-democratic or anti-democratic aspects of 
the Laws which cannot be explained by the democratic approach; thus, it fails to provide 
an answer to the question in the desiderated sense (1.2.1). Second, it plots the two 
political dialogues along an inappropriate axis – namely, with regard to which material 
portion of the populace possesses political power rather than regard to whether the 
power-possessing part is also knowledge-possessing (1.2.1) The system-pertinent concept 
of “popular involvement” preserves – and even captures in a superior way – those 
                                                            
407 For comments on prominent individual authors within the secondary literature, see 1.2.4 and 1.4, in 
addition to the many other places in the main body of the dissertation where such comments appear. 
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elements of the Laws ostensibly captured by the democratic approach. In addition, many 
aspects of Magnesian life and society which are not well described as democratic can 
indeed be well-described with respect to popular involvement (1.3.2). To show this, I 
point to my subsequent analyses of social persuasion and social enforcement (5.3), as 
well my examination of the electoral process for the nomophylakeas as “intelligent” 
(2.3.4). 
 The legal approach identifies the distinctive aspect of the Laws as the rule of law. 
Again, this is substantially – if not comprehensively – correct. In addition, it is quite close 
to the systematic approach. Indeed, the legal approach is the direct ancestor of the 
systematic approach. However, the legal approach suffers from two flaws which the 
systematic approach escapes: (i) it cannot describe the aspects of the Laws which are 
more than, or different from, the legal; and (ii) it has an uneasy relationship with Plato’s 
frequent and emphatic critique of the law-form (1.2.2). The systematic approach, by 
contrast, incorporates the importance of legality, but also situates it within a concrete 
environment of fallible and social human beings. The system-pertinent concept of 
“culture” embraces more than purely legal ways of maintaining a sense of order and 
equilibrium with respect to this human field (1.3.3). In particular, I make this point in 
dealing with the thematization of the infra-legal (5.2.1) and the nocturnal council (7.8). 
 Finally, the demiurgic approach identifies the distinctive element of the Laws in 
its demiurgy – i.e., the resort to imperfect human materials in the manner of a demiurge. 
While of course it is true that the human material in the Laws is imperfect and that this 
affects the style of its use, the demiurgic approach does not succeed in answering the 
fundamental question, I argue, for three reasons: first, it cannot provide actual content for 
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such an account; second, it relies upon a mistaken interpretation of a key passage; and 
third, it misses the key characterizing detail of Plato’s demiurgy in the Laws, which turns 
on what I call the difference between concessionary and creative demiurgy (1.2.3). 
Concessionary demiurgy simply contains within its concept a regrettable departure from 
some standard of perfection which is necessary in virtue of the imperfect material 
available. However, creative demiurgy, which is the system-pertinent concept 
correspondent to its concessionary cousin, contains additionally within its concept the 
assessment of the particular strengths of the new, “imperfect” material (1.3.4). In support 
of this claim, I draw on my analyses of the function of the lot (3.2), the dense social 
interactivity of human beings for Plato (4.2.4, 5.2.2, 5.3), and the team functionality of 
the nocturnal council (6.8). 
 The above clarifies (i) the fundamental question this dissertation is intended to 
answer, (ii) the particular answer it gives (the systematic approach) with regard to its 
broad logical characteristics, and (iii) how this answer compares to, or improves upon, 
other answers. It remains for this conclusion to recapitulate the body of the dissertation. 
This consists in the three linked investigations spread out over six chapters. The first 
investigation, consisting of the first two chapters (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3), is devoted 
to the broad theme of Electoral Policy in the Laws; the second investigation, consisting of 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, is devoted to the broad theme of Cultural Policy in the Laws; 
and the third investigation, consisting of Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, is devoted to the 
broad theme of Intellectual Policy in the Laws (even though it only discusses one, albeit 
an important, part of this policy: the nocturnal council). In each of these investigations, I 
have sought (a) to shed light on material in the Laws which is intrinsically interesting in 
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its own right, (b) to make the case for the systematic approach by showing its explanatory 
“fit” in all relevant domains, and (c) to exhibit in situ the systematic approach in 
comparison with, and in preference to, other approaches like the democratic, legal, and 
demiurgic, as well as to show how the systematic approach harmonizes with, or departs 
from, the claims of various authors in the secondary literature. 
 To carry out these goals in relation to Electoral Policy in the Laws, I first make 
some preliminary distinctions and theoretical points regarding government and 
officialdom in the Laws in general (2.2). Key points from this section include the 
proximate priority of officials in comparison with the laws they enforce, the substantial 
influence of elected officials, and the characterization of the electoral process itself in 
terms of elector and candidate strategies. In the remainder of Chapter 2, I take the 
election of the nomophylakes as a test-case for the systematic approach (2.3).  I single out 
six aspects of this electoral process for extended analysis from a systematic point of view: 
(i) militarity (2.3.1), (ii) religiosity (2.3.2), (iii) the expanded ballot (2.3.3), (iv) intelligent 
process (2.3.4), (v) scene of instruction (2.3.5), (vi) and age restrictions (2.3.6). Militarity 
and religiosity characterize the overall electoral environment and culture, as Plato 
repeatedly makes clear. I argue that these things are in place in order to make Magnesian 
political culture resemble its military and religious culture. Based on an analysis of the 
latter two, I argue that, for Plato, electoral decisions made under their influence are likely 
to be viewed as superior decisions which help to mitigate the inherent insecurity of 
voting-contests (2.3.1, 2.3.2). The phrase “expanded ballot” refers to the atypical extent 
of information recorded on Magnesian ballots. I argue that this additional information 
forces electors to make use of it in ways which he finds beneficial for the electoral 
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process (2.3.3). The phrase “intelligent process” refers to ways in which electoral 
procedures combine and manipulate the inputs of electors in a way as to exhibit a greater 
intelligence than the providers of those inputs. Specifically, I define and instantiate forms 
of aggregative, oppositional, and iterative intelligence at work in the election for the 
nomophylakes (2.3.4). The phrase “scene of instruction” refers to the educative work 
(including both information and character-improvement) performed upon the electors 
who participate in electoral processes (2.3.5). Finally, I argue that the use of age-
restrictions exploits certain (for Plato) biological facts about human beings (2.3.6). 
 Next, in Chapter 3 I proceed to an examination of the election for the council-
members. Here I single out two additional aspects of electoral processes: (i) the schedule 
of incentives and (ii) the function of the lot. With regard to (i), I argue that Plato 
selectively permits and discourages electoral apathy in a way intended to yield the best 
possible electoral result (3.1). Likewise, with regard to (ii), I argue that Plato carefully 
combines voting by lot and the voting-contest in such a way as to make maximal use of 
the differing benefits of both. In particular, the use of the lot is necessary to promote civic 
friendship among the citizens (3.2). 
 Having exhibited the systematic approach in relation to the Electoral Policy of the 
Laws, I proceed to an examination of Cultural Policy in the Laws. Thus, in Chapter 4 I 
point to Plato’s designation of what I call “culture in the broad sense” – i.e., the ways in 
which large groups of people are subject to unpredictable waves of mutual influence – as 
a touchstone for philosophical concern (4.2). I situate this concern in relation to the logic 
of habituation in the Laws (4.2.2), the social field as a source of danger (4.2.4) and 
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positive feedback (4.2.5); and, in particular, I flesh it out through two important case-
studies of theatrical culture (4.2.7, 4.2.8). 
 In Chapter 5, by contrast, I present the set of counter-strategies at Plato’s 
disposal, including the careful use of “infra-legal” customs and practices (5.2.1), the 
institution of preferred patterns of social and cultural interaction among the citizens such 
as Magnesian memorial culture and contest culture (5.2.2), and the recourse made to 
citizens themselves to directly and publicly police one another and thereby arrest 
potential chains of bad influence (5.3). Finally, I discuss the particular social and cultural 
organization imposed on different regions of life such as fan culture (5.4.1), single-sex 
communal meals (5.4.2), and the religious culture of shrines and temples (5.4.3). In each 
case, the goal is to prevent any section of society from hiving off and developing a 
dynamic contrary to the needs of public life. 
 Next, under the heading of “Intellectual Policy in the Laws,” I inspect the 
institution of the nocturnal council in close relation to the evidence in the text which 
bears upon it. In addition to shedding light on this institution on its own right, I also want 
to integrate it within the systematic approach. Indeed, such a task is particularly salient in 
virtue of the institution’s ostensible inconsistency with this approach: after all, the council 
appears at first glance almost exactly like a cadre. However, I argue that the nocturnal 
council lacks the absolute power, knowledge, and surveillance of a Republic-style cadre 
and instead exemplifies the systematic approach. To show this, in Chapter 6 I present a 
comprehensive descriptive analysis of every aspect of the nocturnal council, including its 
textual beginnings (6.2), precise membership (6.3), the mentoring program (6.4), 
meeting-time (6.5), stated rationales for its existence (6.6), its complete list of activities 
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(6.7), the “style” of its operation (6.8), and finally its powers of government both 
explicitly (6.9) and implicitly attributed (6.10). The three chief passages relevant to the 
determination of this last element I call the “title claim,” “legal protectorate,” and “the 
grant.” 
In Chapter 7 I turn to the argument itself concerning the nocturnal council. First, 
I argue that the nocturnal council is certainly not at odds with the rest of the 
governmental apparatus of Magnesia (7.1). Next, I point to the status of its members as 
indirectly elected, contrasting this with the favored mode of ascent for the guardians of 
the Republic (7.2) and arguing that the mentorship program does not vitiate this 
difference (7.3). Subsequently, I precisely canvass and evaluate the explicitly attributed 
powers of the nocturnal council to the benefit of my general contention (7.4). In the 
succeeding three sections, I deal with various symbolic accouterments of the council, 
arguing that we should make too much of its “nocturnal” meeting-time (7.5), that the 
meaning of council here is decidedly deliberative rather than executive (7.6), and that the 
awarding of titles such as “guardian” as well as related expressions ought not to give us 
pause concerning the scope of the council’s powers (7.7). Finally, I give a unified 
account of the authority of the nocturnal council which is fully compatible with, and 
indeed a fulfillment of, the systematic approach (7.8.1) while also giving a detailed 
response to the three passages which seem to grant sweeping powers to the council – 
namely, the title claim (7.8.2), legal protectorate (7.8.3), and the grant (7.8.4). 
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